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ABSTRACT 
	
THREE ESSAYS ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA: SOCIAL, 
ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS 
 
SEPTEMBER 2016 
 
YING CHEN, B.A., SHANGHAI INTERNATIONAL STUDIES UNIVERSITY 
 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor David Kotz and Professor Robert Pollin 
 
 
The first essay focuses on the role of the hukou (i.e. Household Registration 
System) with full awareness of the economic system it operates under, and the 
development model it assists. I find that hukou’s main role in the planned economy was 
to assist socialist industrialization while averting the Lewis development model, a 
development strategy based on unlimited supply of labors from the rural sector, largely 
adopted in developing countries. In the market reform period, hukou performed exactly 
the opposite function, which is to assist the Lewis model based on the unlimited supply of 
rural surplus labor “released” from the rural de-collectivization. Based on these results, I 
argue that the interacting effects of the hukou and the economic system, rather than hukou 
alone, should be the analytical focus to address important development topics such as 
industrialization, urbanization, spatial and social inequality.  
The second essay compares the different agricultural investment patterns when 
agricultural credit is borrowed on a collective basis versus on an individual basis. I find 
that on the same income level, a one percent increase in the IC ratio (i.e. the ratio of loan 
made on individual base relative to on a collective base) leads to of a two percentage 
point decline on irrigation investment. On the other hand, a one percent increase in the IC 
ratio leads to about 10 percentage point increase in fertilizer use. Based on these results, I 
argue that the form of agricultural lending matters significantly in decisions regarding 
vii 
 
agricultural investments. Collective-based agricultural lending tends to be channeled to 
investment that contributes to more sustainable agricultural development yet with returns 
only in the intermediate or long run (such as irrigation).  
The third essay addresses the employment issue through estimating the relative 
employment impacts of renewable energy investments versus spending within the 
traditional fossil fuel sectors. I find that spending within three segments of the renewable 
energy sectors—solar, wind and bioenergy, will produce in combination about twice as 
many jobs per dollar of expenditure than an equal amount of spending on fossil fuels. I 
also find that, more than 70% of jobs from renewable energy sectors are created in the 
informal economy. Overall, the results of my estimates demonstrate that, for the case of 
China, the project of building a clean energy economy does not face the prospect of a 
massive obstacle in terms of negative employment effects.  
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 1 
CHAPTER 1 
THE HUKOU SYSTEM AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 In this paper, I examine the role of the Household Registration System (i.e. hukou), 
in both the planned economy period (1950s to late 1970s) and the market economy (early 
1980s to now) period in China. I show that the commonly held view that hukou is the 
reason for urban and rural inequality is not well-grounded in evidence. This view does not 
differentiate hukou’s effects that result within the context of alternative policy settings, i.e. 
the planned economy versus the market economy. Not differentiating hukou’s impacts 
under different interactions with other policies risks a misjudgment about the effect of the 
still ongoing hukou reform. For example, the official discourse is that the repeal of the 
hukou system will help alleviate urban and rural inequality. My study suggests that the 
reality is more nuanced when understanding hukou’s roles within the context of different 
economic systems.  
 The Hukou system refers to the household registration system that records the 
information of Chinese citizens with regard to their names, dates of birth, birth places, 
addresses, family members, and occupations. It was officially implemented nationwide in 
1958. The distinct feature of China’s hukou system is that different social policies are often 
associated with regard to the birthplaces and occupations registered in hukou. Despite 
several reforms, the hukou system has still been effective in controlling residents’ 
accessibility to resources, and therefore influences the labor mobility across provinces.  
 2 
 For example, compared to residents with local hukou (i.e. meaning they were born 
in a given province), policies are stricter to residents who want to purchase real estate 
properties in the places they are residing in but without local hukou (i.e. meaning that they 
were not born in this province). There will be limitations on the total number of apartments 
or houses that can be purchased by the residents without local hukou, or the number of 
years they have resided and paid taxes to the local government before they are qualified to 
make the purchase, although specific policies vary across different places. Constraints are 
also imposed on the children of the residents without local hukou, with regard to their 
access to primary education and high-school education services. These policies generate 
controversies especially when the more economically developed areas have promising real 
estate values as well as better educational resources. Occupation-wise, residents with 
agricultural hukou (i.e. nongye hukou) are entitled to the right to use land for agricultural 
purposes while those with non-agricultural hukou (i.e. fei nongye hukou) are not. In 2014, 
the distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural hukou was repealed. Now, like 
urban residents, rural residents can buy and sell the village land that was once entitled to 
their original agricultural hukou as they wish. This reform facilitates land concentration 
and the transfer of village land to outside developers and agribusiness companies (Andreas 
and Zhan 2015).  
 The hukou system is usually considered as an institutional basis for the broader 
rural-urban chasm (Cheng 1991; Chan, 1994; Knight and Song, 1999; Solinger, 1999; Yu 
2002; Alexander & A. Chan 2004; Wang 2005; Whyte, 2010; Qin 2013). This 
generalization of hukou’s function fails to take into account the economic system hukou 
operates under. In this essay, I examine the interacting effects of the hukou and different 
 3 
economic systems based on a review of historical policy documents, data on migration 
from rural to urban sectors, agricultural output and industrial output growth. I argue that 
hukou has different economic and social effects when operating under different economic 
systems. Under the planned economy, hukou’s main role was to assist socialist 
industrialization while averting the Lewis development model widely adopted in other 
developing countries. Under the market economy, hukou performed exactly the opposite 
function: to assist the Lewis development model based on the unlimited supply of rural 
surplus labor “released” from the rural decollectivization. The Lewis model is a 
development model that builds on the idea of unlimited supply of surplus labor from the 
rural sector (or non-capitalist, subsistence sector) to the urban sector (capitalist sector). The 
unlimited labor supply leads to the low wage and thus (assumed) high investment 
development path, until the exhaustion of the rural sector surplus labor, or “Lewis turning 
point”. At this point of exhaustion, wages of the urban sector will be forced to increase and 
the economy is then considered developed. 
 The essay will be organized as follows. In Section 2, I review the existing studies 
and show that they have largely missed the discussion about how hukou actually functions 
with the assistance of other policies implemented in different time periods. In Section 3, I 
examine some historical policy documents to study the origins of the modern hukou 
system. I show that hukou’s function of migration control was only made possible after the 
implementation of the Unified Procurement and Marketing of Grain grain policy. Section 
4 uses evidence to show how hukou assisted the planned economy to achieve a balanced 
growth of both industrial and agricultural sectors. Section 5 examines how hukou assists a 
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Lewis development model in the market economy, with the assistance of a series of policies 
preceding the hukou reform. Section 6 concludes the essay. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
 The existing studies on hukou have not addressed sufficiently the different 
functions that hukou played under the planned economy and market economy. Most 
scholars focus on the restrictions the system has imposed on rural-urban labor mobility, or 
the privileges that came with the urban hukou. Yet they tend to overlook the discussion 
about how these restrictions and privileges have implications on the overall economic 
development models. As a result, they are not able to recognize that some of the social 
impacts are not the results of hukou alone, but result from other policies that are specifically 
associated with the broader economic system. 
 A number of studies attribute the hukou system as the institutional base for the 
rural/urban chasm over the past 60 years (Cheng 1991; Chan, 1994; Knight and Song, 1999; 
Solinger, 1999; Yu 2002; Alexander & A. Chan 2004; Wang 2005; Whyte, 2010; Qin 
2013). Some compare it to the South African Apartheid system (Alexander & A. Chan 
2004; Qin 2013), because the hukou system has divided the population into two “castes.” 
They are the non-agricultural population that is economically and socially superior to the 
other “caste”—the agricultural population. These two distinct groups have vastly different 
opportunities, obligations and socio-economic status (Yu 2002; Chan& Zhang 1999). 
According to these studies, hukou-based discrimination is a kind of “birth-ascribed 
stratification” (Potter 1983). 
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 This is why studies focus on hukou’s role in restricting labor mobility from rural to 
urban sectors in the planned economy as it reinforces such birth-ascribed differences (Yu 
2002; Wang 2004). There are some exceptions though. For example, urban residents 
maintained ties with the countryside by hosting visiting relatives, and through visits home 
for the Chinese New Year (Brown 2012). Also, urban sector jobs are occasionally available 
to rural residents, with opportunities for rural residents to permanently settle down in the 
urban sector (Wu 1994).  
 When the restrictions on labor mobility were lifted in the market economy in the 
early 1980s, scholars shifted their focus to the urban privileges associated with the hukou 
system. Rural migrants now indeed had higher chances to take up jobs in the cities 
compared with in the planned economy experience, but a full conversion from rural 
residents to urban citizens remained difficult for ordinary peasants (Cai & Chan 2000). 
Usually, these chances were only open to the very wealthy who could afford to “purchase” 
urban hukou status, or, “the powerful, educated and talented, and needed manual laborers” 
(Wang 2004). 
 Going beyond hukou’s impact on ordinary residents, some studies view hukou as 
part of a larger economic and political system set up to serve multiple state interests 
(Chan& Zhang 1999; Wu and Treiman, 2004; Wang, 2005; Naughton 2007; Fan, 2008). 
For example, much of the existing literature recognized hukou’s important role in 
contributing to China’s development of heavy industry in the socialist era (Cheng 1991; 
Chan 1992; Lin et.al 1994; Mallee 1996; Cai& Chan 2000; Chan 2009). At the same time, 
many considered this strategy detrimental to the development of both the urban and rural 
sectors (Ka& Seldon 1986; Yu 2002). Specifically, Ka & Selden (1986) argued that hukou 
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assisted China’s socialist industrialization through restricting rural-urban labor mobility, 
and therefore depressing income and consumption levels so as to help transfer agricultural 
surplus to strategic industries. They further argued that this development strategy is no 
more pro-rural than the urban-biased capitalist industrialization in Taiwan because of the 
intentional repression on income and consumption in the rural sector (p1296). Yu (2002) 
argued that both sectors were worse off during the socialist era because the productivity of 
the urban sector workers was hampered due to the lack of competition from the rural 
surplus labor. 
 The early studies rarely engage the discussion of hukou policy with urbanization 
issues. However, this topic was picked up recently by Chinese scholars in the context of 
debates regarding rural land privatization. Chan (1992) highlighted the deliberate under-
urbanization rate relative to the high industrialization speed in the planned economy period 
and suggested that the reverse, over-urbanization, is happening in the market economy 
period.1 This over-urbanization issue is especially severe when the public infrastructure 
(i.e. transportation) proved to be insufficient to meet the demand by surging migrant 
workers who need to travel back to the rural sector for the Chinese New Year. Regarding 
these migration issues, Chan (2001, 2009) argued that the root cause was hukou’s 
restrictions on the permanent stay of rural residents in the urban sector. He thus proposed 
that the permanent settle-down of rural-urban migrants will be possible as long as the hukou 
restriction is lifted, and these migrants are also guaranteed access to education facilities 
and housings in the urban sector. Others disagree with the argument, suggesting that the 
																																																						
1 According to Chan (1992), This unique “anti-urban” policies including “a tight control of rural-urban 
labor and population mobility, fuller utilization of the existing urban working-age population, suppression 
of the expansion of urban service employment and personal consumption in general, promotion of rural 
industrialization and increased use of urban ‘temporary’ workers”. 
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ownership of land is the key reason why there is no massive permanent migration from 
rural to urban area (Wen 2007, Qin 2013). 
 The problems with these analyses are that these economic and social impacts that 
were attributed to hukou were actually the results of the interaction between hukou and 
other policies. To incorrectly identify hukou as the only cause for these impacts is running 
the risk of false evaluation of the effect of repealing the hukou system as is discussed in 
the context of urbanization debate. This confusion of hukou’s function is partly why the 
existing literature has been ambivalent towards the future of the hukou system. Some argue 
that hukou is playing a critical role in China’s current export-oriented development model. 
The repeal of the system will deteriorate the welfare services accessible to urban citizens 
and cause social tensions (Huang 2001; Yu 2002; Li 2012); Others think an urgent reform 
of hukou is needed, if China wants to push for further economic reform and to become “a 
modern, first-world nation and global leader” (Chan 2009; Qin 2013; Zhang 2013).  
 Overall, despite many insights on hukou’s role in both the planned economy and 
market economy periods in China, the existing studies fail to separate hukou’s social 
impacts from those caused by the changes in the economic systems. For the few studies 
that paid attention to such structural change, the evidence on which they relied is not 
updated. This essay focuses on the function of the hukou with full awareness of the 
economic system it operates under and the development model it assists.  
 
1.3 Origin of the Hukou System  
 Hukou is associated with three levels of functions. They are the functions of 1) 
civilian registration; 2) migration control; and 3) employment regulation. Each function 
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needs the other two function(s) as its basis. By reviewing several policies preceding the 
official implementation of hukou system in 1958, I argue that hukou’s function goes 
beyond civilian registration and migration control as the existing studies often claim. Its 
main function was to assist with the urban full employment goal through regulating internal 
migration according to economic planning. Moreover, the alleged migration control 
function of hukou was actually achieved through the overlooked Unified Procurement and 
Marketing of Grain (UPMG) policy adopted in 1953. Hukou only played a secondary role 
to the UPMG policy regarding regulating migration. 
 The existing studies trace Hukou system back to the baojia system in the Song 
dynasty of the 11th century (Cheng& Selden 1994). The baojia system was a military 
management structure imposed on civilians for security reasons. The basic structure is as 
follows: Ten households made up one pai (row), ten pai constituted one jia (tithing), and 
every ten jia formed a bao (watch). If there is crime committed by one family in a pai, it 
would result in punishment for all ten families in that pai. This management structure had 
been revised over time, and was continuously revived under the Chiang Kaisheck 
government in 1912 and under the Japanese occupation in 1933, in order to to monitor and 
control Chinese civilians. 
 Such association of the hukou system with the baojia system suggests a focus on 
the civilian registration function of hukou as its basic function. Indeed, policies for civilian 
registration, migration and employment were initially separate in the history of the People’s 
Republic of China. But then as early as in year 1953, these policies for different purposes 
started to become interacted. The result, though, was not very satisfactory. 
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 The policy for civilian registration was implemented first. In 1951, the Ministry of 
Public Security, with State Council Approval, issued a Temporary Regulation Governing 
the Urban Population.2 The main idea of the regulation was to launch a registration system 
for the urban population only. Urban households were divided into six categories including 
residential households, industrial and commercial households, public residents (i.e. those 
living in hotels, inns etc.), floating household (i.e. those living in boats and ships), temple 
households, and aliens (i.e. residents of foreign countries of origin). Those who intended 
to move out of the cities had to report to the local public security and apply for a change-
of-residence permit. Then they are required to submit this permit to the new residence 
within three days of arrival. 3  Meanwhile, their census record regarding the former 
residence would be canceled. Under this household registration system, urban residents 
enjoyed free mobility to a great extent, according to Cheng & Selden (1994, 649). As a 
matter of fact, anyone who intended to apply for a permit to move out of the original 
residence could obtain it and then register anywhere, including in Beijing and Shanghai. 
 Then came the employment policies. In 1952, three years after the establishment of 
People’s Republic of China, the State Council announced a “Decision on Labor 
Employment Problems” to address urban unemployment and the “blind” influx from the 
rural sector into the cities.4  
																																																						
2 Temporary Regulation Governing the Urban Population, or Chengshi hukou guanli zanxing tiaoli, issued 
on 16 July, 1951; published online at http://www.rmlt.com.cn/2014/0731/300526.shtml, and retrieved on 
Jan 16th, 2016. 
3 See Article 5 of the Temporary Regulation Governing the Urban Population. 
4 On 6 August 1952, the State Council issued “Decision on Labor Employment Problems”, or Guanyu jiuye 
wenti de jueding. See Chinese version of the Decision, online at  
http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/1200/23051/23052/23055/2006/3/zh97916371113600240-0.htm, 
retrieved on Jan 16th, 2016 
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 For the urban sector, the goal was to achieve full employment. Urban 
unemployment has always been a challenge to the Chinese Communist government since 
it took power in 1949 from the Kuomingtang government. The Chinese government 
recognized that, in the war recovery period, unemployment is inevitable but only 
temporary.5 Such inevitability is due to the fact that a significant number of people whose 
expertise and skills acquired in the previous economic system (i.e. capitalist system) cannot 
find appropriate positions in the current socialist system. These people include, for example, 
those who previously work for unproductive industries (i.e., luxury consumption and 
entertainment industries for landlords and former elite class); some intellectuals and former 
Kuomingtang cadres without special skills to join work; and women who previously were 
not allowed to work outside home but now wanted to work. All these situations contributed 
to a massive unemployed population with the urban unemployment rate as high as 23.6% 
in 1949.6 
 The Chinese government’s strategy to full employment was to provide training to 
unskilled workers so that they can adjust to structural changes in the industries. The 
government also required that enterprises could not lay off workers at will. For example, 
Article 1 of the document stated that during the industrial restructuring period, those who 
were temporarily unemployed should not only be paid as employed but also receive 
training so that they will be prepared for new positions in the upgraded industries. Article 
1 suggested that, in principle, labor should follow capital when capital needs to transfer to 
other industries. However, any lay-offs would require going through various legal 
																																																						
5 Ibid. 
6 Report on the 60 Years of People’s Republic of China: the Development of multi-way Employment 
Structure (Xinzhongguo 60 zhounian xilie baogao: duofangshi jiuye geju xingcheng), at 
http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2009-09/14/content_1416987.htm, retrieved on July 12, 2016. 
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processes including application to unions and the Labor Department before the enterprise 
can legally lay off the worker. As was highlighted in the document itself, the nature of 
unemployment is different in the socialist system versus in the capitalist system. This 
strategy to reduce unemployment and the ultimate goal for full employment are indeed 
distinguished from the political necessity of maintaining a pool of reserve army under the 
capitalist economy.7 
 This strategy worked successfully. In the beginning of the 1952 document, the 
Chinese government proudly announced the achievement it had made in dealing with 
massive unemployment as a left-over problem from China’s colonialism period and the 
Kuomingtang period. Specifically, 1.2 million unemployed workers went back to work by 
December 1951, including 0.6 million in the state mining industry. Another 1 million 
previously unemployed intellectuals began new employment opportunities after some 
training offered by the state.  
 A different strategy was used to solve rural unemployment because of its different 
nature compared with urban unemployment. For the rural sector, the solution for surplus 
labor was to cultivate wasteland so that more arable land is made available for rural 
residents to cultivate. The 1952 document provided the reasoning behind the different 
strategies in both sectors. The crucial difference between urban and rural surplus labor was 
that urban surplus labor depended on the rural sector to provide food, while the rural surplus 
labors “have land to cultivate and have food to eat.”8 The key contradiction between the 
surging demand for food production and the existence of rural surplus labor lies in the 
																																																						
7 Michael Kalecki 1942, Political Aspects of Full Employment, retrieved online at 
http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2010/kalecki220510.html, on Jan 16th, 2016. 
8 Article 4 of the 1952 Decision on Labor Employment Problems. 
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problem of “insufficient amount of arable land”, and therefore the surplus labor force in 
the rural sector should be directed for more food production in the previously uncultivated 
land. Based on this analysis, the state encouraged that the rural surplus labor pool cultivate 
the previously wasteland through irrigation building and other cultivation technologies. 
They were also encouraged to migrate to North-East, North-West and South-West to 
reclaim the wasteland while not “damaging the water and land condition, and without 
disturbing the development of animal husbandry”.9 
 Clearly, this grand plan for mobilizing rural surplus labor requires a strong control 
of labor mobility both within sectors and across rural and urban sectors, as well as a 
carefully-designed long-run plan. Yet, its enforcement was completely based on persuasion. 
So is the other Directive issued in 1953.10 The outcome is quite satisfactory (see Table 1.1). 
In 1953, the net rural-urban migration rate is 2.7%, dropping almost half from the previous 
year’s migration rate of 4.6%. 
 Yet a 2.7% migration rate still leads to a sizable migration population. To strengthen 
the previous policies that relied on persuasion only, Shanghai and other major cities started 
to issue a more detailed Household Registration Book (huji bu) for civilian registration. 
The Household Registration Books required the recording of birth, death, residence, 
education and occupation of every household member, very much like the categories of 
information required by the later hukou system.  
																																																						
9 Ibid. 
10 On 17 April 1953, the State Council promulgated a “Directive on Dissuading Peasants from Blind Influx 
into Cities”, or Quanzhi nongmin mangmu liuru chengshi de zhishi. The directive, using persuasive 
language, urged the hundreds of thousands of peasants who had entered the cities in search of work to 
return to their villages, exempting those who had already obtained employment and had government or 
factory papers to prove it. 
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 But it was really after the implementation of the “Unified Procurement and 
Marketing of Grain” policy (UPMG) that migration control finally became effective.11 In 
1953, the UPMG policy, or Tonggou Tongxiao policy was initiated to prevent grain 
speculation and to stabilize the grain price. According to this policy, the state purchased 
specified amounts of grain from the rural sector and rationed the food to urban residents 
based on their recorded information on the household registration books. By diminishing 
the possibility for speculative activities on grains, the goal of grain price stabilization was 
effectively achieved very soon (Cheng and Selden 1994). At the same time, the UPMG 
policy also made rural-urban mobility more difficult. This is because as food is strictly 
rationed to every citizen according to their registration record, rural people can no longer 
purchase food in urban areas as much as they want. Rural people could still stay in the 
urban sector temporarily either with food which they had brought to the cities, provided by 
urban relatives, or they could exchange some grain for grain tickets usable in the city. Yet 
the stay would not last long.12  
 Although migration control was often associated with hukou, the UMPG policy was 
the de facto policy that made migration control possible through food rationing. When 
migration control became effective, policies for employment regulation started to be 
effectively implemented as well. As a matter of fact, policies for civilian control and 
employment regulation started to be explicitly combined. 
 In 1954, a “recruitment quota” mechanism was introduced so that the urban labor 
department could use it to hire rural workers based on economic planning (Cheng & Selden, 
																																																						
11 On 19 November 1953, State Council passed “Regulation on Planned Procurement and Planned Supply 
of Grain”. See Chinese version at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-12/22/content_2367996.htm 
12 Peasants may use grain to exchange for traveling-place local grain tickets or Grain ticket for nation-wide 
use according to Article 13 in Tonggou Tongxiao Policy, but it would only be a temporary solution for 
those who are not recorded as residing in urban areas in the household registration books.  
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1994). These transitions of jobs required a transfer from an agricultural to non-agricultural 
hukou. According to the state plan, the urban labor department made the recruitment 
decision. Yet instead of directly recruiting rural workers, the urban units need to notify the 
relevant county and township governments, who would then allocate recruitment quotas to 
villages for local cadres to make the selection of rural workers. This policy was 
implemented during the process of massive nationalization and collectivization of 
agriculture, industry, handicrafts and commerce. Some studies use the analogy of the 
conversion process with permanent residence in the US immigration system to show how 
difficult it was for a Chinese rural resident to convert from an agricultural hukou to a non-
agricultural hukou in the planned economy, when immigrants should both fill the 
requirement and do not exceed the quota of a particular year (Chan 2004). The use of the 
term “recruitment quota” suggests an embrace of rural-urban migration control as part of 
the employment regulation under the planned economy.  
 In 1955, the registration requirement was extended to the rural sector as well. The 
State Council passed “The Directive Concerning Establishment of a Permanent System of 
Household Registration”. This required the recording of birth, death, internal migration and 
immigration information for cities, towns and villages. This Directive could be considered 
as the antecedent of the 1958 Hukou system.13  
 Two months later, the State Council passed “Provisional Measures Governing 
Grain-rationing in Cities and Towns,” which formally established the food rationing 
system in detail. For example, Article 4 differentiated seven categories of grain cards 
																																																						
13 On 22 June 1955, State Council passed “The Directive Concerning Establishment of a Permanent System 
of Household Registration”, or Guanyu Jianli Jingchang Hukou Dengji Zhidu de Zhishi. This document 
can be accessed at http://knews.shaanxi.gov.cn/zxfw/www1.shaanxi.gov.cn/bszn/xxxx_p.asp-no1=737.htm, 
retrieved on Jan 17th, 2016. 
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regarding residence, occupation and grade, as well as three grain tickets based on the range 
of its applicability.14 All citizens needed to bring their Household Registration Book to the 
local government to receive grain tickets and cards. By this point, the migration control of 
UPMG policy had been strengthened, and the association of migration control with 
household registration had become clearer. At the same time, the state managed to largely 
eliminate private home ownership from 1953 to 1956. Migrants could not obtain housing 
in the urban sector without obtaining official approval. Even hotels or inns required travel 
documents issued by work units or local governments (Cheng and Selden 1994, 657). 
Therefore, another barrier was imposed for any unsolicited migration in terms of housing 
by 1956. 
 In 1958, the hukou system was officially launched.15 Every household in cities and 
towns was required to have a Household Registration Book issued by a local public security 
organ. In rural areas, Household Registration Book was issued at the unit of collectives. 
Compared with all of its previous versions that had been advanced for almost a decade, the 
1958 Regulations was more specific and stricter, and set up instructions for the registration 
process. For example, for rural to urban migration, one has to obtain a “move-in permit” 
first issued by an urban department (i.e. either the urban labor department or urban school 
enrollment certificate, etc), in order to apply for a “move-out permit” from one’s original 
																																																						
14 On 5 August 1955, State Council passed “Provisional Measures Governing Grain-rationing in Cities and 
Towns”, or Shizheng Liangshi Dingliang Gongying Zanxing Banfa. The seven kinds of grain cards include 
city and town resident grain-supply card; Industrial and commercial trade grain-supply card; City and town 
animal feed-supply card and City and town resident grain-transfer card. The three tickets include Grain 
ticket for nation-wide use; Local area grain ticket and Local area animal-feed ticket.The document can be 
accessed at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-12/28/content_2388644.htm, retrieved on Jan 17th, 
2016.  
15 1958 Jan 9, the Standing Committee of the NPC promulgated “Regulations on Household Registration in 
the PRC”, or Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hukou Dengji Tiaoli. The Chinese version of this document 
can be accessed at: http://www.jincao.com/fa/04/law04.55.htm, retrieved on Jan 17th, 2016. 
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residential place.16 This policy suggests that only those who were admitted either to work 
or study in the urban sector were allowed to migrate.  
  By now, hukou’s three levels of functions including civilian control, migration 
control, and employment regulation were realized one by one through a series of policies 
starting as early as 1955. The civilian control function of hukou was not new and could be 
traced back to as early as the 11th century. Yet the effective migration control and 
employment regulations were the key distinction of the hukou system since its official 
implementation in 1958. This distinctive feature of the hukou system was established 
within the broader economic planning system under which it was operating. These latter 
two functions cannot be achieved without the assistance of other policies that are also 
contributing to organizing production and distribution in the planned economy, especially 
the food rationing policy UMPG.  
  
1.4 Hukou’s role in the planned economy 
Once the hukou system was established in 1958, its three functions (i.e. civilian 
registration, migration control and employment regulation) started to take effect. 
Contrary to a common misunderstanding, hukou's priority during the planned economy 
period was not migration control but to assist the socialist industrialization process. In 
fact, rural-urban migration reached its peak several months after the official 
implementation of the hukou system in 1958. This is to say that whenever the urban 
industrial sector needed more workers, hukou policy adjusted accordingly to meet 
industrial needs. In this section I present both the theoretical argument and empirical 
																																																						
16 See Article 10 of the “Regulations on Household Registration in the PRC”. 
 17 
evidence to show how hukou assists socialist industrialization through maintaining 
balanced growth in both the industrial and agricultural sectors.  
 
1.4.1 Rural-Urban Migration Rate 
 Hukou’s migration regulation function played only a secondary role relative to its 
purpose in supporting industrialization. Figure 1.1 shows the net rural-urban migration rate 
from 1949 to 1990 based on the “residual method” developed in Wu (1994). The net rural-
urban migration rate was calculated as a “residual” by subtracting the annual natural 
increase (n) from the annual total increase (g) in urban population. The assumption here is 
that the rate of increase in the urban population beyond the natural rate of increase birth 
population in the urban population is due to migration rural to urban areas.17  
 As we can see, the greatest rise in migration during the planned economy period 
occurred in 1958 and 1962 respectively. The year 1958 witnessed the largest rural to urban 
migration with the net rural-urban migration rate as high as 22.1%. The year 1962 
experienced the largest urban to rural migration with the net migration rate as -10.1%. The 
massive rural to urban migration in 1958 corresponded with the Great Leap Forward, while 
the massive urban to rural migration in 1962 corresponded with the youth rustication 
campaign, in which young people were sent to the countryside to learn from the peasants. 
																																																						
17 Note that this methodology uses the Urban Non-Agricultural Population instead of the Official Total 
Urban Population in the Statistical Yearbook due to the several revisions that the official statistical 
definition of urban population has gone through. These revisions have rendered the concept of “urban 
citizens” more and more loosely defined. For example, a 1982 revision defined urban population as 
including “all persons who had lived for one year or more, and those who had resided less than one year but 
had been absent from their place of hukou registration for one year or more, within the official boundary of 
a city/town” (Wu 1994, 678). This revision led to a sudden increase of 60 million of urban population in 
1982 from 1981, while a consistent measure suggests only 4 million increase in urban population. See more 
detailed methodological discussion in Wu (1994), pp 682-84. 
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 The peak of rural to urban migration (22.1%) occurred in 1958, which was exactly 
the year when the Chinese government officially launched the hukou system nationwide. 
The regulation was announced in January of 1958 together with the full implementation of 
the Tongue Tongxiao policy that imposes food rationing on the urban sector. Therefore, 
theoretically speaking, we should expect to see rural-urban migration as being moderate 
starting with 1958. However, in autumn 1958, 38 million people were reported to be 
mobilized to leave their villages to join iron and steel production projects in the cities, in 
response to the explosion of urban industrial and construction jobs (Cheng and Selden 
1994). Just within three years (1958-1960), the urban population as a share of the national 
population rose from 15 to 20 percent (Ibid, 664). Obviously, the hukou system that was 
established in that year was not being strictly enforced. As the General Manager of the 
Huhhot Iron and Steel Mill said, this was a year of “jobs scrambling for people. As long as 
you could read and write and had good health, you qualified for employment in any factory. 
Mangliu (Blind Influx) were also welcome. No migration certificate was required” (Cheng 
and Seldon 1995). 
 Clearly, the top priority of state at this time was not to control migration from the 
rural sector to the urban sector, but socialist industrialization in the urban sector. When 
things get in the way, even the newly established hukou system could become just a 
formality. Hukou, as a tool under the planned economy was adjusted and loosened so as to 
encourage, rather than restrict, migration based on the needs of production. However, this 
wave of uncontrolled migration left an insufficient supply of workers to cultivate the land. 
This is one of the key factors that contribute to the notorious Great Famine. The detrimental 
effect from uncontrolled migration further proved the importance of migration control 
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especially under the specific context in China. That context was the economy with 
agriculture still being labor-intensive and with urban sector solely dependent on the 
agricultural sector for food provision. 
 
1.4.2 Two types of development models 
 The key feature of the development model in the planned economy is its aim to 
achieve a balanced growth between the industrial and agricultural sectors. The growth is 
balanced in the sense that the industrial sector development does not come at the cost of 
squeezing agricultural development. Socialist industrialization was the goal of New China. 
To achieve that goal, the industrial sector needed food subsistence produced by the 
agricultural sector. It also needed rural workers to join the urban working class but not too 
many to threaten sufficient production of food to feed the entire population. The industrial 
sector also needed the rural population to consume their industrial production. In order for 
the rural sector to play these three roles (i.e., food provision, labor supply and industrial 
goods consumption), a population balance must be maintained between the urban and rural 
sectors for a long-run sustainable development trajectory. 
 From a static point of view, hukou under the planned economy did prevent peasants 
from entering the urban areas at will. But in a dynamic view, a planned and control 
migration for now would be necessary for a massive migration in the future. How can more 
peasants join the urban labor forces without affecting agricultural output levels? A 
prerequisite is a massive mechanization of the agricultural sector so that rural laborers can 
be “freed” to support industrial production in the urban sector. At the same time, the 
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mechanization of the rural sector needs the assistance from the industrial sector. Therefore, 
again, a balanced population between the two sectors is necessary to guarantee good 
performances of both sectors. 
 A typical development model is one that concentrates on industrialization by 
attracting labor from the rural sector. The natural outcome of such a development strategy 
is that the stronger, and the more educated people chose to move to the urban sector, leaving 
the agricultural sector diminished. This development strategy is strongly unbalanced 
between the urban and the rural sectors. It has been used in many other developing 
countries, and is succinctly summarized in the Lewis model.  
 According to Lewis, due to an overpopulated rural sector relative to the available 
natural resources (i.e. arable land), the marginal productivity of rural labor is zero or even 
negative. Meanwhile, the urban sector exhibits relatively higher productivity, thus offering 
relatively higher wages, and that would attract an “unlimited supply” of rural surplus labor 
at this subsistence wage. As more and more rural laborers leave the village to the urban 
sector, those who are staying in village will have a larger share of food supply at a given 
output level. This is supposed to be a positive outcome for the rural residents. Meanwhile, 
capitalists (i.e. employers in the urban sector) started to accumulate profits by paying 
workers only the subsistence wage at the initial stage of capitalist development. The profit 
they earned translates into investment which drives the economy. This accumulation period 
ends when the unlimited supply of labor (from the rural sector and foreign immigration) is 
exhausted and capitalists have to start paying wages higher than the subsistence level. 
When the overall wage level in the urban sector is lifted up, the country is considered 
developed. 
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 However, the Lewis model overlooked an alternative solution to rural surplus labor 
in the rural sector. That is to cultivate more arable land. Studies show that during the 
collective years, labor mobilization was high for building productive infrastructure (i.e. 
irrigation works, land reclamation, afforestation) and thus rural surplus workers are rare 
(Patnaik and Natrajan 2000). With the assumption that the only way to solve rural surplus 
labor problem was to move to the urban sector to look for jobs, the outcome with the Lewis 
development strategy is a squeezed and diminished rural sector. 
 A diminishing agricultural sector has problems in the Chinese context. First, 
population density in China is very high. On average, for every square kilometer of land 
area in China, there are 145 inhabitants as of today. For the urban sector, this number could 
go even higher, such as 1525 for Beijing and 3826 for Shanghai.18 This number is very 
high compared with only 35 for the United States for example and 49 for the world average. 
An unattractive agricultural sector will lead to an even higher population density in the 
urban sector, posing problems for accessing resources such as health care, housing, and 
education (Zhang and Kanbur 2005). Second, without advanced technology, the agriculture 
sector is completely dependent on physical labor. This way a shortage of rural labors will 
lead to a drop in agricultural production and pose severe food security issues such as the 
Great Famine. 
 
																																																						
18 Average population density data for China and United States is from World Bank. Urban sector data is 
extracted from the Statistics Portal for year 2014, at http://www.statista.com/statistics/279040/population-
density-in-urban-areas-of-china-by-region/. World average population density is from United States Census 
Bureau at http://www.census.gov/popclock/. 
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1.4.3 Empirical evidence regarding balanced growth model 
 The key feature of a socialist industrialization in China is that the agricultural sector 
is not being sacrificed in order for the development in the urban sector. The mechanism to 
achieve a relatively balanced growth of both the industrial and agricultural sector is as 
follows: To generate surplus labor from the rural sector without actually harming the 
agricultural production, there must be a massive rural mechanization and infrastructure 
building that significantly raise agricultural productivity. This rise in agricultural 
productivity allows labors to be freed from agricultural-related work while guaranteeing 
sufficient agricultural production to feed both urban and rural population. When these 
surplus rural laborers transition to the industrial sector to work, we expect a high growth 
rate occurring in the industrial sector, which would in turn assist further mechanization of 
the rural sector.  
 Table 1.1 shows the growth rates of total industrial output, total agricultural output, 
and total power of rural machinery extracted from China Statistics Yearbook 2012, with 
references to the net rural-migration rate calculated by Wu (1994).19 The data cover the 
years 1950 to 1980. The second column shows the growth rate of total industrial output. 
The third column shows the growth rate of total agricultural output. Both growth rates are 
calculated based on information on industrial output and agricultural output measured in 
value (RMB). The fourth and fifth columns present data on the growth rate of rural 
mechanization, where the rural mechanization was measured by the total power of 
agricultural machinery (kilowatt). Note that the fourth column presents the growth rates 
based on the original data available. For example, the growth rate of 559.8% for year 1957 
																																																						
19 The methodology is explained in details in Section 4.1. 
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suggests that the rural mechanization in 1957 is a roughly 6-fold increase compared to year 
1952, the previous year in which data on the total power of agricultural machinery was 
available. The fifth column presents the compound annual growth rate based on 
information in the left sub-column. The last column shows the net rural-urban migration 
rate as discussed in Section 4.1. 
 As we can see, the first major rural-urban migration occurred in 1958 (with 22.1% 
rural-urban migration rate), after more than 5-fold increases in total power of agricultural 
machinery in 1957 relative to year 1952. As one of the achievements of the First Five Year 
Plan (1953-1957), the significant improvement in agricultural machinery provides the basis 
for rural mechanization which contributed to the release of rural laborers from the 
agricultural sector. Such release of rural laborers sets a foundation for the historically 
massive migration out of the rural and into urban sector in the following year. In this sense, 
the Great Leap Forward is by no means some random thoughts of some particular policy 
makers according to the social discourse as of today, but has its objective and material 
base.20  
 The year 1959 and 1960 witnessed a significant decline in agricultural growth (-
13.9% and -11.2%), corresponding to a lower level (but still positive) net migration rate 
(1.9% and 4.1%). From these data, we see that the massive influx of rural labor for the sake 
of Great Leap Forward mainly occurred in the year of 1958 on the basis of significant 
improvement in agricultural machinery. However, the goal of industry growth was set 
higher and higher and eventually went beyond what the real agricultural basis could support 
																																																						
20 The same year also witnessed the highest industrial growth rate of 52.95%. Although this statistic could 
be overstated, we could infer that the industrialization process went smooth and shows very optimistic 
prospect. 
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in terms of both labor availability and crop production. Then the natural disaster came as 
the last straw to the agricultural sector. The first significant decline in agricultural sector in 
1959 corresponds with 30% industrial growth. This positive but relatively moderate growth 
rate can be interpreted as the interaction between both a lagged but positive effect from 
1958’s fast growth (53%), and a negative impact on industrial sector due to the shock in 
the agricultural sector (-13.9%). The sudden drop in net migration (from 22.1% in 1958 to 
1.86% in 1959), suggests that rural workers stopped migrating to the urban sector, and that 
many temporary migrant urban workers went back to their previous residence in 1958. The 
same pattern is also shown by the 1960 data, with industrial growth becoming even slower 
but still positive (5.5%) and a continuing decline in agriculture (-11.2%). This pattern 
suggests that under the planned economy, industrial growth depends on agricultural 
growth, in terms of both subsistence and labor provision.  
 From 1961 to 1964, the migration rate was persistently negative (with the highest 
level of -10.1% in 1962), corresponding to the strict implementation of the hukou policy in 
1960-1962 and a rural exile of 20 million workers discussed above (Cheng and Selden 
1995). With more rural labor force returning to work on the farm, the agricultural sector 
started to recover in 1961 (29.5%) and continued the steady growth until the 1975. The 
industrial sector took two more years (1963) to recover (12.4%) from the previous two 
years of negative growth. The two years lag in the industrial sector again justified the 
importance of agricultural accumulation in the socialist industrialization. 
 The relatively stable and high level of agricultural growth from 9.8% in 1963 to 
16.5% in 1965 corresponds with the industrial growth rate averaging around 20% from 
1963 to 1966. The corresponding migration rate is relatively stable but very moderate from 
 25 
1963 to 1967 (within a positive and negative 3% range). This is partly due to the strict 
control of migration implemented through the hukou system, and also partly because the 
increasing productivity in the urban sector. As such, the labor requirement for the same 
level of output is lower compared with previous years. 
 The start of Cultural Revolution in 1967 corresponded with a relatively lower but 
still positive agricultural growth (with an average agricultural output growth rate of 3.7%) 
rate until 1975. Echoing Mao’s call for “Reeducation of the Intellectual Youth”, 
institutionalized the youth rustication is reflected by the negative net migration in the years 
of 1968-1970. The migration rate then turned positive and remained so after, suggesting 
that the youth rustication program was not sustained at a rapid rate. The industrial sector 
was affected in the year 1967 (-15.99%) and 1968 (-10.02%), but as the youth were 
rusticated and the urban unemployment pressure was relieved, industrial sector’s growth 
rate remained positive (with highest level 32.26% in 1970) until 1975. 
 The rural-urban net migration rate started to surge after the Cultural Revolution, 
rising to 6.1% in 1979, corresponding to the return of the rusticated youth. The second peak 
of migration rate occurred in 1984, corresponding with the repeal of Unified Procurement 
and Marketing of Grain policy in 1985 and its pilot program of “temporary residence 
certificate” in large cities (i.e. Hubei) in 1984.  
Overall, most data conform to a pattern that suggests that agricultural growth 
usually predicts an industrial growth in the following 1-2 years during the planned 
economy period, and net migration rate adjusts according to both agricultural and 
industrial growth.21 When the agricultural sector shows steady growth, positive net 
																																																						
21 Exceptions also exist. So a definitive conclusion of the logic loop stated in this essay needs a formal 
model and econometric analysis which I aim to examine in further research. 
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migration occurred (i.e. year 1958) and contributed to fast industrial growth. But when 
agricultural growth started to decline, net migration rate soon turned negative to adjust to 
the rural need (i.e. year 1962). The institutional migration from rural to urban sector (or 
with reverse direction) was used to adjust to the balanced growth for both the rural and 
urban sectors. 
 
1.5 Hukou reform within the market economy 
 Contrary to the view that was commonly held, it is not hukou’s reform per se that 
lifted the restriction on rural to urban migration. Hukou’s reform was preceded by a series 
of policy changes that made available a massive pool of rural surplus laborers on the one 
hand, and that created a much more flexible labor market in the urban sector compared 
with that in the planned economy. Hukou was only adjusted so that it can work with other 
reform policies that allow flexible migration for a new market-economy-based 
development model.     
 
1.5.1 Preconditions for the hukou reform 
 In a chronicle view, the series of policies that have been implemented presented the 
inner logic of how the state managed to push massive rural labor force to migrate to urban 
areas. It was achieved through rural decollectivization first (through the 1982 rural 
Responsibility System and the 1984 Household Responsibility System in 1984). The 
decollectivization disciplined these rural migrants to be prepared as the de facto urban labor 
force (through 1982 Custody and Repatriation policy). Then the state reduced the 
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bargaining power of urban workers with the prepared reserve army of rural migrants 
through the 1984 Decision on Economic reform and the 1986 Labor Contract System). 
 
1.5.1.1 1982 Agricultural Production System and 1984 Household Responsibility 
System 
 In 1982, the state issued the Meeting Minutes of National Agricultural 
Development, in which it praised the achievements after implementing the Agricultural 
Production Responsibility System in the rural sector since the 1978 Third Plenum of the 
Eleventh National Party Congress.22 The Agricultural Production Responsibility System 
(APRS) has a wider meaning than the later and better known Household Responsibility 
System (HRS). Under APRS, all types of agricultural work are contracted to individual 
commune members or individual households. These include work on different types of 
land, work under different seasons, or detailed work such as fertilizing, spraying pesticides, 
dry grains, etc. The compensation is either predetermined by the type of work or associated 
with output when output is measurable.23 
 These various contracting formats were experimented within the production 
brigades as supplementary production to collective agricultural production since the start 
of the reform. The 1982 document emphasized that more than 90% of the brigades adopted 
																																																						
22 On Jan 1st 1982, the state issued Meeting Minutes of National Agricultural Development, or Quanguo 
Nongcun Gongzuo Huiyi Jiyao. See Chinese version at: 
http://www.ce.cn/cysc/agriculture/gdxw/201001/15/t20100115_20043473.shtml, retrieved on Mar 2nd, 
2016. 
23 See more details at 1980 Document on Issues with Reinforcing Agricultural Production System 
(http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-02/04/content_2547020.htm), and the section on Labor 
Compensation in Chronical of Shao Wu City, Fujian Province 
(http://www.fjsq.gov.cn/ShowText.asp?ToBook=3180&index=406&), both retrieved on Mar 2nd, 2016. 
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various forms of APRS. This contributed to overcoming the free rider issues in the 
collective production as well as raising incentives and productivity of agricultural 
production. In addition, restrictions on rural markets and fairs were eased, and peasants 
were encouraged to engage in the production of cash crops as well as other market-oriented 
activities. Also, the legal limit on private family plots was raised from 5% to a maximum 
of 15% of the cultivated land (Meisner 1999, 221). Despite all these market-oriented reform, 
the 1982 document still spent great efforts explaining why APRS did not contradict the 
socialist system. The main reasoning was that planning was still the overall guide in the 
economy while market adjustments were only ancillary. Also, ownership of land and other 
means of production were still collective. Selling, renting and transferring of contracted 
land remained strictly prohibited. 
 In 1984, the state adopted the term Household Responsibility System (HRS) to 
recognize the nation-wide reform that has already taken place.24 HRS involves a series of 
policies. First, land was divided so that each individual peasant household enters into 
contracts with the production team for the use of a given portion of land. Second, farm 
tools and draft animals were divided among households. Third, households pay the 
production team a stipulated portion of its output to meet state tax and grain quota 
obligations (Meisner 1999, 473).  
 In order to spare the peasants from worrying about frequent policy changes, the 
time limit for land contracts was extended to 15 years based on HRS, and even longer for 
the projects that involve longer production cycles such as fruit trees, forestry, and 
																																																						
24 On 1 January 1984, the state issued “Notice Regarding the Agricultural Sector in 1984”, or Guanyu 1984 
Nongcun Gongzuo de Tongzhi. See Chinese version at: 
http://www.china.com.cn/aboutchina/data/zgncggkf30n/2008-04/09/content_14685167.htm, retrieved on 
Mar 2nd, 2016. 
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wastelands.25 The previous prohibition against transfer of contracted land was released. 
Instead, the document explicitly “encourage[s] the gradual concentration of land to those 
who are more able to cultivate farms.”26. The same document also defended the practice of 
hiring workers by rural enterprises. According to the document, hiring workers does not 
imply capitalism, as long as a “certain portion of after-tax profit goes to communal property; 
and goes to workers as compensational payment in additional to wage payment.” 27 
Moreover, brigade enterprise managers who are responsible for hiring workers in such 
situations are allowed to receive higher pay than ordinary workers.28 Despite being clearly 
open to land transfer, land concentration as well as hiring workers, the document was vague 
on many critical concepts. These included the boundary between the rights owned by the 
communes and by the individual specializing household (i.e. Zhuanye hu), or the limit of 
wage difference between managers and ordinary workers.  
 There are three things worth noting here. First of all, individual households now 
became the de facto owners of land although the ownership of the land remains collective 
in theory. Second, HRS was originally presented as being voluntarily implemented only in 
the places where collectives failed to operate well in the 1982 document. Yet in fact, it 
soon became mandatory and was rapidly universalized in the early 1980s. According to 
Meisner (1999, 473), 98% of peasant households had converted to one form or another of 
the HRS by the end of 1983. Third, the 1984 document recognized the growing 
phenomenon that more and more peasants were unable to cultivate their land and had to 
																																																						
25 See Article 1 of the 1984 document. 
26 Ibid. 
27 See Article 3 of the 1984 document. 
28 Ibid. 
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work for others. But the way it was discussed suggests that this phenomenon was being 
treated as a given fact rather than a problem to solve.   
 The rural sector reform did not face strong resistance. One of the key reasons was 
that new policies for government subsidies were also implemented simultaneously with the 
APRS. These subsidies included a lowered amount of compulsory quota required from the 
agricultural sector, a 20% increase in the state price for compulsory grain and a 50% 
premium for above-quota state purchases, together with a significant price increase for a 
wide range of other agricultural products (Meisner 1999, 221). Peasants gained huge 
material compensation through these subsidies. In particular, it was easy for them to 
produce above-quota amounts of crops largely based on the irrigation system built in Mao’s 
era and cheap fertilizers already accessible in the pre-reform era.29 
 However, the stimulus effects on the agricultural sector did not last long. Starting 
from the mid-1980s, agricultural production began to decline. Other problems also 
occurred such as high inflation, reduced rural social welfare and declining amount of arable 
land.30  The most important change in the agricultural sector was the rapid growth of 
socioeconomic inequality. As Meisner observed (1999, 474), the agricultural sector started 
to show “a class distinction of those who were hiring labors and those who are hired labors 
gradually appeared.” Meisner further described in detail that this is a class distinction 
between “an elite group of successful entrepreneurs who own machinery or operate 
commercial and service enterprise, hire wage laborers, and accumulate capital in a diverse 
variety of private business endeavors” and “the great mass of peasants increasingly 
																																																						
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
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differentiated by income and function, and ranging from the relatively prosperous to the 
relatively impoverished.” 
 
1.5.1.2 1982 Custody and Repatriation policy 
 As a result of the HRS, rural surplus laborers flourish. At the peak of the collective 
communes, 100 million people were mobilized annually for the “winter works” programs 
of capital formation and maintenance (i.e. irrigation works). Now these number of people 
became the surplus laborers “freed” from their rural collectives (Patnaik and Natrajan 2000, 
Rawski 1979). More and more peasants became unable to afford basic subsistence by 
cultivating small pieces of land that were distributed to their individual households. Those 
households with fewer laborers, draft animals or agricultural tools were the ones who were 
hit first. They appeared less competitive in agricultural production than others so they had 
to accept side-line work to support their families. Moving to urban areas to find jobs or 
begging were among the choices (Meisner 1999; Solinger 1999).  
 Also, rural mechanization could be more fully utilized on collective farms than on 
small pieces of lands that are distributed to each household under HRS. The fast 
development of rural mechanization could guarantee either agricultural production 
increase or the collective benefit increase (i.e. health, education, etc.). Yet for individual 
households, the only effective way to increase production on the limited land is fertilizer. 
This could explain the much slower growth in mechanization development after HRS 
compared to the collective era as is shown in Figure 1.2.31 
																																																						
31 The agricultural mechanization level also falls for average person. According to the Comprehensive 
Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (Xinzhongguo Wushinian Tongji Ziliao Huibian), 
the employed population in the primary industry shows an overall increasing trend (with mild fluctuations) 
until the peak in 1991. This measure includes people who are employed in farming as well as forestry, 
herding and fishery. This is the best available measure to calculate machinery power per person. 
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 Comparing the rate of agricultural mechanization growth before and after the 
economic reform, we could see that since 1980, the annual growth rate of total power of 
agricultural machinery has never exceeded 10%. From 1965-1977 (adding one more year 
before and after the Cultural Revolution), the total growth rate of agricultural machinery 
power achieved 834%; while the growth rate from 1978-1990, which also spans 12 years, 
was only 144%. An important implication from this comparison is that the rural migration 
after the economic reform was not based on a massive improvement of rural mechanization. 
Lack of rapid rural mechanization makes it difficult to free physical labor without affecting 
agricultural output level. Yet the land distributed to each household was insufficient to 
assign work to every laborer. As a result, those who are not needed for the farm work 
became the surplus labor. They were then forced to migrate to the urban sector to earn 
subsistence. 
 As a result of the limited land that households could work on and the bad 
maintenance of collective work (i.e. building of irrigation, etc.), surplus labor emerged as 
a severe issue. Data show that 100 to 220 million peasants rapidly became “surplus” rural 
laborers, among whom some 50 million peasants migrated to urban areas from 1978 to 
1988 (Solinger 1999, 18). Figure 1.1 presents the urban migration rate before and after 
economic reform. We can observe that since 1978, the migration rate remains positive, 
with the peak (10.7%) occurring in 1984.  
 The 1982 Custody and Repatriation policy (i.e. Shourong Qiansong Banfa) aimed 
to address the issue of surging migrants who became vagrants due to the lack of urban 
employment opportunities. Cities established Custody and Repatriation stations to offer 
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reliefs, education and repatriation for vagrants. 32  These stations recorded the names, 
identities and addresses of these vagrants and their reasons and time for being homeless.33 
The vagrants were then repatriated to their original hukou places. The new policy also 
required that their local government or brigades shall help them solve their living problems 
so that they do not need to migrate to cities.34 Those having ability to work will be sent to 
the Placement Farms, or Anzhi Nongchang. These are the places to settle those homeless, 
income-less, long-term vagrants by offering minimum subsistence.35  Those who have 
problems to be repatriated back and have no ability to work will be sent to social welfare 
homes or nursing homes and be provided with five protections (i.e. wu bao), namely the 
protections for food, clothes, shelter, medical aid and burial after death.36  
 The Custody and Repatriation policy is more than just aiming to offer humanitarian 
aid to the homeless and jobless in the urban sector. These people migrate to cities because 
they cannot survive by working in the rural sector. Instead of addressing the issue of surplus 
labor in the rural sector, the state sets the priority of maintaining the fiction that everyone 
shall have a job in order to live legally in cities by repatriating those people back to the 
places that they fled from. Usually they are the “incompetent farmers” who had transferred 
their land to other “competent farmers.” It was also increasingly difficult for them to get 
hired by rural enterprises with surging unemployment in the rural sector in the 1980s 
(Solinger 1985, 102). Compared with the repatriation of rural migrants from the urban 
																																																						
32 See Article 2 of the Custody and Repatriation policy, http://china.findlaw.cn/fagui/p_1/191162.html, 
retrieved on Mar 3rd, 2016. 
33 See Article 8 of the Custody and Repatriation policy. 
34 See Article 18 of the Custody and Repatriation policy. 
35 See Article 19 of the Custody and Repatriation policy. 
36 See Article 20 of the Custody and Repatriation policy. 
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sector in the planning period, the difference lies in that the peasants repatriated to farm now 
cannot survive under de-collectivization. 
 
1.5.1.3 1984 Decision on Economic reform and 1986 Labor Contract System 
 After ensuring that one needs to have a job to live legally in cities, the state started 
to work to make sure that these urban workers must be “good,” or disciplined workers. 
 In 1984, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued the 
Decision on Economic Reform (i.e. Guanyu Jingji Tizhi Gaige de Jueding), which begins 
with the statement that “Socialism shall eliminate poverty. We shall not take poverty as 
Socialism”.37 It then emphasized the importance of providing enterprises with autonomous 
decision-making power and called for government organs to restrain from intervention.38 
On the theoretical side, the document defended the economic reform as not contradicting 
socialism given the public ownership of the means of production. However, the document 
made explicit that commodity production and commodity exchange is necessary given 
China’s unique context with “massive population, inconvenient transportation, information 
difficulties, imbalanced economic and cultural development among different regions which 
are all problems hard to solve in the short run”.39 
 According to the document, the Production Responsibility System implemented in 
the rural sector shall be applied to the urban sector as well. 40  This reform has two 
implications. First, workers’ power over the production process will be shifted 
																																																						
37 See Article 2 of the Decision on Economic Reform, at 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64565/65378/4429522.html, retrieved on Mar 3rd, 2016. 
38 See Article 3 of the Decision on Economic Reform 
39 See Article 4 of the Decision on Economic Reform 
40 See Article 7 of the Decision on Economic Reform 
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disproportionally to the management level. The document explicitly stated that only the 
“Manager-Responsibility System” can meet the requirement of detailed division of labor, 
management for highly productive production in modern enterprises.41 Second, significant 
wage differences are allowed based on the different types of work, such as intellectual 
versus physical labor, complicated versus simple labor, skilled versus unskilled labor, or 
heavy-load versus light-load labor. The document stated that it is “urgent” to change the 
current situation of relatively low payment for intellectual labor.” This perspective stands 
in sharp contrast to the goal of elimination the three differences (i.e. intellectual labor and 
physical labor, urban and rural area, workers and peasants) under the planned economy.  
 In 1986, two more documents were issued that were more bold in their wording 
with respect to the urgency of disciplining workers.42 The Temporary Regulation on Labor 
Contract System in State-Owned Enterprises required a universal implementation of the 
Labor Contract System. This included various forms such as 5 years long-term workers, 1 
to 5 years short-term workers and temporary workers. 43  Based on this document, 
enterprises can terminate the labor contract when 1) workers are found unqualified during 
the probation period (3-6 months); 2) workers are sick or damaged not because of work 
and cannot be involved in the original work after health medication; 3) workers disrupt 
production order or do not conform to reasonable personnel change); 4) enterprises go 
bankrupt.44 If we compare this regulation with the 1952 Decision on Labor Employment 
																																																						
41 Ibid. 
42 On 12 July, 1986, the State Council issued Temporary Regulation on Labor Contract System in State-
Owned Enterprises, or Guoying Qiye Shixing Laodong Hetongzhi Zanxing Guiding, see: http://www.law-
lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=3786; 
On 12 July 1986, the State Council issued Temporary Regulation on Laying off Undisciplined Workers in 
State-Owned Enterprises, or Guoying Qiye Citui Weiji Zhigong Zanxing Guiding, see: 
http://library.jgsu.edu.cn/zscq/04/Product4/Law/18_Work/18_Work1234.htm  
43 See Article 2 of the Regulation on Labor Contract System. 
44 See Article 12 of the Regulation on Labor Contract System. 
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Problems, we will find that workers now can be laid off with the reasons that were strictly 
forbidden to be used to fire workers in the planned economy. 
 
1.5.2 Hukou’s Reform 
 With all these preset conditions in 1984, large cities such as Wuhan started to loosen 
the hukou regulation by openly issuing Temporary Residence Certificates for rural workers 
coming to urban cities to work. One year later, this “Temporary Residence Certificate” 
became applicable in the whole country. Yet grain access was still an issue under the food 
rationing system for rural migrant workers to maintain even “temporary residence” (6-12 
months) in cities and towns. In 1985, the Unified Procurement and Marketing of Grain 
(UPMG) policy was repealed. This meant that the most effective control over migration 
through food rationing was lifted. With food becoming accessible in the market, a nation-
wide implementation of “Temporary Residence Certificate” was announced in 1985. 
 
1.5.2.1 Temporary Residence Certificate and the Repeal of UPMG policy 
 This newly emerging hostility toward urban workers from 1984 to 1986 is in the 
context of the adjustment of hukou policy and the repeal of UPMG policy. This is because, 
only when the food rationing constraint was lifted, rural migrants could stay in the urban 
sectors for as long as they were needed. This created a massive reserve army of workers to 
compete against the urban sector workers.  
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 The change in the hukou system started in some major cities such as Wuhan. As 
early as May 1983, Wuhan started to adopt the use of “Temporary Residence Certificates” 
in order to “institute, verify and issue certificates declaring temporary residence for non-
native personnel coming to our city [Wuhan] to engage in various kinds of economic 
activity” (Solinger 1985, 98). In that year, Wuhan’s “temporary and floating population” 
numbered 222,000 (Solinger 1985, 103). This round of rural-urban migration differed 
significantly from the floating population in the 1950s in that the migration now was no 
longer for the sake of central planning of production and distribution operating through 
“recruitment quota” set by the Labor Department. It was exactly the “blind influx” that the 
government had fought to prevent from occurring in the 1950s. As a result of this change 
in the nature of the migration pattern, the Labor Department was no longer responsible for 
rural-urban migration issues. Rather, it became the responsibility of the Public Security 
Department (Solinger 1985).   
 Yet grain access was still an issue under the food rationing system for rural migrant 
workers to maintain even “temporary residence” (6-12 months) in cities and towns. In 1985, 
UPMG policy was finally repealed. 45  In the opening statement of Ten Policies on 
Stimulating the Rural Economy, the state claimed that UPMG policy was no longer 
applicable as it now “largely hampers the development of agricultural commodities 
production and the improvement of economic efficiency.” Instead, a system of contractual 
order and market sales of agricultural products needs was implemented immediately.46 
																																																						
45 On 1 January, 1985, CCCPC and the State Council issued “Ten Policies on Stimulating Rural Economy”, 
or Guanyu Jinyibu Huoyue Nongcun Jingji de Shixiang Zhengce, see: 
http://www.china.com.cn/aboutchina/data/zgncggkf30n/2008-04/09/content_14685741.htm 
46 See Article 1 of Ten Policies on Stimulating Rural Economy. 
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  With food becoming accessible in the market, a nation-wide implementation of 
“Temporary Residence Certificate” program was announced in 1985.47 According to the 
regulation, any rural resident 16 years or older planning to stay in the urban sector for more 
than 3 months needed to apply for a Temporary Residence Certificate (zan zhu zheng). 
Those staying in the urban sector for a relatively longer time due to work needed to apply 
for a Lodge Certificate (ji zhu zheng). With the issuance of this regulation, the restriction 
on migration was completely lifted. Just within 10 years, the floating population amounted 
to about 80 million (Chan and Zhang 1999, 833). 
 There are two things worth noting in this “Provisional Regulation on Temporary 
Residences in Cities and Towns” issued in 1985. First, the time limit for temporary stay 
was extended. With the initial experiment in Wuhan in 1983, the policy only allowed six 
to twelve months of temporary stay. Now one could stay an unlimited amount of time only 
by receiving a different type of certificate. The term “temporary” in the regulation only 
refers to the nature of the stay, not the time length of the stay. Second, the occupations of 
those staying in the urban sector for longer time is explicitly discussed in the document. 
Those workers are concentrated in the construction, transportation, and other contracted 
works.  
 
																																																						
47 On 13 July, 1985, the Ministry of Public Security issued “Provisional Regulation on Temporary 
Residences in Cities and Towns”, or Guanyu Chengzhen Zanzhu Renkou Guanli de Zanxing Guiding. See: 
http://code.fabao365.com/law_263315.html 
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1.5.2.2 Implementation of Blue-Stamp Urban Hukou 
 The 1992 introduction of the Blue Stamp Urban Hukou allowed purchasing of urban 
hukou status. As a result, capital now plays a crucial role in determining who enjoys 
privileges. 
 In August 1992, the Ministry of Public Security issued a Circular on 
Implementation of Locally-Valid Urban Hukou Registration. This document started to 
allow the application of urban hukou. To apply for a Blue-Stamp Hukou, one needs to pay 
a large lump-sum fee for urban infrastructural construction (chengshi zengrongfei). The 
specific amount of this fee varied by development level of each specific city and town 
(Chan and Zhang 1999, 838). After holding Blue-Stamp Hukou for certain years (specified 
by cities independently), one can transfer his or her hukou status into becoming a regular 
urban resident. These residents could then enjoy the same rights and obligations as urban 
residents.  
 Needless to say, this right to transfer hukou is only enjoyed by those who are 
relatively rich or powerful. These people include, for instance, relatives of overseas 
Chinese or Hongkong or Macau investors; domestic investors and their close relatives; 
persons and their close relatives who, with permission, purchase urban housing at market 
prices or building urban housing with their own capital; and persons and their close 
relatives who make significant contributions to the urban economy (Chan and Zhang 
1999).This association of urban hukou with money value marked the beginning of the 
hukou system being associated with inequality. 
 
 40 
1.5.3 Hukou’s Role in the Market Economy 
 Hukou has played three roles in the market economy. First, it assisted in the creation 
of the reserve army in the urban sector. Second, it assisted the adoption of the Lewis 
development model under the economic reforms. Third, it reinforced inequality between 
the urban and rural sectors.  
 
1.5.3.1 Creation of Industrial Reserve Army 
 In Capital, Marx described how the creation of industrial reserve army as a result 
of a surplus laboring population is a necessary product of accumulation or of the 
development of wealth for capitalism. Marx also explained how wages are regulated by the 
expansion and contraction of industrial reserve army. The series of policies implemented 
first in the rural sector and then in the urban sector resulted in the creation of an industrial 
reserve army, paving ways for the capitalist development in the urban sector. 
 The process of creating an industrial reserve army involves two steps in China. 
From the mid to late 1980s, the urban private sector was not well developed. Therefore, 
the rural migrants were mainly drawn to the construction and transportation sector, or self-
employed as vendors. During this period, rural migrants and urban workers were still 
working in segregated sectors, and the competition did not start yet. Following the massive 
lay-offs (i.e. xia gang, literally means stepping down the position) in the urban state-owned 
enterprises in 1990s, the urban private economic sector started to grow and was fully 
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developed as an integral part of the economy.48 Employment in the private sector as a share 
of the total national non-agricultural labor force grew rapidly from only two percent in 
1981 to 18 percent in 1997 (Wu 2006; Garnaut et.al 2001). It is not until then the urban 
laid-off workers started to face competition in both the full fledging private sector and self-
employment opportunities.  
 The competition from the rural migrant workers became fierce. Compared with the 
urban laid-off workers, on average rural migrants are younger, physically stronger, more 
educated on average, and willing to work harder for lower wages (Solinger 2002, 314). The 
reasons are intuitive. First of all, it is hard for urban workers who previously worked in the 
state-owned enterprise to get accustomed to the work intensity in the informal sector (i.e. 
temporary waged worker or self-employed). By contrast, a high proportion of rural 
migrants already had more than 10 years of experience. As for the physically 
competitiveness of the rural migrants, the interviewed urban laid-off workers admitted that 
rural migrants could endure greater hardship: “They can work hard, eat worse food, carry 
heavier things.” Third, the percentage (12.7%) of rural migrants who were educated at the 
junior high school level or above was twice high as that (6.7%) for the laid-off urban 
workers. This may seem counter-intuitive. But in fact, it is often the youngest and the most 
educated that are able and willing to leave the rural sector to join the labor force. 
 All of the above advantages combine to produce a 50% higher rate of average labor 
productivity of rural workers relative to urban workers (Solinger 2002, 314). Yet the 
average wage for hiring an urban worker (including the legally required benefits) is almost 
																																																						
48 In 1999 the National People’s Congress amended the state constitution, proclaiming the private sector a 
“component part” of the national economy. During the late 1990s the official media constantly trumpeted 
the significance of the private sector in providing employment for workers pushed aside by the state sector 
(Solinger 2002).  
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five times higher than employing a rural worker.49 The choice facing private employers is 
straightforward. Therefore despite some state policies to protect the priority for urban laid-
off workers, private employers either would hire rural labor instead or “play on the workers’ 
eagerness to find new jobs, refusing to give them wages equal to regular workers, though 
they do just the same work” (Solinger 2002, 313).50   
 As urban workers’ bargaining power gradually declined, employers, intellectuals 
and skilled labor are paid increasing amounts. Blue-Stamp hukou explicitly attracted 
capital and “competent personnel” into urban area to be the preparatory citizens for special 
economic zones. The difference between urban and rural sector was no longer on a track 
toward convergence. 
 
1.5.3.2 Implementing the Lewis Model of Development 
 An important element of economic development is industrialization, but 
industrialization can take different forms. In most countries, industrialization follows 
Arthur Lewis’ dual-sector development model (Fields 2004). In the planned economy, 
Lewis development model was largely avoided. Yet the market reform led to an alternative 
development path. 
 With rural decollectivization first and then a series of labor flexibility policies 
implemented in the urban sector, a Lewis development path eventually took off in China 
in the 1990s. However, the Lewis development with Chinese characteristics suggests a 
																																																						
49 Ibid. 
50 According to Solinger (2002, 314), state regulations have divided jobs into three categories. Those jobs 
that peasants were not permitted to be hired; those that peasants could only be hired if there were an 
insufficient urban labor supply and those that peasants could be hired. 
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much less precarious process than what most other developing countries experienced 
(Wang 2005, 118). This is mostly because China successfully prevented the emergence of 
large-scale slums in the country’s developed metropolitan cities, as occurred in Brazil and 
India. Yet unlike what much the literature has been arguing (Wang 2005, 27), hukou policy 
alone did not prevent slums. The condition for any existence of slums in large cities was 
already matured since the repeal of Unified Procurement and Marketing of Grain policy in 
1985 when rural people could buy food in cities with cash. And the implementation of 
Custody and Repatriation policy that forced the slums from occurring in cities since 1982. 
After this policy was repealed in 2003, the Department of Public Security became in charge 
of keeping slums invisible from the public sight.51 
 The natural consequence of a Lewis type of development is the squeezing of the 
rural sector, as a result of tolerance towards unbalanced distribution of resources between 
the urban and rural sector. As Taylor (1988, 760) argues, the major threat to the rural sector 
is that the most productive workers (i.e. the young, the educated and the skilled) will 
migrate out of the agricultural sector, leaving older and weaker family members to hold the 
plots of land as a form of income insurance.  
 In comparison, in the socialist mode of urban development, the rural sector was not 
badly treated. Health care and education services had improved rapidly (Zhang and Kanbur 
2005). By the late 1970s, bare-foot doctors and clinics were set up in almost all villages. 
By 1980, the school enrollment rate among rural children reached about 90%. Another 
important piece of evidence to witness the long-lasting effort the state had made to reduce 
																																																						
51 Although slums are almost invisible in urban China, United Nations calculated that the actual slum 
dwellers in China was about 37.8% of the urban population in year 2001. The criteria are access to tap 
water and bathrooms. See more discussions in Jiang (2006). 
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inequality between urban and rural sector is the 1965 Direction on the Adjustment of 
Current Prices.52 The direction announced that in the 15 years’ history of People’s Republic 
of China, the procurement price of grain has been raised by about 90%, and there is 30% 
price increase from 1957 to 1964. For the government, the urgent issue at hand is that the 
unified sale price of grain in urban areas is lower than both the sale price in rural areas and 
the procurement price from rural area. And this, in the wording of the direction, “causes 
the unreasonable fact that urban workers can purchase grain at a cheaper price than peasants 
could, which affects the alliance between workers and peasants.” What the state did to 
reduce urban-rural inequality is first to “raise the unified urban sales price of grain to the 
same level of the unified procurement price from the rural area”; and then to ensure a “one-
yuan increase for every 50 kg grain” which resulted in a total surplus from the price 
increase of 300 million yuan. Also, for those extremely poor urban areas, government 
would provide compensation to ensure the affordability of food grain. With a goal of 
balanced growth of both sectors, the planned economy shows a slow but steady 
accumulation pattern of both sectors, one that the urban sector was not developed at the 
sacrifice of rural sector. 
 It is interesting to look at the solution to this increased draining of the most 
productive rural workers from the rural sector from the perspective of major official 
policies and much of the existing studies. The official solution is to encourage seasonal 
migration of rural labor, that is: rural laborers are welcomed to find urban employment 
during nong xian (slack farming season) but they are encouraged to return farmland to help 
																																																						
52 On 19, January 1965, State Council issued the “Direction on the Adjustment of Current Prices”, or Guan 
Yu Tiao Zheng Dang Qian Shi Chang Wu Jia de Jue Ding. See Chinese version at:  
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66676/4493812.html 
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out during nong mang (busy farming season). Mainstream scholars, on the other hand, 
criticized this solution as insufficient to solve the fundamental problem. And their 
reasoning is that only mechanized farming techniques could compensate for this massive 
loss of productive laborers. Yet since agricultural mechanization is more effective for large 
land areas, the government should allow the selling of land-use rights between households. 
This would permit more effective utilization of rural mechanization on the consolidated 
land area (Taylor 1988, 761). It is ironic to see that the advantages of farming on large land 
areas instead of small plots was realized in this context. This is after a nation-wide 
decollectivization campaign.  
 
1.5.3.3 Reinforcing the Urban-Rural Inequality 
 Hukou is often associated with protecting urban privileges. This association 
originated from the planned economy, when urban workers were guaranteed full 
employment and social benefits related with their employment. These benefits included 
free compulsory education for children, free or subsidized health care and housing (Zhang 
and Kanbur 2005). In the rural sector, healthcare and education services were also provided 
but with lower quality than in the urban sector. Healthcare services were provided with a 
focus on preventive rather than curative measures. Education services were provided at the 
commune level.53 The results were rather successful, as is discussed in Section 5.3.2. 
However, although social benefits are much improved in the rural sector, the physical 
hardship innately associated with agricultural work still suggest to many an inferior status 
																																																						
53 Ibid. 
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of the agricultural sector compared to the industrial sector. So although it was actually the 
UMPG policy that effectively controlled migration in the planned economy, hukou’s role 
of civilian registration, and therefore its assistance in migration control, made it a common 
target for critique regarding protecting urban privileges.54 
 After the market reform, the nature of the urban privileges changed. Since the urban 
labor reform in 1984, the “iron rice bowl” system no longer existed. With decollectivization 
in the rural sector, rural residents started to leave agricultural work and move to the urban 
sector to work. So the key difference between urban residents versus rural residents was 
no longer related to the nature of their work. Now the difference is related to the social 
resources that rural hukou holders have access to in the urban sector, and the wages they 
are paid in the urban sector compared to urban hukou holders. They are lower wages even 
for the same jobs. Moreover, barriers between urban and rural hukou holders were more 
directly confronted because they are now competing for the same jobs and resources, 
including water, electricity, transportation, stably priced food in the urban sector.55  
 Furthermore, the family separation issues related with the strong mobility control 
under the planned economy were intensified after the market reform. This was largely due 
to hukou’s role of reinforcing urban- rural inequality. In the planned economy, control of 
population mobility served both production and distributional purposes. Of course, the 
urgent need to balance the population between the two sectors through strict imposition of 
the hukou system created problems. For example, policies had been revised gradually to 
guarantee the reunion of workers and cadres family through an annual two-to-three weeks 
leave at state expense instead of an automatic migration of family members to the urban 
																																																						
54 See discussion in Section 3. 
55 See relevant discussion for Solinger 1999, page 112. 
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areas.56 But problems still existed for long-distance separated couples and families when 
only one member is recruited by the urban state sector. According to Cheng and Selden 
(1994, 661), six million of China’s 24 million state sector workers and employees lived at 
a distance from parents, spouses or both in 1957. This arrangement is indeed inhumane. 
Yet besides the importance of controlling population mobility, one could also argue that 
this arrangement limits the privilege of urban workers and cadres. If, according to the 
current discussion, urban workers and cadres already enjoy some privileges over peasants, 
it would be more unfair when they can bring family members to urban areas immediately 
after they were hired in the industrial sector.  
 Unsurprisingly, this seemingly “non-humanitarian” arrangement induces 
resentment from the related people. That is why one of the first things that the state did in 
the beginning of the reform era was to revise the nong zhuan fei policy (transfer from 
agricultural to non-agricultural hukou status) mainly to ease the process for the reunion of 
those long-time separated couples. The state also rehabilitated those purged cadres and 
intellectuals with their families (Chan and Zhang 1999, 834). This policy was welcomed 
by professionals and cadres that had experienced family separation. However, the extent 
of family separation actually worsened during the market economy period. Hundred 
millions of peasants were forced to leave their land to earn a living. The left-behind children 
in rural China amounted to 23 million in 2000 (Zhou and Duan 2006).  
 
																																																						
56 On 16 November 1957, “Provisional Regulations Governing Home Leaves and Wages of Workers and 
Employees”. 
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1.6 Conclusion 
 In this paper, I examine the hukou’s functions in both the planned economy and the 
market economy. While a range of existing studies attribute China’s urban-rural inequality 
to the hukou system in general, I identify the policies, other than hukou, that played crucial 
roles in controlling rural to urban migration and for protecting the privileges associated 
with the urban sector.   
 A review of the experimental policies regarding population and labor employment 
control since 1951 before the official launch of hukou system suggests that civilian 
registration is not new in China. Rather it can be traced back to the 11th century. However, 
the distinctive feature of the hukou system comes from the broader economic system it is 
operating under. In the planned economy, hukou played important roles in civilian 
registration, migration control and employment regulation. I emphasize that the Unified 
Procurement and Marketing of Grain policy was the actual policy that effectively 
controlled the rural-to-urban migration, with hukou only playing a secondary role. The 
employment regulation function of hukou was specifically designed to meet the needs of 
balanced growth of both rural and urban sectors. The privileges of the urban sector in the 
planned economy was associated with the nature of the work, with the physical hardship 
of the agricultural work being considered inferior to jobs in the urban factories. Education 
and health care services were improving rapidly with successful results in the rural sector. 
Therefore, access to social resources were not the key dividing areas for urban and rural 
residents in the planned economy.  
 The hukou system seemed to be an obstacle to the market reform in the sense that 
it binds the rural labor force on their land. But the true obstacle to the reform is not the 
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hukou system alone, but the planned economy within which the hukou system is operating. 
In that sense, the repeal of the Unified Procurement and Marking of Grain and reducing 
urban workers’ bargaining power is more important in promoting market reforms than the 
hukou system. My study of the policies from 1982 to 1985 shows how the government, 
step by step, generated a massive pool of surplus laborers in the rural sector, and broke the 
“iron rice bowl” system in the urban sector, thus creating the supply and demand conditions 
for a massive rural to urban migration. This process continues at present. All these policies 
preceded hukou’s first adjustment, i.e. Temporary Residence Certificates and the second 
adjustment, i.e. the Blue-Stamp Hukou. This evidence refutes the view that it was hukou’s 
reform per se that lifted the restriction on rural urban migration. The nature of the urban 
privileges has also changed. Not all urban residents are now employed in the public sector 
that provided free and subsidized health care services and housing, as in the planned 
economy. Now money capital and human capital play major roles in the accessibility to 
social resources. 
 As a result, although urban and rural residents now both have the the freedom to 
migrate within the market economy, they have paid high costs for this freedom of 
movement. Urban residents now have lost their guaranteed work and associated benefits, 
while rural residents lost their access to local education and health care services. They also 
lost their freedom to live in the rural sector because they can no longer live by merely doing 
agricultural work. Social resources have been minimized, as the rural sector has been 
squeezed, in order to further develop the urban sector.    
The overall implication of this study is that the interacting effects of the hukou 
and the economic system, rather than hukou alone, should be the analytical focus to 
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address important development topics such as industrialization, urbanization, spatial and 
social inequality. This finding contributes to the understanding of policy discussion of 
hukou in the context of the overall development model in China.  
 
1.7 Bibliography 
Alexander, P. and A. Chan (2004). "Does China Have an Apartheid Pass System?" Journal 
of Ethinic and Migration Studies 30(4): 609-629. 
  
Andreas, J. and S. Zhan (2015). "Hukou and land: market reform and rural displacement 
in China." The Journal of Peasant Studies. 
  
Brown, J. (2012). City versus countryside in Mao's China. USA, Cambridge University 
Press. 
  
Chan, K. W. (1988). "Rural-urban migration in China, 1950-1982: estimates and analysis." 
Urban Geography 9(1): 53-84. 
  
Chan, K. W. (1992). "Economic growth strategy and urbanization policies in China, 1949-
1982." International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 16(2): 275-305. 
  
Chan, K. W. (1994). Cities With Invisible Walls: Reinterpreting Urbanization in Post-1949 
China. Hong Kong, Oxford University Press. 
  
Chan, K. W. (1996). "Post-Mao China: A Two-Class Urban Society in the Making." 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 20(1): 134-150. 
  
Chan, K. W. (2001). "Recent Migration in China: Patterns, Trends, and Policies." Asian 
Perspectives 25(4): 127-155. 
  
Chan, K. W. (2003). Migration in China in the Reform Era: Characteristics, Consequences, 
and Implications. The Chinese Development Miracle: Origins, Transformation, and 
Challenges. A. So. Armonk, M.E. Sharpe: 111-135. 
  
Chan, K. W. (2004). "Chinese Hukou reforms and rural-urban migration." China Labor 
Economics 1: 108-123. 
  
Chan, K. W. (2009). "The Chinese Hukou System at 50." Eurasian Geography and 
Economics 50(2): 197-221. 
  
 51 
Chan, K. W. (2010). "A China Paradox: Migrant Labor Shortage amidst Rural Labor 
Supply Abundancew." Eurasian Geography and Economics 51(4): 513-530. 
  
Chan, K. W. (2010). "The Global Financial Crisis and Migrant Workers in China: There is 
No Future as a Labourer; Returning to the Village has No Meaning." International Journal 
of Urban and Regional Research 34(3): 659-677. 
  
Chan, K. W. (2010). "The Chinese Household Registration System and Migrant Labor in 
China: Notes on a Debate." Population and Development Review 36(2): 357-364. 
  
Chan, K. W. and W. Buckingham (2008). "Is China abolishing the Hukou System." The 
China Quarterly 195: 582-606. 
  
Chan, K. W. and F. Cai (2000). The Political Economy of Urban Protectionist Employment 
Policies in China. Working Paper Series, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Institute of 
Population Studies. 
  
Chan, K. W., et al. (1999). "Hukou and Non-hukou Migrations: Comparisons and 
Contrasts." International Journal of Population Geography 5(6): 425-448. 
  
Chan, K. W. and X. Xu (1985). "Urban Population Growth and Urbanization in China since 
1949: Reconstructing a Baseline." The China Quarterly(104): 583-613. 
  
Chan, K. W. and L. Zhang (1999). "The Hukou System and Rural-Urban Migration in 
China: Processes and Changes." The China Quarterly(160): 818-855. 
  
Cheng, T. (1991). Dialectics of contro: the household registration (hukou) system in 
contemporary China. Dept. of Sociology, State University of New York at Binghamton. 
Doctoral Thesis. 
  
Cheng, T. and M. Seldon (1994). "The origins and social consequences of China's hukou 
system." The China Quarterly(139): 644-668. 
  
Christiansen, F. (1990). "Social division and peasant mobility in mainland China: the 
implications of hukou system." Issues and Studies 26(4): 78-91. 
  
Dutton, M. R. (1992). Policies and Punishment in China. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
  
Fan, C. C. (2008). China on the Move: Migration, the State, and the Household. New York, 
Routledge. 
 
Fields, G. S. (2004). Dualism in the labor market: A perspective on the Lewis model after 
half a century. Retrieved [insert date] from Cornell University, ILR school site: 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/268/ 
  
 52 
Garnaut, R., et al. (2001). Private Enterprise in China, Asia Pacific Press. 
  
Huang, P. C. C., et al. (2012). "Capitalization without Proletarianization in China's 
Agricultural Development." Modern China 38(2): 139-173. 
  
Huang, Y. (2001, June 26th, 201). "Hukou system cannot be repealed at this moment." 
Retrieved April 16th, 2013. 
  
Jiang, L. (2006). "Living Conditions of the Floating Poluation in Urban China." Housing 
Studies 21(5): 719-744. 
  
Ka, C.-M. and M. Seldon (1986). "Original Accumulation, Equity and Late 
Industrialization: The Cases of Socialist China and Capitalist Taiwan." World 
Development 14(10/11): 1293-1310. 
  
Knight, J. and L. Song (1999). The Rural–Urban Divide: Economic Disparities and 
Interactions in China. New York, NY, Oxford University Press. 
  
Kotz, D. M. and A. Zhu (2011). "The Dependence of China's Economic Growth on Exports 
and Investment." Review of Radical Political Economics 43(1): 9-32. 
  
Li, T. (2012, June 27th, 2012). "Hukou system cannot be repealed." Retrieved April, 2013. 
  
Lin, Y., et al. (1994). Zhongguo de qiji: fazhan zhanlue he jingji gaige (The China Miracle: 
Development Strategy and Economic Reform). Shanghai, Shanghai renmin chubanshe 
(Shanghai People's Publisher). 
  
Mallee, H. (1996). "China's household registration system under reform." Development 
and Change 26: 1-29. 
  
Mallee, H. (1996). "Reform of the hukou system." Chinese Sociology& Anthropology 
29(1): 3-14. 
  
Naughton, B. (2007). The Chinese Economy. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 
  
Patnaik, U. and S. Natrajan (2000). "Output and Employment in Rural China: Some Post-
Reform Problems." Economic and Political Weekly 35(38): 16-22. 
  
Potter, S. H. (1983). "The Position of Peasants in Modern China's Social Order." Modern 
China 9(4): 465-499. 
  
Qin, H. (2013). "Three kinds of inequality behind the hukou system." Retrieved Jan 30th, 
2013. 
  
Rawski, T. G. (1979). Economic Growth and Employment in China. Published for the 
World Bank, Oxford University Press. 
 53 
  
Ren, X., et al. (1996). "China's Registration Taboo." Chinese Sociology& Anthropology 
29(1): 15-26. 
  
Solinger, D. (1995). The floating population in the cities: chances for assimilation? Urban 
Spaces: Autonomy and Community in Contemporary China. Cambridge, Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press: 113-139. 
  
Solinger, D. (1999). Contesting Citizenship in Urban China. Berkeley, CA, University of 
California 
Press. 
  
Solinger, D. and K. W. Chan (2002). The China Difference:  City Studies Under Socialism 
and Beyond. Understanding the City. J. E. a. C. Mele, Blackwell Press. 
  
Wang, F.-L. (2004). "Reformed Migration Control and New Targeted People: China's 
Hukou System in the 2000s." The China Quarterly(177): 115-132. 
  
Wang, F.-L. (2005). Organizing through Division and Exclusion: China’s Hukou System. 
Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press. 
  
Wen, T.-J. (2007). "Jianshe Xinnongcun zhongzai silu bentuhua 
Localizing is the key to building the new rural society." Jiansu Rural Economy(2). 
  
White, L. T. (1977). Deviance, modernization, rations, and household register in urban 
China. Deviance and Social Control in Chinese Society. A. A. Wilson, S. L. Greenblatt and 
R. W. Wilson. New York, Praeger. 
  
Whyte, M. K. ( 2010). One country, two societies: rural-urban inequality in contemporary 
China, Harvard University Press. 
  
Wu, H. X. (1994). "Rural to Urban Migration in the People's Republic of China." The 
China Quarterly(139): 669-698. 
  
Wu, X. (2006). "Communist Cadres and Market Oppurtunities: Entry into Self-
employment in China, 1978-1996." Social Forces 85(1). 
  
Wu, X. and D. J. Treiman (2004). "The Household Registration System and Social 
Stratification in China." Demography 41(2): 363-384. 
  
Yu, D.-P. (2002). Changxiang shehui: cong geli zouxiang kaifang: zhongguo huji zhidu yu 
hujifa yanjiu 
Urban and rural society: from separation to open-up: studies on the China Household 
Registration System and Law. Jinan, Shandong People's Publisher. 
  
 54 
Zhang, Q. (1988). "Basic Facts on the Household Registration System." Chinese Economic 
Studies 22(1). 
  
Zhang, S. (2013). Repeal and hukou system and let peasants freely enter the cities. Beijing 
Morining Newspaper. http://cq.ifeng.com/world/detail-1_2013_04/10/700610_0.shtml. 
  
Zhang, X. (2005). "Spatial Inequality in Education and Health Care in China." China 
Economic Review(16): 189-204. 
  
Zhou, F. and C. Duan (2006). "Literature Review Regarding the Left-Behind Children." 
Population Journal(3). 
 55 
Table 1.1.  Growth Rates of Total Industrial and Agricultural Output, Rural 
Mechanization, and Net Rural-Urban Migration Rate, 1950-1980 (continued onto 
next page) 
 
Year Growth rate of 
Total Industrial 
Output 
Growth rate 
of Total 
Agricultural 
Output 
Growth rate 
of rural 
mechanization 
(original)  
Growth rate of rural 
mechanization 
(compounded 
annual growth rate)  
Net Rural-
Urban 
Migration 
Rate 
1950 NA NA  NA 5.1% 
1951 NA NA  NA 4.9% 
1952 NA NA  45.8% 4.6% 
1953 36.5% 10.2%  45.8% 2.7% 
1954 13.0% 3.7%  45.8% 0.1% 
1955 3.5% 7.4%  45.8% -2.3% 
1956 17.5% 5.4%  45.8% 3.4% 
1957 20.6% -3.1% 559.8% 45.8% 0.1% 
1958 53.0% 3.7%  44.2% 22.1% 
1959 29.9% -13.9%  44.2% 1.9% 
1960 5.5% -11.2%  44.2% 4.1% 
1961 -36.3% 29.5%  44.2% -8.8% 
1962 -10.1% 2.7% 523.6% 44.2% -10.1% 
1963 12.4% 9.8%  13.2% -1.8% 
1964 26.1% 12.4%  13.2% -2.7% 
1965 18.5% 16.5% 45.2% 13.2% 0.7% 
1966 18.7% 7.8%  14.5% -0.3% 
1967 -16.0% 1.7%  14.5% 0.6% 
1968 -10.0% 1.7%  14.5% -3.9% 
1969 27.7% 1.4%  14.5% -3.1% 
1970 32.3% 7.8% 97.1% 14.5% -1.2% 
1971 11.9% 4.2%  30.2% 2.1% 
1972 6.8% 0.1%  30.2% 2.0% 
1973 8.3% 9.7% 120.9% 30.2% 1.3% 
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1974 1.0% 4.2% 24.0% 24.0% 0.0% 
1975 14.9% 2.7% 26.1% 26.1% 0.4% 
1976 -3.2% -0.4% 15.4% 15.4% 0.9% 
1977 13.9% -2.6% 18.9% 18.9% 0.7% 
1978 17.1% 8.1% 14.5% 14.5% 3.2% 
1979 10.1% 23.6% 13.9% 13.9% 6.1% 
1980 12.8% 8.0% 10.2% 10.2% 3.3% 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2012.
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Figure 1.1 Net Rural-Urban Migration Rate 1950—1990 
 
Source: Methodology was discussed in details in Wu (1994). 
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Figure 1.2. Growth Rate of Rural Mechanization 1952 to 2008 
 
 
Note: Rural mechanization is measured by the total power of agricultural machinery 
(kilowatt). The growth rate for year 1952-1973 is calculated as the compound annual 
growth rates based on the information on the available years.  
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2012). 
 
 
  
  
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%
50.0%
19
52
19
54
19
56
19
58
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
Growth	Rate	of	Rural	Mechanization
 59 
CHAPTER 2 
DOES THE FORM OF BORROWING AFFECT INVESTMENT PATTERNS? 
EVIDENCE FROM CHINA 1979-1989 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The importance of rural finance has been widely acknowledged in the rural 
development literature. The availability of rural credit is often assumed to have 
substantial positive impacts on agricultural investment as well as agricultural growth. 
However, the links among credit, investment and growth are not always straightforward. 
This is because rural credit can have different sources and can take various forms. For 
example, credit from institutional sources and private sources are associated with 
different interest rates which will affect the repayment behavior. Sometimes different 
institutions will impose specific conditions for the loans they are making. These 
conditions will in turn affect how borrowers spend their loans. At the same time, 
investment can also take many forms. While a small amount of loans can only be used to 
invest in agricultural inputs or small machinery tools, large loans can be used to invest in 
large-scale projects such as infrastructure building. These different types of investments 
will have their distinct implications for the loan effectiveness and agricultural growth.  
However, most rural finance studies have been focusing on the supply side with 
specific attention on availability of credit. This quantity perspective is valuable but 
incomplete. There are also other important perspectives that deserve examination.  One 
example of an understudied perspective is the myriad forms borrowing rural credit takes. 
Missing the perspective of borrowing forms risks overlooking the link between 
borrowing patterns and agricultural loan effectiveness. In this paper, the term 
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“agricultural loan effectiveness” refers to whether loans are being channeled effectively 
to contribute to the long-run sustainable development of the agricultural sector. If we can 
understand how different borrowing patterns might lead to different investment behavior, 
we might better understand why some kind of lending practices are successful while 
others are not. We might also understand the way through which production is organized 
influences investment behavior from the credit demand side.  
This essay compares the different agricultural investment patterns when credit is 
borrowed on a collective basis versus on an individual basis. I construct a model of 
agricultural investment explained by factors of income, weather and geography as well as 
and the form of borrowing. Specifically, I use a two-way fixed-effects model for the 
estimation based on a panel data on the ratio of agricultural credit borrowed on individual 
basis versus on collective basis (the IC ratio), irrigation, income and weather, covering 11 
years and 28 provinces in China. I use irrigation to represent the type of investment that 
involves a slow yet long-run reward for sustainability, and fertilizer to represent the 
investment that aims for an immediate return, but can be short-sighted in nature as it is 
inconsistent with agricultural sustainability. 
I find that on the same income and loan level, more loans made to individuals versus 
to collectives (i.e. a higher IC ratio) will lead to a lower level of investment in irrigation 
building and maintenance work. Correspondingly, more loans made to individuals versus 
to collectives (i.e. a lower IC ratio) will lead to a much higher investment in fertilizer use. 
Based on these results, I argue that the forms of borrowing (i.e. on a collective or 
individual base) matters significantly in decisions regarding agricultural investments. 
Collective-based agricultural lending tends to be channeled to investment that contributes 
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to more sustainable agricultural development yet with returns only in the intermediate or 
long run.  
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. In section 2, I review 
the existing literature on rural finance. I show that despite two streams of literature that 
modestly engage with forms of borrowing, the majority of existing studies has not 
sufficiently studied how different forms of borrowing affect investment patterns. I also 
introduce the history of China’s rural finance development and argue that the particular 
decollectivization history provides a real-world case of transformation in the forms of 
borrowing.  In section 3, I introduce the specifications of the models that I use to test my 
hypotheses about the relationship between the forms of borrowing and agricultural 
investments. I also discuss the reasons behind choosing irrigation and fertilizer as two 
representative types of investments that are different in their implications for sustainable 
development. In section 4, I discuss the data sources and provide some descriptive 
statistics for the key variables. In section 5, I present the main results from my estimation 
exercises. I also discuss about the implications of the results in details. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2.2 Background and Literature Review 
2.2.1 Literature Review 
A large body of empirical evidence suggests that increasing access to rural credit 
leads to higher levels of agriculture-related investment (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 
1986; Feder et.al 1992; Binswanger et.al 1993; Rosenzweig& Wolpin 1993; Dinar& 
Keck 1997; Foltz 2004; Petrick 2004; Binswanger 2006; Mohan 2006; Kohansal et.al 
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2008).57 These case studies have covered a range of countries, including India, China, 
Columbia, Tunisia, Poland and Iran. However, not all types of agricultural investment 
have positive associations with agricultural growth under all circumstances. For example, 
agricultural investment can be publicly or privately funded. Such investment can aim at 
infrastructure building such as irrigation facilities or roads, as well as raw materials such 
as seeds or fertilizers. At the same time, agricultural work can be organized by small 
households or by large collectives. The impact of investment varies with different 
conditions. Some empirics suggest that public investment in the form of fertilizer 
subsidies shows negative correlations with agricultural growth in the cases of smallholder 
farmers.58 
Also, credit supply does not necessarily alleviate the credit constraint issue in the 
Chinese case. Rural credit constraint, defined as borrowers who indicated a desire for 
more credit and the non-borrowers who responded that they could not obtain credit, has 
been recorded in the literature since the late 1980s (Feder et.al 1989, 1990, 1991) and 
throughout the literature in the 1990s and 2000s (Park et.al 1997; 2001; Du 2002; Brandt 
et. al 2004; Tsai 2004; People’s Bank of China and China Statistics Bureau 2009). Into 
the 2010s, the problem appears to still exist. Study of He and Li (2011) shows that among 
1.2 billion rural households with credit need, about 30% do not have access to credit. 
Meanwhile, the supply of credit from financial institutions to the agricultural sector has 
been increasing dramatically. Despite some fluctuations, the total amount of agricultural 
loan from the the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and Rural Credit Cooperatives 
																																																						
57 There are some exceptions. For example, Foltz (2004) suggests that the empirical evidence does not 
support the claim that credit constraints have impinged on agricultural investment in Tunisia.  
58 See the report of “Models of Agricultural Investment” by Dochas, the Irish Association of Non-
Governmental Development Organizations, at http://www.dochas.ie/Shared/Files/4/dochas-agricultural-
investment.pdf. 
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(RCCs), the two major institutional sources, has increased more than eight-fold in real 
terms from 1979 to 1994.59 If we take account of the total loans made to the agricultural 
sector, data suggests that from 1995 to 2009, the loan supply has increased from 89.9 
billion to 739.17 billion yuan (at 1978 price level), a significant nine-fold increase.60 
The ambiguous relations among agricultural credit, investment and growth suggest 
the importance of studying what we can term “agricultural loan effectiveness.” In this 
paper, the term “agricultural loan effectiveness” refers to whether loans are being 
channeled effectively to contribute to the long-run sustainable development of the 
agricultural sector. This paper approaches the “agricultural loan effectiveness” issue from 
the perspective of the form of borrowing. The forms of borrowing refer to borrowing on a 
collective basis versus on an individual basis. This perspective has its theoretical and 
empirical basis within the existing literature.  
There are two streams of studies touching upon the topic of the borrowing forms. The 
discounting and time preference literature offer some theoretical elaborations on how 
public investment involves a lower social discount rate than private investment. The 
conventional wisdom is that given two similar rewards, humans show a preference for 
one that arrives sooner rather than later (Solnick e.t al 1980; Thaler 1981; Millar and 
Navarick 1984; Benzion et.al 1989; Green et. al 1994; Kirby and Herrnstein 1995; Pender 
																																																						
59 The total agricultural loans from Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) increased from 9.9 billion RMB in 
1979 to 51.2 billion yuan in 2005, while the agricultural loans from Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs) 
increased from 2.9 billion yuan in 1979 to 42.1 billion yuan in 1994. The Chinese government ceased the 
publication of China Rural Finance Statistical Yearbook in 1997. The publications were shifted to China 
Finance Statistical Yearbook, and Agricultural Bank of China Statistical Yearbook. In either publication, 
the information about Rural Credit Cooperatives as independent lending source has become unavailable. 
Instead, the transactions in RCCs have been combined into the balance sheets of ABCs.  
60 China Statistical Yearbook 1996-2010 Table 19-2, Balance Sheet of Credit Funds of Financial 
Institutions (Funds Uses). This data source does not differentiate loans from public and private institutions. 
And it does not have data specifically on the loans for agricultural use. This suggests that the loan for the 
rural sector also includes loans for development of industry and commerce within the rural sector. 
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1996). The implication of this argument is that when the risks associated with the 
investments are comparable, investors prefer to make the investment that will give a 
quick return. Given that social risks affiliated with government projects can be distributed 
over the entire country and thus are inherently smaller than private risks, public 
investment will lead to a preference towards rewards in the longer run (Samuelson 1964; 
Vickrey 1964; Arrow (1965; 1966)). But there is no consensus upon such explanations 
(Hirshleifer 1961; Jensen and Bailey 1972). The counter-argument is that government 
projects are still carried out by many private sectors as producers. Thus, the benefits of 
the projects are received by private household sector as consumers. Therefore, the costs 
and benefits, as well as the risks occurred to the same group of people. This line of 
argument leads to the conclusion that there should not be any necessary discrepancy in 
the discount rates between public and private investment, or that the social discount rate 
should be at least as high a rate as a similar private project.  
This stream of literature does shed some light on the reasons behind different 
investment patterns. Yet the theoretical discussion is usually too general to be applied to 
specific cases such as investment from agricultural credit. Also the empirical evidence in 
the discounting literature is usually produced in laboratories by offering cash rewards to 
participants. This methodology often suffers from the critique of their external validity 
(Schram 2005; Roe and Just 2009). Specifically, the laboratory settings are very different 
from the real world, especially the rural sector that is characterized by high poverty rates. 
Therefore, one should not expect the behavioral choices made by lab participants to be 
applicable to the specific cases in the real world. 
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Research on microfinance is the other stream of literature that engages the discussion 
about the forms of borrowing.61 It compares the loan repayment rates from group lending 
versus individual lending in developing countries. Most studies suggest higher repayment 
rates when credit is lent to a group of borrowers (Stiglitz, 1990; Varian, 1990; Remenyi, 
1991; Besley and Coate, 1995; Ghatak, 1999; Coleman, 2000; Abbink et.al 2006; Karlan 
2007; Li et.al 2013; Sinn 2013). One of the key reasons for launching group lending 
practices in microfinance institutions all over the world is that poor villagers usually do 
not have access to conventional loans due to their lack of collateral. A group lending 
practice allows group members to use joint liability as a substitute for collateral. This is a 
technique through which the poor are supposed to have more access to rural credit. Based 
on these studies, the higher repayment rates from group lending practices, as compared to 
the individual lending practices in the microfinance institutions all over the world, can be 
explained by better information and peer pressures. More specifically, the fact that the 
borrower groups are usually self-selected by evaluating each other’s creditworthiness 
mitigates the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard from the beginning. Also, 
the member in the group lending practice tends to repay her loan in order to avoid the 
social sanction of her peers. The self-selected borrower groups also tend to avoid 
excessively risky projects, and are more willing to contribute to others’ repayment 
responsibility when loan-supported projects turn out to be unsuccessful. However, there 
is also empirical evidence that suggests that group lending does not always show 
advantage over individual lending in terms of loan repayment in all cases over the world 
																																																						
61 In the microfinance case, the forms of accessing rural credit is more imposed from the supply side. So a 
more appropriate term should be “forms of lending”. This is different from the Chinese case that this essay 
focuses on. 
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(Huppi and Feder 1989; Wydick 1999; De Aghion and Morduch 2000; Gine et.al 2006; 
Karlan and Gine 2007). For example, Huppi and Feder (1989) suggested that successful 
group lending and credit cooperatives have some common attributes such as homogenous 
borrowers and bottom-up organization. Other less successful groups or cooperatives do 
not show advantage in loan repayment compared with small-farmer borrowers. 
In addition to the empirical inconsistency for the advantage of group lending for loan 
repayment, the crucial shortcoming of the microfinance literature in terms of evaluating 
the forms of borrowing is the targeted indicator: the loan repayment. Since the 
sustainability of microfinance institutions is one of the key concerns in the real practice, 
the literature reflects this concern by ambiguously equating high loan repayment rates 
with success of microfinance operations. However, as Coleman (1999) points out, the 
primary goal of microfinance institutions as well as village banks in general, should 
instead be the improvement of overall welfare of the borrowers. If this standard is used 
for evaluation, one cannot conclude that the microfinance institutions have been 
operating successfully (Adams and Pischke 1992; Coleman 1999, Bateman 2010). This 
loan repayment measure gives evidence of the sustainability of lenders, not borrowers, 
and therefore is unable to provide sufficient information regarding how borrower use the 
borrowed credit to make investment that is supposed to help improve their financial 
situation. 
This question is important as the way investment is made has an influence on how 
effectively the loans are being used. And loan effectiveness is reinforced by the level of 
sustainability of the rural sector. If investment is made in order to have a quick cash 
return, investors look at ways to get the maximum benefits out of an investment within a 
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relatively short time. In this case, sustainability will not be a priority. In the case of 
agriculture, an investment with no sustainability perspective will contribute to the fast 
decline of agricultural productivity that negatively affects the loan effectiveness in the 
long run. For example, although fertilizers can significantly improve crop productivity, 
heavy use of fertilizers was found to have led to significant loss of soil-water and soil 
organic carbon (SOC) that is crucial for maintaining soil productivity (Huang 2003; 
Srinivasarao 2014). This means sacrificing sustainable agricultural development in the 
long run. 
The insufficient attention to this critical question of the form of borrowing could be a 
result of the lack of large-scale data for collective borrowing. This is because most 
countries under review have not experienced a significant change in the agrarian mode of 
production that leads to a dramatic change in the form of borrowing.62 It is therefore 
reasonable to expect that these studies do not raise the issue of how the change of mode 
of production, through its impact on the organization of rural finance, affects the 
decisions on agricultural investment.  
 
2.2.2 Historical background 
China’s rural decollectivization in the early 1980s provides a real-world case of 
transformation in the form of borrowing, from one that is predominantly based on 
collective borrowing to one based on individual borrowing. The analysis in this paper is 
based on this unique history in rural China. 
																																																						
62 Exceptions exist such as Cater and Olinto (2003). 
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Agricultural production in China has shifted from one based on large-scale collectives 
to a small-peasant economy. As a result, the basis of the rural finance organizations in 
China has changed. Prior to decollectivization, lending mainly took place in the rural 
credit collectives (RCCs) that operated on the collective communes and corresponded to 
local demands. In 1976, there were about 50,000 RCCs in operation, reaching the level 
that there was at least one RCC operating for each rural commune (Lu 2001). After 
decollectivization, RCCs lost most of their independence when the government re-
launched the state-owned agricultural bank, the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC). In 
fact, half of the RCCs were combined with the business units of banks. Some still kept 
the names of RCCs but functioned no more than the local branches of ABC. The RCCs 
also lost their previous local bases, as the production communes were gradually 
decollectivized. The ABC does very little business directly with agricultural households. 
Its main focus is on the state agricultural agencies and rural industrial enterprises (Feder 
et. al 1989). Starting in 1979, ABCs used interest rate and reserve requirement policies to 
transfer funds from RCCs to ABCs, thus further hampering the RCCs’ ability to provide 
rural credit (Tam 1988).63 As a result, RCCs loosened their ties with the local production 
basis, and have to work more in line with ABCs. However, as Wen & Jiang (2007) 
argued, the bank-type rural finance institutions are by nature unable to address the small-
amount, low interest return, long-term and high-risk credit demand from the 
geographically sparse small peasants. By the time RCCs eventually gained their 
independence from ABC in 1996, the RCCs had already lost their financial significance 
																																																						
63 RCCs are to place 30% of deposits with the ABCs at the annual interest rate of 4 percent. Yet RCCs have 
to provide their annual deposit interest rates to members within the range of 7 to 8 percent. Also RCCs 
need to keep 15% of deposits as their own reserves, which leaves only about 50% of the total deposits to be 
utilized as loans. 
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and local connections. The major rural finance institutions and the way they operate 
therefore had undergone a dramatic transformation. 
One might expect that given China’s agrarian history, studies regarding Chinese rural 
finance should have probed into the impacts of forms of agricultural lending on 
agricultural investment. However, this is not the case. Ever since the literature on Chinese 
rural credit began to appear in the late 1980s, the issue of credit constraint has become 
the main focus [Tam 1988; World Bank 1988; Feder et.al (1989, 1990, 1991); Park et.al 
(1997, 2001, 2003); He 1999; Du& Sun 2000; Park & Ren 2001; Xie (2001, 2003); Du 
2002; Brandt et.al 2004; Tsai 2004; Chen&Sun 2006; Wen & Jiang 2007; People’s Bank 
of China and China Statistics Bureau 2009; Yang et.al 2010; He and Li 2011; Newman, 
2011]. These studies mostly focus on providing empirical evidence on the extent of the 
credit constraint, as well as explanations for the existence of these constraints. These 
explanations all took decollectivization for granted and positively evaluated 
decollectivization as releasing the incentives for higher credit demand that were inhibited 
in the planned economy. The problem, according to these studies, is the failure of the 
institutional finance resources to adjust to meet the surging demand.  One thing worth 
noting is that unlike the earlier literature on rural finance (Nolan 1983), very few recent 
studies have discussed the topic in the context of the development of the agricultural 
sector. Many discussions were focused too narrowly on comparing the amount of loans 
available to the rural sector, without examining the effect of those loans. Most of these 
studies miss the important dimension of who gets the loans, how are loans used, and how 
these loans assist in promoting sustainable development in the agricultural sector. One 
possible reason is that the goal of rural credit at present is limited to raising the income of 
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individual rural households. In the previous era, there was much more emphasis on the 
welfare of the collective of the whole, for example in building the irrigation systems. 
This essay takes advantage of the agrarian change in China that has affected both the 
ways that rural finance operates and also the agricultural mode of production in general. 
Specifically, I compare the different agricultural investment patterns when agricultural 
credit is borrowed on a collective basis versus on an individual basis. Although the case 
study is about rural China, its implication for understanding agrarian change and rural 
finance has broader implications, in particular for other developing countries. 
 
2.3 Model Specifications and Methodological Concerns 
2.3.1 Models 
In this section, I present two econometric models that test how the forms of credit 
borrowing, collectively versus individually, affect different agricultural investment 
decisions.  
The first model specifically looks at the investment decisions regarding irrigation 
building and maintenance. All the dependent and independent variables are in their 
natural logarithm forms. Both provincial (𝜙") and year (𝜏$) fixed effects are included to 
control any possible provincial characteristics or specific year effects.64 The specification 
is as follows:  
   𝑦"$ = 𝛽 ∗ 𝐼𝐶"	$,- + 𝑋"$ + 𝛾 ∗ 𝐼𝐶"	$,- ∗ Ζ"$ + 𝜙" + 𝜏$ + 𝜀"$. 
																																																						
64 This regression model leaves out the initial level of irrigation investment and fertilizer use for each 
province in the beginning of year 1979 because these provincial differences are supposed to be captured by 
the provincial dummy variable 𝜙". 
 
 71 
The dependent variable 𝑦"$ is the effective irrigated area as a share of total sown area 
in province	𝑖 and time 𝑡. The independent variable 𝐼𝐶 refers to the ratio of the amount of 
loan borrowed by individuals over the amount borrowed by collectives. This IC ratio 
directly measures the degree of loan borrowed on an individual basis versus on a 
collective basis. It is therefore the key regressor of the model. Adding a subscript,	𝐼𝐶"	$,- 
refers to the IC ratio in province	𝑖 and in year 𝑡 − 1, or one year in advance. The reason 
to use the one-period lagged IC instead of the contemporaneous IC ratio is the existence 
of time lags between borrowing and using loans. This time lag is especially noticeable 
between investment decision and implementation regarding irrigation projects. Usually, 
irrigation building and maintenance works take place in winter when farming work is 
minimal and surplus labor is available. The irrigation works that conclude in year 𝑡 
usually started in the last several months of year 𝑡 − 1 in the beginning of the winter, 
after investment decisions were made. Therefore, the completed irrigation work recorded 
in the official statistics as effective irrigated land should be traced back to the credit 
borrowed in the previous year. 𝐼𝐶"	$,- here captures this lagged effect between the time 
when credit is borrowed, investment decisions are made and the time when the 
investment project is completed and recorded in the official statistics.  𝑋"$ is a vector of control variables including the real rural income per capita, real loan 
per capita and climate variables; 𝐼𝐶"	$,- ∗ Ζ"$ refer to the interaction terms between the 
one-period lagged value of IC and all the control variables in 𝑋"$ except the climate 
variables. This subset of controls denoted by Ζ"$ includes the contemporaneous real 
income level, as well as the contemporaneous and one-period lagged value of real loan. 
The main reason to include interaction terms between the 𝐼𝐶 ratio and the specified 
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controls is that the 𝐼𝐶 ratio imposes different effects on the outcome variable depending 
on the values of these controls. For example, at a higher income level, one would expect 
that the households or collectives might be less dependent on borrowing credit to make 
investment decisions, and therefore the form of loans should show weaker effects on 
investment outcomes. Similarly, one would expect that with different amounts of 
available credit, the forms of borrowing might impose different impacts on the eventual 
investment decisions. All these possible differences in the impacts could be captured 
through the interaction terms of income and 𝐼𝐶, as well as loan and 𝐼𝐶. 
Although this model aims to identify the variables that affect irrigation investment, a 
reverse causality might also be in play.65 To take account of this endogeneity issue, I use 
the one-period lagged value of real income as the instrumental variable for the current 
income level. The income level of the previous year is correlated with the current income 
level, but does not correlate with the investment in the current year. Therefore it meets 
the criteria for an instrumental variable (IV) for the income control variable in the model. 
The second model focuses on the investment decisions on fertilizer use. The 
specification is as follows: 𝑦"$ = 𝛽 ∗ 𝐼𝐶"	$ + 𝑋"$ + 𝛾 ∗ 𝐼𝐶"	$ ∗ Ζ"$ + 𝜙" + 𝜏$ + 𝜀"$ 
This model specification looks slightly different from that for the irrigation 
investment, mainly because of the different time horizons to carry out the investment 
projects. In particular, the key regressor in this model specification is the 
contemporaneous form of borrowing indicated by 𝐼𝐶"	$ as compared to the 𝐼𝐶"	$,- in the 
																																																						
65 Binswanger& Rosenzweig (1986) noted how irrigation projects reduce the demand for credit through 
reducing the seasonality of production and increasing the total production as well as diversifying the risk 
associated with double cropping.  
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model for irrigation investment. This is because fertilizer investment can be made 
immediately. It is reasonable to expect a negligible time lag between when credit is 
borrowed and when fertilizer is used. Except for this slight difference, this model 
resembles the previous model for irrigation investment with respect to the use of the 
dependent variable, control variables, interaction terms, and instrumental variable. 
 
2.3.2 Why use irrigation and fertilizer as the key dependent variables? 
Irrigation and fertilizer represent two very different types of agricultural investment. 
In China, irrigation investments cost about 400 USD per hectare.66 Irrigation projects 
usually take about 1 to 20 years depending on the sizes.67 Irrigated plots yield 
significantly higher level of crop production compared to non-irrigated plots (Huang et. 
Al 2006). As long as irrigation facilities are well maintained, their benefits to agricultural 
production stability could last for several decades.68  
However, one type of irrigation facilities, tube wells, that started to surge among rural 
households in 1990s needs to be singled out from the irrigation works we focused in this 
essay. Household tube wells are usually criticized for draining out more water than 
necessary and for doing more harm than good to agricultural sustainability (Lv 2010). 
The data coverage in this essay ends in 1989 so the potential negative effects of tube 
wells do not influence the results. 
																																																						
66 These costs are estimated based on the irrigation projects conducted in China in 1999. The money value 
is expressed in terms of USD of 2000 level. See Database on Investment Costs in Irrigation from the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, at 
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/investment/index.stm, retrieved on April 30th, 2016. 
67 For example, Miyun Reservoir of 4.3 billion cubic meters in Beijing takes two years to complete the 
construction. Longyangxia Reservoir of 24.7 billion cubic meters in Qinghai Province takes 16 years to 
complete the contruction. 
68 The Miyun Reservoir was constructed in 1960 and is still well functioning. 
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On the other hand, chemical fertilizers cost only about 150 USD per hectare, less than 
half of the costs for irrigation facilities (Pray et. al 2002).  The return from using fertilizer 
is often immediate, within one crop season. The positive impacts of fertilizers can be best 
illustrated by the significant improvement in crop yields during the Green Revolution 
period (Tilman 1998). However, the heavy use of fertilizer also brings detrimental effects 
on the environment. For example, studies show that fertilizers are often accompanied by 
significant loss of soil-water and soil organic carbon (SOC) that is crucial for maintaining 
soil productivity (Huang 2003; Srinivasarao 2014).  
I generalize the features of the two types of investment with the recognition of the 
positive impacts of fertilizers as well as the negative effects of certain types of irrigation 
facilities. In this essay, I use irrigation to represent the type of investment that involves a 
slow yet long-run reward for sustainability, and fertilizer to represent the investment that 
aims for an immediate return, but can be short-sighted in nature as it is inconsistent with 
agricultural sustainability. 
 
2.3.3 Supply versus demand effect and the relevant endogeneity issue 
A shift from collective-based loan to individual-based loan, indicated by a higher 
value of the IC ratio, may have twofold implications. Following decollectivization, 
communes and production teams were divided and the dominant mode of production in 
the rural area became small-household production. As a result, a higher share of credit 
was demanded by individual households. If this mechanism plays the dominant role, then 
we conclude that the impact on the IC ratio comes mainly from the demand side. On the 
other hand, since decollectivization is a policy imposed by the state, one would suspect 
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that the rural finance institutions show bias towards lending to individuals rather than 
collectives. If this mechanism is in operation, then there is also a supply-side impact on 
the IC ratio.  
The measure of the IC ratio itself does not distinguish between the supply-side and 
the demand-side effects. Yet I argue that the dominant impact on the IC ratio comes from 
the demand side. First, the rural finance reform starting from the 1980s ensures self-
sufficiency and profit-orientation as the main goals for rural finance institutions. 
Collective loans on average have higher repayment rates compared with individual 
loans.69 So profit-wise, one should not expect an institutional bias towards making loans 
to individuals. Although policy does encourage making loans to individual households to 
echo the decollectivization campaign, there is no specific requirements regarding what 
the size of loans should be made to individuals rather than collectives.70 Therefore the 
actual form that any rural loans take should still be interpreted as driven by the 
borrowers’ needs. 
Another reason why demand-side effects play a dominant role in the IC ratio is as 
follows. In theory, individual households can still coordinate the small loans they 
borrowed individually to make large-scale investments, such as irrigation that requires 
higher costs. The reality is that these individual households simply did not collaborate 
when the coordination platforms no longer existed after decollectivization. No matter the 
rural finance institutions favor making loans to individuals or collectives, in the end it is 
the level of solidarity among the households. Here the term “solidarity” specifically 
																																																						
69 From 1980 to 1989, the average repayment rate of collectively-borrowed agricultural loans is 91.45%, 
compared with 84.96% for the individually-borrowed agricultural loans. The repayment advantage of 
collectively loans is more significant from year 1980 to 1986, but was caught up in the last three years of 
the statistics. See page 73 to 76 in the China Rural Finance Statistical Yearbook 1979-1989. 
70 See page 54 of the Yunnan Province Rural Finance Chorography. 
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refers to the possibility of collaborative organization that influences the choice of the 
forms of borrowing.  
The demand-driven form of borrowing in the Chinese case contrasts with that in the 
microfinance practices. In the microfinance setting, banks determine whether loans are 
made to groups or individuals based on the associated default risks with the two distinct 
practices. In the beginning of the microfinance history, the dominant lending practice was 
group-based (Herms and Lensink 2007). Now individual-based lending is also taken by 
the most well-known microfinance institutions such as the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh 
and is expected to be gaining a higher share of the microfinance loans in the future 
(Lehner 2009). 
It is tempting to associate the IC ratio with the level of decollectivization, and thus 
consider the level of decollectivization as a missing variable in the regression analysis. 
However, these two statistics are very different. Xu (2012) uses a variable called “HRS 
Adoption” to measure the percentage of production teams which adopted the Household 
Responsibility System, or the de-facto small-farm production. This statistic was only 0.01 
in 1979, and then jumped to 0.98 in 1983, and 0.99 until 1987 when the data are 
available. This suggests that while there was only one percent of the production teams 
being decollectivized in 1979, the decollectivization was almost complete by 1984. 
However, the IC ratio shows a different picture. Across the provinces, the IC ratio was, 
on average, about 0.12 in 1979, and became about 1.55 in 1984, and remained in the 
range of 1.4 to 1.6 until 1987. This suggests that even when decollectivization is almost 
complete as when HRS adoption percentage became 0.99, the individual loans at that 
time consist of only about 60 percentage of the total loans on average. This is because 
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HRS measures the land ownership following a state-imposed decollectivization policy, 
while the IC ratio measures the solidarity, or the possibility for collaborative work of the 
collectives. Collectives with strong solidarity in the collective era still have the 
coordination network which enable them to borrow and invest on a collective basis, even 
if lands are mostly distributed to individual households already. 
This divergence between the two statistics suggests that the IC ratio is a more 
accurate measure of the solidarity of the collectiveness compared to HRS which measures 
the level of decollectivization. The irrelevance between the two variables also suggest 
that the concern for the missing variable is invalid.  
 
2.4 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
2.4.1 Panel data selection 
The econometric analysis is based on a panel dataset of 28 provinces and 11 years 
(1979-1989). There are altogether 308 observations for each variable. The time range is 
chosen to reflect the largest possible variations for the variable IC ratio (i.e. individual 
versus collective loan) from the av2.ailable data sources. Prior to 1979, the rural sector in 
China was still collectively based, and the statistics do not have a category for individual 
loans.71 After 1989, The China Rural Finance Statistical Yearbook eliminated the 
category of collective versus individual loans. During 1979 to 1989, rural collectives 
were gradually dismantled at various rates depending on the historical conditions of 
																																																						
71 The national Rural Finance Statistics only recorded provincial level data from 1979. Yet provincial level 
Finance Statistics include agricultural loan data for years prior to 1979 as well and we can use it as a 
reference for the statistical categories for rural finance in the pre-1979 period. For example, Tianjin Rural 
Statistics show that from 1949-1978, agricultural loans are broken down to three categories as down 
payment loans (yugou dingjin daikuan), state-run agricultural loan (guoying nongye daikuan), and 
collective agricultural loans (shedui nongye daiguan). No individual loans are recorded. 
 78 
individual collectives. The variation in paces of decollectivization allows the largest 
possible variation in the IC ratio, although these two indicators are not identical.72 
The selection of provinces is mainly based on the data availability. I excluded the 
data for Hainan and Chongqing due to the administrative change that has affected the 
data availability.73 Xizang (Tibet) was not included because a series of variables was not 
available for this province. After excluding these three areas, there are altogether 28 
administrative units in the datasets.74  
 
2.4.2 Irrigation variable 
The dependent variable for the first regression model is the irrigation variable.  It 
specifically measures the share of the effectively irrigated area in the total sown area. The 
unit of this variable is percentage. The numerator of this measure is the total effectively 
irrigated area. It refers to the area of level land (in 1000 hectares) that has water sources 
and complete sets of irrigation facilities to lift and move adequate water for irrigation 
purposes under normal conditions (Fan and Zhang, 2002). The effective irrigation area is 
a reasonable proxy for irrigation investment because it contains information of both the 
investment made to build new irrigation facilities and that made to maintain existing 
irrigation facilities. This number is then normalized with respect to the sown area (in 
1000 hectares) in each province. This is to ensure that neither the irrigation investment 
nor the fertilizer use level is over-weighted for those provinces with larger geographical 
																																																						
72 I discussed the reason in Section 3.3 
73 Hainan became administratively a province in the People’s Republic of China after 1988, Chongqing 
after 1997. 
74 The administrative units include both provinces and autonomously-run cities such as Shanghai which are 
at the same administrative level as provinces. 
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areas. The information is extracted from China Compendium of Agricultural Statistics 
1949-2008.75  
The effectively irrigated area is a cumulative concept. It is a stock variable that 
includes not only the flow of irrigation investment in the contemporaneous year, but also 
the investment and maintenance work in the previous years. In this sense, it is not an 
ideal measure of irrigation investment for any given year. Alternatively, one can use the 
growth rates of effectively irrigated area to measure the investment flow. However, using 
growth rates has its own problems. This is because irrigation involves not only the newly 
irrigated area but also the maintenance of the already irrigated area, both requiring 
investment in irrigation. While a zero growth rate of the effectively irrigated area 
suggests zero investment in irrigation, it significantly underestimates the the actual 
investment because it cannot capture the investment made for irrigation maintenance 
work.76 The maintenance work involves both labor inputs which are not acknowledged in 
the statistics, and also the investment in purchasing materials that are needed for building 
irrigation facilities in money units. If there are reliable statistics for the depreciation rate 
of the irrigation facilities, we can use the depreciation data and the level measure of 
effectively irrigated area to calculate the actual net investment for year. However, such 
statistics are not available. Therefore, even a growth rate measure cannot capture the 
actual net investment flow that we are interested in.  
																																																						
75 Xin Zhongguo Nongye 60 Nian Tongji Ziliao.Page 97, Sheet 3-2-3. 
76 The average expenditure on irrigation maintenance work is estimated to be about 10-20 RMB per mu 
every year. For the total 0.95 billion mu effectively irrigated area in China, the maintenance costs are about 
14.3 billion RMB (or 2.5 billion dollars) every year. See Establishing Municipal Maintenance Foundation 
for Small-Scale Irrigation (Jianli Caizhen Xiaoxing Nongtian Shuili Sheshi Weixiu Jijin) at 
http://zx.pinghu.gov.cn/ucms/html/zx/col1401/2013-06/06/20130606165954872181703_1.html, 
retrieved on April 29, 2016. See Aiming for 60% of Effectively Irrigated Area with Efficient Water Use by 
2020 (Lizhen 2020 nian jieshui guangai mianji zhan youxiao guangai mianji chao 60%), at 
http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0929/c1001-25759350.html, retrieved on April 29, 2016. 
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Some studies use the number of pumps (Binswanger et.al 1993; Rosenzweig& 
Wolpin 1993;Dinar& Keck 1997) as a measure of net irrigation investment for each year. 
Using physical tools for irrigation certainly is convenient for deducting the net increase in 
investment, however physical tools are only part of the costs involved in irrigation 
investment. Material and labor inputs for constructing ponds, drainage, ditch and weirs 
(gou, tang, qu, yan), which are the major irrigation projects carried out by rural 
collectives cannot be captured by simple statistics such as the numbers of pumps.77 Some 
micro-level analyses use categorical variables to indicate the irrigation status, such as 
plots that are irrigated by surface water, ground water, both or neither (Huang et.al). Such 
status variables are also measures of the stock of irrigation facility and are used with 
similar reasoning that this essay applies to use a stock variable. However, this micro-level 
survey dataset China National Rural Survey does not cover the key period with the 
largest variation in individual versus collective loan ratios on which I focus here.   
This paper uses the share of effectively irrigated area in the total sown area because it 
contains the information of all the possible formats of irrigation work including both 
irrigation construction and irrigation tools purchasing to ensure that the land is effectively 
irrigated. Also it is a level measure so it does not cancel out the crucial information of 
maintenance work as in the growth rate statistics. I discuss the regression results when 
using growth rate statistics for irrigation in Section 5.6 for comparison purpose.   
 
																																																						
77See featured discussion on rural irrigation construction, at http://news.sohu.com/s2010/dianji395/, 
retrieved on April 29, 2016  
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2.4.3 Fertilizer variable 
The dependent variable for the second model is fertilizer use. It measures fertilizer 
consumption normalized by the size of the sown area. The unit of this variable is 
kilogram per hector of land. The information is based on China Compendium of 
Agricultural Statistics 1949-2008.78 Like the irrigation variable, I also discuss the 
regression results when using the growth rate statistics for fertilizer in Section 5.6 for 
comparison purpose. 
 
2.4.4 Key regressor: IC ratio 
The most critical independent variable I use in this regression is the IC ratio. The IC 
ratio is defined as the ratio of individual loans relative to collective loans from formal 
rural finance institutions.79 Exclusion of informal rural finance is based on the fact that 
until the year 1990, the informal loans are mainly made from family members or 
relatives. They neither resembled the private loans undertaken at present in terms of 
market interest rate, nor were they for productive use. By 1990, the loans for productive 
investment were still predominantly made from state-owned financial institutions. Since 
this paper focuses on studying rural finance and its impact on rural productive 
investment, the loan information from institutional sources is more relevant. 
I constructed this ratio for each province based on the statistics from China Rural 
Finance Statistical Yearbook 1979-1989. From page 178 onwards, detailed statistics are 
																																																						
78 Xin Zhong Guo Nongye 60 Nian Tongji Ziliao.Page 97, Sheet 3-2-3. 
79 The terms used in China Rural Finance Statistical Yearbook 1979-1989 are Collective Agricultural 
Loans (Jiti Nongye Daikuan), and Rural Household Loans (Nonghu Nongye Daikuan) 
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available for the constitution of loans from Agricultural Bank of China and Rural Credit 
Cooperatives for all provinces in China.  
Table 1 below presents the IC ratio of each province for the years 1979, 1984 and 
1989 (the first, sixth, and the eleventh years respectively). As we can see, IC ratios do not 
share a common pattern among all provinces. Most provinces experienced a significant 
increase in the IC ratio between 1979 and 1989 (with the exception of Shanghai and 
Beijing). This indicates that most provinces in China experienced a significant 
transformation in the form of borrowing rural credit, from one on a collective basis to one 
predominantly on individual basis. We can also see that a quarter of the provinces 
experienced a sharp increase in the IC ratio in the first 6 years and then the IC ratios 
dropped. The way of organizing the rural finance units reflected the overall mode of 
production in the rural sector. The variations in the patterns of IC changes are consistent 
with the variability in the timing and pace of decollectiviation across provinces. Some 
implemented it thoroughly and persistently with the result of a sharp increase in the IC 
ratio throughout the 11 years of the study period. Some provinces left the rural finance 
units as a cushion for the fast decollectivization of agricultural production. This is 
indicated by a mild decrease of IC ratio in the second half the year period of study. 
 
2.4.5 Other regressors 
Other independent variables include the income variable, the loan variable, and the 
dummy variables on climate regions. These are all control variables for the purpose of 
this exercise. 
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The income variable specifically measures the inflation-adjusted annual net income 
per capita of rural households. I collected the data from China Compendium of Statistics 
1949-2008 published in 2010. By definition, the net income of rural households is the 
total income of rural households minus operational expenditure for rural households, 
depreciation of productive assets, tax and contract fee for household responsibility system 
and transfer to family relatives.80 Total income includes both income in-cash and in-kind, 
adjusted by the market price of the “kind”.81 The operational expenditure, by definition, 
includes all operational costs that are attributed to that year’s gain, thus including 
fertilizers, seeds, pesticides for use of that year yet excluding those purchased but were 
put stock for future use.82 According to Binswanger (2006), household income is 
especially important in affecting the rural agricultural investment. Some other relevant 
factors can also be reflected in this income control. These factors include the imported 
food price (Hayami& Kikuchi 1978; Svendsen& Mark 1994; Dinar& Keck 1997); high 
costs of irrigation equipment and technology (Svendsen& Mark 1994); general 
profitability from farm work (Binswanger 2006) and other related income factors 
(Rosenzweig& Wolpin 1993). 
The loan variable measures the inflation-adjusted agricultural loan per capita. The 
data source is constructed from China Rural Finance Statistical Yearbook 1979-1989. 
The reason for including loan as explanatory variable is that the development literature 
(Binswanger et.al 1993; Rosenzweig& Wolpin 1993; Dinar& Keck 1997) recorded the 
																																																						
80 Definition and Calculation of net income for rural household. http://www.xydcd.com/onews.asp?id=636 
81 90% percent of market price for grain and meat ,85% market price for other agricultural-related products 
were calculated as “in-kind” price, to reflect the difference of in-kind and in-cash income. 
http://www.china001.com/show_hdr.php?xname=PPDDMV0&dname=LI6R841&xpos=13 
82 Definition and Calculation of net income for rural household. 
http://www.china001.com/show_hdr.php?xname=PPDDMV0&dname=LI6R841&xpos=13 
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importance of credit constraints in affecting agricultural investments. This is especially 
true for investments that take much longer time to see effects, such as irrigation 
investments. 
In addition to income level and credit availability, the development literature suggests 
that climate condition a critical determinant for irrigation investments, including rainfall, 
temperature and humidity (Dinar& Keck 1997). Detailed information for these climate 
variables at the provincial level is not available prior to 1986. Therefore, half of the 
information will be missing if they are to be used. Instead, I construct dummy variables 
according to the official geographical division based on information on rainfall, humidity 
and temperature. According to this standard, China is divided into four regions: humid, 
half-humid, half-drought and drought regions. Since many provinces are located at 
overlapping regions, the dummies I constructed are humid regions (11 provinces), half-
humid regions (4 provinces), humid and half humid regions (6 provinces), half humid and 
half drought regions (2 provinces), and half drought and drought regions (5 provinces). 
 
2.4.6 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 summarizes the key variables in the estimation. The ratio of the amount of 
loan lent to individual households versus lent to collectives, or the IC ratio, averages 
about 2.13 over the sample period across the provinces. It has increased dramatically, 
from a mere 0.14 in 1979 to 4.22 in 1989. This pattern indicates that following the 
decollectivization policy, a rising share of loans were lent to individuals. Those loans are 
more than four times the amount of loans lent to collectives in 1989. The share of 
effectively irrigated area in the total sown area increased only slightly, from 32.06% in 
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1979 to 33.38% in 1989. The fertilizer use per sown area has increased by 77% over the 
time span, from 149.31 kilograms per hector in 1979 to 264.74 kilograms per hector in 
1989. Table 2 also shows that the total amount of loans measured by individual 
household level has increased by a huge amount over the year, while the real income on 
the per capita level increases at first, and then declined modestly from 1984 to 1989. The 
summary of weather dummies show that among the 28 provinces in the dataset, humid 
regions take the highest percentage of 39%, followed by regions covering both humid and 
half-humid areas which take about 21% of the total land. Regions covering both half-
humid and half-drought areas take the lowest percentage of total land, of only 7%. 
Table 3 presents the detailed breakdown of key variables by different income and 
loan quintiles. As we can see, the IC ratio peaked when income is at its 60% quintile 
level and when loans are at its 80% quintile level. The share of effectively irrigated area 
in the total sown area peaked when income is at its maximum quintile level and when the 
amount of loan is at its lowest quintile level. Fertilizer use also peaked when income is at 
its maximum quintile level, but when the amount of loan is at its 80% quintile level. This 
summary suggests that different levels of income and loans have different impacts on IC, 
and the two dependent variables representing irrigation and fertilizer investment. It also 
implies that a different combination of the income and loan level would predict different 
values of irrigation and fertilizer investment. This is why we need to separate out the 
effects of income and loans when considering the relationship between the IC ratio and 
irrigation/ fertilizer investment in the model. This also explains why I include interaction 
terms in the model to capture the different combination of income and loan levels. 
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In Figure 2.1 I present the scatterplots of the IC ratio and the irrigation variable as 
a preliminary examination of the possible relationship between the two variables. Figure 
2 present the scatterplots for IC ratio and the fertilizer variable. Both scatterplots are 
plotted using the logged value and the pooled sample across years and provinces. A fitted 
line and also a 95% confidence interval are also presented on the scatterplots to suggest 
possible relationship of statistical significance.  
As we can see, Figure 2.1 shows a negative correlation between the IC ratio and 
the share of the effectively irrigated area as suggested by a slightly tilted fitted line 
running from upper left to lower right. Most of the scatterplots are clustered within the 
95% confidence interval, implying a strong negative correlation. On the other hand, 
Figure 2.2 shows a positive correlation between the IC ratio and the fertilizer use per 
hectare of sown area as suggested by a fitted line running from lower left to upper right. 
Again, this positive correlation seems quite strong as most of the observations are 
clustered within the 95% confidence interval.  
This preliminary examination suggests that more rural credits borrowed at an 
individual level is associated with less investment devoted to irrigation building and 
maintenance. On the other hand, more rural credits borrowed at an individual level is 
associated with higher level of fertilizer use. However, this association does not imply 
causality as the scatterplots only show the relationship between two variables without 
controlling other variables. To strictly examine the impact of IC on the two investment 
variables, we need to control for other possible effects such as income, loan and climate 
variables in a fully specified formal model.  
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2.5 Results and Discussions 
2.5.1 Interpretation of coefficients when the dependent variable contains a fraction 
value 
The fact that the irrigation variable is a fraction value between 0 to 100% invites 
some discussion about the interpretation of coefficients in the regression model. A simple 
numerical example will show the theoretical foundation of interpreting the change in the 
dependent variable as a percentage point change. Suppose both the dependent variable 
and control variable are level values rather than log values, then the coefficient 𝛽 = ∆8∆9 
implies that one level increase in x leads to 𝛽 level change in y. If y is a fraction (i.e. 
between 0 and 1), then we can rewrite the equation into 100*	𝛽 = -::∗∆8∆9 . This rewritten 
equation suggests that one level increase in x leads to 100*	𝛽 percentage point increase in 
y. When both the dependent variable and control variables are also transformed to its log 
form, then the interpretation should be an elasticity change of y as a result of x 
(percentage change as a result of percentage change). In this paper, the coefficients are 
thus interpreted as percentage point increases as a result of percentage increases. 
Alternatively, one can address the fractional dependent variable by estimating the 
variables in a fractional response model or a zero one inflated beta models. However, 
there is no empirical evidence showing that these alternative model specifications are 
theoretically better than the simple OLS regression model. This essay therefore adopts 
the simple OLS regression specification. 
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2.5.2 The upper bound limit on the share of effectively irrigated area does not create 
problems for the estimations 
Several concerns could be raised regarding the value range of the dependent variable 
in the model, or the share of effectively irrigated area. First, the estimation needs to rule 
out the possibility that some agricultural land does not need irrigation either due to 
plentiful and reliable water or crops that do not need irrigation. This is because, if such 
natural endowments exist widely, one should expect an upper bound for the share of 
effectively irrigated areas, well below 100%, on the land that is suitable for irrigation. 
Second, the stagnating growth in the share of effectively irrigated area during 1979-1989 
might be explained by an upper bound limit as a result of an already sufficient level of 
irrigation. In this case, any additional establishment of irrigation facilities only leads to 
diminishing returns.  
There are four main reasons why these concerns do not present serious problems. 
First, agricultural land is defined as effectively irrigated when it is equipped with basic 
irrigation facility, and/or with constant water resources, and/or with relatively flat land 
level, so that the land could be effectively irrigated within the present year. The key idea 
behind this definition is that the agricultural land could only be categorized as effectively 
irrigated when it has the capability to endure any unforeseen drought event in the same 
year. Even if the agricultural land has plentiful and reliable water resources, the water 
still needs to be channeled out when too much is reserved for future use. Being endowed 
with plentiful water resources does not suggest that the farmland should be completely 
rain-fed, or kaotian chifan, (i.e. completely depend on the natural forces without any 
basic facility to prevent or fight for flood or drought events). The 2010 drought in 
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Yunnan province proved to be out of expectation because Yunnan is endowed with most 
reliable waterfalls. However, without updated irrigation facilities to accumulate and 
channel water for future use, it had been struck hard by a historically rare drought.83 
Second, the major crops in China, such as rice, wheat, corn, soybeans and tuber crops 
are all water-dependent.84 As a matter of fact, two-thirds of the Chinese crops need to be 
produced on the irrigated land (Gao 1998). Even for traditionally rain-fed farmland, 
supplementary irrigation is essential in generating optimal yield even on the (Bello, 
2008). Dry-farming is a technique only developed to cope with the fact some land cannot 
be effectively irrigated so is not ideal. Therefore, the mere existence of non-water-
dependent crops do not justify the stagnation of irrigation building and maintenance 
during the period examined in this paper.  
Third, based on the definition of effectively irrigated area, a mere 33.9% of total 
sown area in 1989 suggests that only one-third of the sown land has the capacity to 
endure drought and flood events. Even at present, the percentage of effectively irrigated 
area in rural China is so low that it threatens food security. In 2010, it is estimated that 
less than half of the sown area in China is effectively irrigated. The Chinese Academy of 
Science interpreted this as a dangerous sign for drought that could potentially threaten 
food security and economic stability.85 Given the urgent need for irrigated area, a mere 
																																																						
83 The village in Yunnan that is under discussion in this article reported that the only irrigation facility they 
have was built in 1958, during the Great Leap Forward. Yet due to lack of maintenance, no one dares to use 
it to accumulate full level of water. Irrigation building is too lagged behind in South West China to endure 
the historically rare drought weather (Lishi Hanjian de Ganhan Tianqi Tuxian Xinan Shuili Jianshe 
Zhihou), published on March 23rd, 2010, on http://news.sohu.com/20100323/n271020821.shtml, retrieved 
on November 20, 2015.  
84 China in brief----Agriculture. Retrieved on November 21, 2015, at http://www.china.org.cn/e-
china/agriculture/crop.htm. 
85 China Academy of Science, Irrigation building as the key national policy and be prepared for fighting 
natural disasters (Jiang shuili jianshe zuowei jiben guoce, wei dikang zaihai zuohao zhunbei); published on 
March 23rd, 2010, on http://news.sohu.com/20100323/n271039548.shtml, retrieved on November 19, 2015. 
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increase in the share of effectively irrigated area from 32.1% to 33.9% from 1979 to 1989 
does not represent progress. Therefore, the irrigation level in the time period under 
examination is far from adequate for a populous and land-scarce country like China. 
Fourth, methodologically there is a weather control in the model, so that natural 
differences among provinces (i.e., humid, half-humid, half-drought and drought regions) 
are controlled in the model.  
 
2.5.3 Effects of IC ratio on irrigation investment 
Table 4 summarizes the regression results. They show the coefficients for each 
control variable. For example, the coefficient of -0.14 for lagged IC in column 2 suggests 
that after controlling for all other variables listed in column one, a one percentage point 
increase in the IC ratio from last year leads to a 14 percentage point decrease in irrigation 
investment. However, note that the control variables also include the interaction terms of 
lagged IC with income and loans, as shown in column one. The coefficient of lagged IC 
in this case only reports the partial impact of lagged IC because the rest of the impact 
from IC has been controlled through its interaction terms with other variables. The same 
problem applies to the coefficients reported in column 3 and 4 for the analysis on 
fertilizer use. To fully account for the effect of IC on either irrigation or fertilizer use, we 
need to take into account its total effect both through the interaction terms and its partial 
effect reported by the coefficient of non-interaction term of IC. We do that by calculating 
the marginal effects of IC. The results are presented in Table 5 and Table 6.  
Table 5 and 6 report the marginal effects of the key control variables including 
IC, income and loan variables. Weather, provincial and year effects are not reported but 
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they are all controlled in the regression analysis. The first row of Table 5 shows the 
marginal effects of 𝐼𝐶"	$,- on the irrigation investment. To calculate the marginal effect 
of 𝐼𝐶"	$,-, both the coefficient of 𝐼𝐶"	$,-, or 𝛽, and the coefficient of the interaction terms 
involving 𝐼𝐶"	$,-, or 𝛾$*Ζ"$ are taken into account. The results of the marginal effects of 𝐼𝐶"	$,- are presented with income and loan (Ζ"$) setting at their mean values. 
As we can see, the lagged IC has a statistically significant negative impact on the 
irrigation investment in both the basic specification and in the specification including the 
instrumental variable (IV). At this level, a one percent increase in the one-period lagged 
IC ratio would lead to 2 percentage point lower share of effectively irrigated area in the 
total sown area. That is to say, on the same income and loan level, more loans made to 
individuals versus to collectives will lead to a lower level of investment in irrigation 
building and maintenance work. 
2.5.4 Effects of IC ratio on fertilizer investment 
Table 6 presents the regression analysis for fertilizer investment in both its original 
specification (Model 2) and an alternative specification for robustness check (Model 3). 
In Model 2 where only contemporaneous effects of IC are considered, the estimation 
results suggest that the IC ratio has a significant positive impact on the fertilizer use in 
both the basic specification and in the IV specification. Specifically, a one percent 
increase in the IC ratio would lead to about a 10 percent point increase in fertilizer use, 
whether the endogeneity issue is addressed by IV or not.  
For a robustness check, I use an alternative specification which includes both 
contemporaneous and lagged values of IC in the regression model. This is because it is 
possible that in certain rural areas, borrowing entails a significant time lag between when 
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the loan was recorded to be lent to the rural households, and when it actually reaches the 
rural households for any investment. In this specification where both contemporaneous 
effects and lagged effects are considered, results suggest that a one percent increase in the 
contemporaneous IC ratio leads to a 6 percent increase in fertilizer use in both the basic 
specification and in the IV specification. Compared with the first specification, the 
impact of contemporaneous IC on fertilizer use is weaker in this specification because the 
partial impact was accounted for through last year’s IC ratio, although not with statistical 
significance. The contemporaneous IC ratio still has the strongest and the most 
significantly positive impact on fertilizer use compared with other control variables.  
 
2.5.5 Marginal effects of Income and Loan 
The marginal effects of income and loan on both the irrigation and fertilizer 
investment are also worth some discussion. As we can see, the income level (both 
contemporaneous and lagged) shows negative impact on irrigation investment, although 
this effect is statistically insignificant. This direction of impact is counterintuitive, as one 
would expect higher income level leads to higher investment in irrigation. However, the 
data suggest that the causation runs in the opposite direction. Higher income might be 
directed to other types of investment, such as purchasing fertilizer rather than to build and 
maintain irrigation facilities. This is because the rural decollectivization on the one hand 
weakens the solidarity among individuals, and on the other hand, makes it practically 
more difficult to cooperate for large-scale irrigation projects. This argument is confirmed 
by the positive coefficients of income (both contemporaneous and lagged) in the fertilizer 
model. 
 93 
The loan effects show similar patterns. The coefficients for the loan variables (both 
contemporaneous and lagged) are negligible and statistically insignificant for investment 
in both irrigation and fertilizer. This suggests that compared with the form of borrowing, 
the amount of borrowing has much weaker impacts on the actual investment. 
 Overall, the results of this exercise suggest that once the IC ratio, together with 
weather, provincial and time effects are controlled, income and loan are irrelevant as 
explanatory variables in determining investment in irrigation and fertilizer. This result is 
consistent with the main argument of this essay, that the form of borrowing, collective or 
individual, has a crucial impact on the types of investment.  
 
2.5.6 Alternative measures 
Alternatively, I used the growth rate of the effectively irrigated area as the dependent 
variable in the regression analysis for investment in irrigation. In this specification, I use 
the level value instead of the log value for the dependent variable because the dependent 
variable is already a growth rate measure. A level value is easier for interpretation. Table 
7 presents the results. As we can see, the marginal effect of the lagged IC ratio has lost its 
significance in this specification. Even some of the coefficients for the income and loan 
controls turn negative which is counterintuitive. One reason could be the inaccurate 
measure of irrigation investment by this growth rate variable as discussed in Section 4.2. 
Moreover, the R-square declined to below 20%, indicating that this specification is 
insufficient to capture the relationship between lagged IC ratio and growth rates of 
irrigation as the dependent variable.86  
																																																						
86 Whether another specification will capture the effects of IC on the growth rates of irrigation will be 
studies in further research. 
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2.5.7 Discussion 
The empirical evidence from these regression exercises suggests that collective 
borrowing leads to a higher level of irrigation investment. As was discussed in Section 
3.2, investment in irrigation contributes to the sustainable development of agriculture in 
the long run as compared to investment in fertilizer use. Therefore, this empirical result 
also implies that collectives are capable of making decisions that extend beyond 
individual horizons. This result is consistent with the theoretical elaboration that the 
social discount rate is lower than private discount rate, and therefore private investors are 
more inclined towards obtaining rewards in the short run. 
Of course, collectives vary in their patterns of operations. Ostrom (2009) summarized 
some common attributes of successful collectives. They include clear and locally 
understood boundaries between legitimate users and nonusers, full participation of 
individuals who are affected by collective choices, monitoring users and resources, etc. 
China’s collectives are also heterogeneous, so not all of them should realize the potential 
for success. Here I emphasize that when some basic conditions are met, collectives have 
the capability of making investments that contribute to the sustainable development in the 
rural sector. These conditions include the the sizes of the collectives as well as the 
accessibility to trusted and organized platforms for production. I argue that the collectives 
in China during the collective era have met these two basic conditions. This was one of 
the key reasons that the empirical result in this essay suggests the advantage of 
collectives over individual households in making investment decisions that meet with the 
sustainability criteria. 
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The first condition is that the size of the collectives must be sufficient to ensure the 
benefits through economies of scale. The average size of a production team, which was 
the basic accounting unit for collective production, is 20 to 30 households.87 This size of 
collective production can easily take advantage of large-scale machinery, irrigation 
facilities as well as laborers. For example, Patnaik (1987) documented how tea 
production requires manuring in the slack season, tea plucking in the busy season, and tea 
picking with coordinated sequence as its essential labor activities. These activities, as 
noted by Patnaik (1987), was most efficiently achieved by production teams of several 
dozen workers rather than by individual households.  
The second condition is a trusted and organized platform for production. Compared 
with the Soviet Union, China’s collectivization was achieved with far less social 
disruption and without drastic economic losses (Nolan 1976). On the contrary, the 
number of farm animals and the grain output in China increased during and after 
collectivization (Ibid). This condition suggests a much more voluntary and cooperative 
basis for China’s collectives compared with those in the Soviet Union.  
These attributes of the rural collectives in China provide the preconditions for their 
capabilities of utilizing rural credits in order to raise the overall loan effectiveness. This 
finding also provides a possible explanation for the persistent credit constraint after de-
collectivization despite surging credit supply. The changing forms of borrowing had 
imposed a negative impact on the overall loan effectiveness.  
																																																						
87 See the Notice Regarding the Basic Accounting Units for People’s Commune (Zhonggong zhongyang 
guanyu gaibian nongcun renmingongshe jiben hesuandanwei wenti de zhishi), released on Feb 14th, 1962. 
See http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66669/4493583.html, retrieved on June 13th, 2016. 
 96 
This finding also sheds light on the explanations towards the disappointing outcomes 
with respect to the majority of microfinance projects. Collectives do more than make 
investment decisions, they also have the resources to carry out the investment project 
collectively. Microfinance borrowers may make group decisions, but they lack the 
capability to carry out the large-scale projects such as irrigation because eventually they 
do not have a trusted and coordinated platform for collective production. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This paper examines the different agricultural investment patterns as a result of the 
change in the forms of borrowing rural credits. This change refers to fact that the majority 
of rural credits are borrowed on an individual basis instead of on a collective basis, as a 
result of the decollectivization taking place in China since the late 1970s. I focus on 
estimating how this change in the forms of borrowing affect the investments in irrigation 
building and fertilizer use respectively. The irrigation investment represents the kind of 
investment that contributes to more sustainable agricultural development yet with returns 
only in the intermediate or long run. By contrast, the fertilizer investments represent the 
kind of investment that is aimed for a quick return yet does potential harms to the 
sustainable development in the agricultural sector. 
This paper mainly builds on a two-way fixed-effects model for the estimation, taking 
account of the endogeneity issue by including the instrument variable for alternative 
specifications. I find that on the same income and loan level, a one percent increase in the 
IC ratio from the previous year would lead to a two percentage point lower share of 
effectively irrigated area in the total sown area this year. On the other hand, a one percent 
 97 
increase in the ratio of loans made on an individual basis relative to a collective basis 
would lead to about 10 percentage point increase in fertilizer use.  
Based on these results, I argue that the forms of borrowing (i.e. on a collective or 
individual base) matters significantly in decisions regarding agricultural investments. 
Collective-based agricultural lending tends to be channeled to investment that contributes 
to more sustainable agricultural development yet with returns only in the intermediate or 
long run (such as irrigation). This empirical result also implies that collectives are 
capable of making decisions that think beyond individual horizon. This is because the 
rural collectives in China met two basic conditions that allow them to utilize rural credits 
with relatively better loan effectiveness. They are large enough to achieve economies of 
scale, and they have a collective production basis which by nature requires coordination 
and mutual-trust that are crucial in carrying out large-scale project such as irrigation 
building.   
This finding contributes to the understanding of the transition in agricultural mode of 
production and its impacts on agricultural investment. It suggests one possible 
explanation for the credit constraint issue in China. It also sheds light on the explanations 
towards some of the unsuccessful microfinance practices in developing countries.  
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Table 2.1. IC Ratio by Province for the 1st, 6th, 11th years (continued onto next page) 
 
	  1979 1984 1989 
Beijing 0.18 0.51 0.08 
Tianjing 0.08 1.62 0.48 
Hebei 0.10 1.96 5.77 
Shanxi 0.07 2.26 2.83 
Neimenggu 0.13 1.04 2.77 
Liaoning 0.16 1.28 1.00 
Jilin 0.10 4.00 3.86 
Heilongjiang 0.08 1.65 2.91 
Shanghai 0.18 0.43 0.07 
Jiangsu 0.13 0.99 0.48 
Zhejiang 0.15 1.55 2.84 
Anhui 0.08 2.70 4.89 
Fujian 0.11 1.32 1.61 
Jiangxi 0.14 2.81 6.13 
Shandong 0.09 0.93 0.78 
Henan 0.10 3.01 6.22 
Hubei 0.21 1.51 2.19 
Hunan 0.18 3.19 5.00 
Guangdong 0.16 2.35 2.04 
Guangxi 0.18 1.87 4.00 
Sichuan 0.30 8.07 11.20 
Guizhou 0.34 2.98 5.79 
Yunnan 0.28 6.89 7.22 
Shannxi 0.12 2.41 9.01 
Gansu 0.09 1.50 5.34 
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Qinhai 0.06 2.17 7.83 
Ningxia 0.12 2.06 10.40 
Xinjiang 0.12 2.16 5.40 
 
Source: China Rural Finance Statistical Yearbook 1979-1989. 
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Table 2.2. Summary Statistics of Key Variables (continued onto next page) 
 
Sample Statistics Unit Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
	  	  1979 1984 1989 
1979-
1989 
	  
IC ratio (Individual 
versus collective loan) 
N/A 0.14 2.33 4.22 2.13 2.54 
Share of Effectively 
Irrigated Area in Total 
sown area  
Percentage 32.06 33.48 33.87 33.38 15.54 
Fertilizer use Kilogram 
per hector 
149.31 195.33 264.74 197.3 132.6 
Real income per 
capita 
RMB (at 
1978 price 
level) 
175.82 337.97 330.39 291.83 111.35 
Inflation adjusted 
agricultural loan to 
individual households 
per capita  
RMB (at 
1978 price 
level) 
21.37 47.66 53.49 40.97 46.54 
Weather dummies 	  	  	  	  	  	  
Humid 
regions 
N/A 0.39 0.49 
Half-
humid regions 
N/A 0.14 0.35 
Regions 
covering both humid 
and half-humid areas 
N/A 0.21 0.41 
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Regions 
covering both half-
humid and half-
drought areas 
N/A 0.07 0.26 
Regions 
covering both half-
drought and drought 
areas 
N/A 0.18 0.38 
 
Note: Number of observations in this table is 308. 
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Table 2.3. Sample Statistics by Income and Loan Quintiles 
 
Source: Calculated by the author. 
  
Quintiles 
IC ratio 
Share of effectively 
irrigated area in 
the total sown area 
Fertilizer use (kilo 
per hector) 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Income (Lowest) 0.27 0.33 0.30 0.14 141.42 103.56 
Income (Second) 2.51 2.8 0.28 0.11 201.99 140.99 
Income (Third) 3.66 3.42 0.32 0.14 213.38 150.87 
Income (Fourth) 2.87 2.05 0.37 0.21 179.15 121.77 
Income (Highest) 1.25 1.31 0.40 0.14 252.12 119.50 
Loan (Lowest) 0.5 0.71 0.37 0.15 184.42 136.31 
Loan (Second) 1.49 1.95 0.35 0.14 176.40 131.99 
Loan (Third) 3.2 3.19 0.33 0.19 194.30 109.08 
Loan (Fourth) 3.3 2.98 0.30 0.12 225.41 125.31 
Loan (Highest) 2.17 1.95 0.32 0.16 205.30 155.03 
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Table 2.4. Regression Results for Level of Irrigation and Level of Fertilizer Use 
(continued onto next page) 
 
  Dependent Variables 
Specification Irrigation Fertilizer 
 Basic IV Basic IV 
IC   0.43** 0.59*** 
   (0.20) (0.19) 
Income -0.06 -0.03 0.18** 0.15 
 (0.04)  (0.05) (0.11) (0.12) 
IC*Income   -0.04 -0.08** 
   (0.03) (0.03) 
Loan 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
IC*Loan   -0.02** -0.02 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
IC (-1) -0.14* -0.14*   
 (0.07) (0.08)   
Income (-1)  -0.04  0.09 
  -0.05  (0.11) 
Loan (-1) 0.00 0.00   
 (0.01) (0.01)   
IC (-1)*Income 0.02 0.04   
 (0.01) (0.03)   
IC (-1)*Loan 0.00 ‘-0.00   
 (0.01)  (0.01)   
IC (-1)*Income (-1)  -0.02   
   (0.03)   
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IC (-1)* Loan (-1) 0.00 0.00   
 (0.01)  (0.01)   
Climate controls Y Y Y Y 
Year and provincial 
controls Y Y Y Y 
R^2 and Adjusted R^2 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.97 
Source: Calculated by the author. 
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Table 2.5. Marginal Effects of lagged IC ratio on the level of irrigation 
 
  Model 1 IV 
IC (-1) 
-0.02*** -0.02*** 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Income 
-0.07 -0.04 
(0.05) (0.05) 
Income (-1) 
  -0.04 
 (0.05) 
Loan 
0.00 0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Loan (-1) 
0.00 0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) 
 
Source: Calculated by the author. 
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Table 2.6. Marginal Effects of IC ratios on the Level of Fertilizer Use 
 
  Model 2 IV Model 3 IV 
IC 
0.1*** 0.1*** 0.06** 0.06*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Income 
0.19* 0.14 0.17 0.19 
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) 
Loan 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
IC (-1) 
  0.04 0.04 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
Income (-1) 
      0.08 
   (0.13) 
Loan (-1) 
    0.01 0.01 
    (0.03) (0.03) 
 
Source: Calculated by the author. 
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Table 2.7. Marginal Effects of lagged IC ratio on the growth rate of effective 
irrigated area 
  
  Model 1 IV 
IC (-1) 
-0.00 -0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Income 
-0.03 -0.02 
(0.04) (0.05) 
Income (-1) 
-0.01 -0.02 
(0.05) (0.05) 
Loan 
0.00 -0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Loan (-1) 
-0.01 -0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) 
 
Source: Calculated by the author. 
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Figure 2.1. Scatterplot of the Irrigation and IC 
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Figure 1. Scatterplot of the Irrigation and IC
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Figure 2.2. Scatterplot of the Fertilizer and IC 
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CHAPTER 3 
RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT IN CHINA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this paper, I estimate the impact on employment creation through investments in 
three renewable energy sectors in China, i.e. solar, wind and bioenergy. I also make 
comparable estimates for China’s traditional fossil fuel sectors, i.e. coal, oil and natural 
gas. 
The underlying issue at hand motivating this research question is the massive global 
challenge to dramatically reduce greenhouse gas emissions and thereby control climate 
change. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the 
leading global authority on this question, global emission will need to fall by 39 percent 
from 2010 levels by 2030 and 72 percent by 2050, in order for there to be a decent 
prospect to achieve climate stabilization (IPCC 2014). 
At present, China is one of the two leading countries in terms of both energy 
consumption and CO2 emissions. Together, China and the U.S. account for nearly 39% 
percent of world energy consumption. Their respective levels of energy consumption 
were nearly identical in 2010, with China at 100.9 quadrillion BTUs (Q-BTUs) and the 
U.S. at 98 Q-BTUs. In terms of carbon emissions, China is at a higher level, at 7,997 
million metric tons (mmt), while the U.S. is at 5,637 mmt. Together, they account for 43 
percent of all global carbon emissions. Obviously we must give major attention to 
developments in China, along with the United States, in terms of mounting an overall 
project for controlling climate change.  
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The climate change has huge impacts on China’s domestic environment in terms of 
water shortage, air pollution and soil degradation. At present, the average northern 
Chinese has access to less than a fifth of the supply of usable water that is above the 
international threshold for water stress—the stress level being 1,000 cubic meters of 
usable water per person per year.88 Cities in China’s Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River 
Delta, and Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region suffer over 100 haze days every year, with 
PM2.5 (particles with an aerodynamic diameter less than 2.5 micrometer) concentration 
two to four times above the World Health Organization guidelines.89 Moreover, one-fifth 
of China’s arable land is contaminated with heavy metals, making the land scarcity issue 
even worse.90  
Further, at the beginning of 2013, the Health Effects Institute announced that outdoor 
air pollution contributed to 1.2 million premature deaths in China in 2010 alone, which is 
nearly 40 percent of the global total. Preliminary estimates suggest that about 11 percent 
of cases of cancer of the digestive system may be attributable to polluted drinking water 
in China.91 Drinking water for roughly 190 million of the rural population contains 
harmful substances that exceed health standards. Regarding food security issues, it is 
estimated that extreme drought could more than triple crop losses in northeast China to 
13.8 million metric tons, or 12 percent of the total production, by 2030.92 Moreover, 
																																																						
88 The Economist (2013): Desperate Measures. Published on Oct 12th 2013 at 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21587789-desperate-measures, retrieved on October 23, 2014. 
89 Greenpeace (2012): Dangerous Breathing—PM2.5: Measuring the human health and economic impacts 
on China’s largest cities. 
90 Josh China and Brian Spegele, China’s Details Vast Extent of Soil Pollution. The Wall Street Journal, 
published on April 17th, 2014 at 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304626304579507040557046288, retrieved on October 
23, 2014. 
91 See China Water Risk (2010): China’s Water Crisis Part I. 
92 McKinsey & Company, From Bread Basket to Dust Bowl, November 2009 
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today, pollution has replaced land disputes as the main cause of social unrest in China.93 
During the 11th Five-Year Plan period (2006-2010) there were over 300,000 
environmental complaints and this number has been growing at an average annual rate of 
29 percent since 1996.9495 
All these environmental issues are translating into unsustainable elements in China’s 
current growth model. In response to the growing domestic and global focus on the issue 
of climate change, the Chinese government is making efforts to substantially reduce 
emissions.96 If China can succeed in reducing CO2 emission from energy-based sources, 
this will also significantly alleviate the related crises with respect to air pollution, water 
shortage and soil contamination. 
In 2011, the Chinese government set as a target the reduction of the country’s level 
of carbon intensity—i.e. its carbon dioxide emission per unit of GDP—by 17 percent 
from 2010 to 2015.97 In fact, as of 2013, this number has already fallen by about 20 
percent compared with five years ago and the government is aiming to cut it further.98 In 
2011, the government aimed at increasing the non-fossil-fuel share of total primary 
energy by 11.4 percent by 2015—the target was then quickly revised upward to a more 
																																																						
93 Bloomberg News, Chinese Anger Over Pollution Becomes Main Cause of Social Unrest. Published on 
March 6th, 2013 at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-06/pollution-passes-land-grievances-as-
main-spark-of-china-protests.html, retrieved on October 23, 2014. 
94 Figures from the China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) 
95 Announcement made by Yang Zhaofei, vice-chair of the Chinese Society for Environmental Sciences in 
2012. 
96 Osnos 2009, Green Giant. The New Yorker, December 21st, 2009. 
97 See No.41 State Council document on controlling the emission of greenhouse gas in 2011. 
98 The East is Grey, The Economist. Published on Aug 10th, 2013, at 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21583245-china-worlds-worst-polluter-largest-investor-green-
energy-its-rise-will-have, retrieved on October 23, 2014. 
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ambitious one: 20 percent of its energy from renewable energy sources by 2020, the same 
target as in richer Europe.99 
In 2012, China has reclaimed its top position from the United States in terms of 
renewable energy investments, totaling $65 billion, 20 percent more than in 2011 and 
constituting 30 percent of all renewable energy investment from G-20 countries. In 2013, 
China invested more in renewable energy than the whole of Europe (Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance 2014).  
China’s big push on investing in renewable energy since 2007 implies a promising 
future of a greener economy in China. However, one of the concerns for building a 
renewable-based economy is the likelihood that a significant contraction of production 
within China’s traditional energy sectors—i.e. coal, oil and natural gas—will lead to 
major employment losses in these traditional fossil fuel sectors. Such employment losses 
could potentially trigger further economic instability in a populous country like China. 
How to implement this structural change while guaranteeing a smooth transition in 
employment is thus highly relevant in discussing the feasibility of the renewable energy 
plan in case of China. 
The potential trade-off between environmental protection and employment stability 
has been a concern in the literature regarding the economic impacts of substituting fossil 
fuel energy with renewable energy (Rose and Wei 2006; Lehr et.al 2008; Moreno and 
Lopez 2008; Alvarez et. al 2009; Frondel et.al 2009; Pollin et. al 2009; Ragwitz et.al 
2009; Mitchell 2011; Pollin et. al 2014).100 However, in the case of China, the 
																																																						
99 See 2011-2015 Five Year Plan. Also see The East is Grey, The Economist. Published on Aug 10th, 2013, 
at http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21583245-china-worlds-worst-polluter-largest-investor-green-
energy-its-rise-will-have, retrieved on October 23, 2014. 
100 See also Atkin 2014. How Obama’s Climate Rule Could Change The U.S. Job Market. Posted online on 
June 6, 2014 at ThinkProgress. http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/06/06/3444200/clean-energy-epa-
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employment issue has not been adequately addressed. To date, there are no reliable 
estimates of the employment impacts of renewable energy investments in China.  
This essay addresses the employment issue through estimating the relative 
employment impacts of renewable energy investments versus spending within the 
traditional fossil fuel sectors. My estimates are based on input-output modeling with 
China-specific data of sectorial and sub-sectorial weighting techniques within China’s 
input-output (I-O) model. This paper aims to make a contribution to the research 
literature in several ways. First, it is focused on the unique labor market structure of 
China. Second, working with China-specific data, it estimates the job creation in the 
renewable energy sectors as well as the traditional fossil fuel sectors, providing empirical 
evidence relevant to the feasibility of a transformation in China to a clean-energy based 
economy. Third, this study, examines employment generation in terms of formal and 
informal jobs within China. This enables us to also consider the issue of the quality of 
jobs being generated by clean energy investments, as opposed to focusing only on the 
quantity of jobs.  
I find that spending within three segments of the renewable energy sectors—solar, 
wind and bioenergy—will, in combination, produce about twice as many jobs per dollar 
of expenditure than an equal amount of spending on fossil fuels. This demonstrates that 
there need not be any significant tradeoff in China between environmental protection and 
expanding job opportunities in a transition to a renewable-based economy.  
																																																						
rule/. See also Dickerson 2014. EPA rules draw wide criticism in W.Va, posted online on June 2nd, 2014 at 
The West Virginia Record. http://wvrecord.com/news/267555-epa-rules-draw-wide-criticism-in-w-va. 
Retrieved on September 6, 2014. 
 121 
With respect to job quality concerns, I also find that more than 70 percent of jobs 
generated by renewable energy investments are created in China’s informal economy. 
Informal economy jobs in China, as elsewhere, are characterized by lower pay, and a lack 
of benefits and basic protections for workers. The high proportion of informal jobs 
generated by renewable energy investments in China thus does raise major concerns 
about these new job opportunities. At the same time, I also find that the proportion of 
informal sector jobs in China’s coal, oil and natural gas sectors are roughly equivalent to 
the proportions of informal jobs in renewable energy. Thus, considering both quantity 
and quality of job issues, the results of my estimates demonstrate that, for the case of 
China, the project of building a clean energy economy does not face the prospect of a 
massive obstacle in terms of negative employment effects. 
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. In section 2, I present a 
brief overview of the existing literature regarding estimates of employment generation 
through investing in renewable energy sectors in China. My critical review suggests that 
to date, there are no reliable estimates of the employment impacts of renewable energy 
investments in China, or any relative employment effects of renewable energy 
investments versus spending within the traditional fossil fuel sectors. In section 3, I 
introduce the input-output model. I also discuss the advantage and limitation of this 
methodology through comparing it with alternative approaches. In section 4, I discuss the 
data sources and data construction methods used for estimation. Specifically, I discuss the 
input-output data, employment data decomposed into formal and informal sector, as well 
as the cost breakdown of both renewable energy and fossil fuel sectors in China. In 
section 5, I present the main results from my estimation exercises. These results include 
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figures for employment generation per $1 million in solar, wind, bioenergy, coal, and oil 
and gas sectors—i.e. the “employment-output ratios” for each of China’s energy sectors. 
I also specify the composition of the employment in terms of formal and informal jobs, as 
well as direct and indirect jobs. The indirect jobs here refer to the jobs created by 
purchases from the supplies of the renewable energy sectors. Moreover, I present the 
projection for total employment generation from the renewable energy sectors by 2015, 
2020, 2030 and 2050. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
One of the strongest obstacles to a successful transition to a green economy is the 
consequential job loss that will occur as in economy’s fossil fuel sectors (Mitchell 
2011).101 If job loss in the fossil fuel sectors outweighs those generated in the renewable 
energy sectors, then the economy will suffer an overall decline in its employment level. 
Therefore to some analysts, building a green economy poses a severe trade-off between 
environmental protection and employment stability (Rose and Wei 2006; Alvarez et. al 
2009; Frondel et.al 2009). This issue has become especially sensitive after the recent 
economic crisis as the USA and many European countries are experiencing economic 
stagnation with high unemployment level. Yet a growing body of literature has examined 
the employment generation of investing in renewable energy, arguing that these 
investments in general generate higher employment-output ratios in an economy’s energy 
																																																						
101 See also Atkin 2014. How Obama’s Climate Rule Could Change The U.S. Job Market. Posted online on 
June 6, 2014 at ThinkProgress. http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/06/06/3444200/clean-energy-epa-
rule/. See also Dickerson 2014. EPA rules draw wide criticism in W.Va, posted online on June 2nd, 2014 at 
The West Virginia Record. http://wvrecord.com/news/267555-epa-rules-draw-wide-criticism-in-w-va. 
Retrieved on September 6, 2014. 
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sector activities than the fossil fuel sectors (Lehr et.al 2008; Moreno and Lopez 2008; 
Pollin et. al 2009; Ragwitz et.al 2009; Wei et. al 2010; Strietska-Ilina et.al 2011; Pollin 
et. al 2014).102 As a result, the employment level as a whole will not decline.  
The employment impacts of investing in renewable energy are highly relevant to the 
discussion on the feasibility of a green economy plan in China. Although using renewable 
energy to substitute for traditional energy is critical for China to combat environmental 
pollution and greenhouse gas emissions in particular, it is also crucial to examine whether 
a significant reduction in production from traditional energy sectors will induce 
employment losses, especially since employment issues could potentially trigger severe 
economic instability in a populous country like China.  
The existing literature has never treated employment impacts of investing in 
renewable energy in China as a primary concern. Existing estimates either lack a 
transparent methodological discussion or do not provide a clear definition of employment 
as a concept. They are therefore incapable of serving as a solid empirical evidence for 
policy discussions on building clean energy economies. Most employment estimates 
appear in the official documents or think tanks affiliated to the government, mainly as a 
justification for the big push on renewable energy development. But even these have 
stopped appearing in the literature since 2012, exactly when the renewable energy 
investment plan began being implemented. It is therefore not surprising to see a shortage 
of serious studies on this topic, especially from the Chinese-language studies.  
																																																						
102 See also Union of Concerned Scientists: Benefits of Renewable Energy Use. 
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/our-energy-choices/renewable-energy/public-benefits-of-
renewable.html#jobs 
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Table 3.1 summarizes the employment estimates of renewable energy investments in 
China from the recent literature. Specifically, I organize the literature as follows. Column 
1 presents the methodology used in these studies. Column 2 examines whether they have 
specified the various kinds of renewable energy technologies in their employment 
estimates. Column 3 examines whether employment estimates are specified as formal or 
informal employment. Here the formal employment refers to those jobs with regular 
working hours and benefits and are protected under state labor laws. By contrast, 
informal employment refers to jobs outside the formal economy, with low pay, little job 
security, few or no benefits, and no legal protection. The specification between formal 
and informal employment is crucial because although they can be treated equivalently in 
the quantitative sense, one job in the informal economy implies significantly lower job 
quality relative to one created in the formal sector.103 Column 4 examines whether 
employment estimates are identified as direct or indirect jobs. Direct jobs refer to the core 
activities in the energy sectors whereas indirect jobs refer to those jobs generated through 
the supply chains associated with renewable energy production. Distinguishing direct and 
indirect jobs helps to specify the composition of the employment opportunities in the 
renewable energy sectors. Column 5 presents information on the relative spending level 
for the employment estimates available in the examined studies. Column 6 categorizes 
the employment estimates in terms of stocks or flows and the last column shows the 
employment estimates. 
A brief overview of the table shows a wide range of estimates over various time 
spans with no consistent methodology or definition for any systematic comparison. In 
																																																						
103 More detailed discussion on formal and informal employment in China is in Section 4.2 through 4.5. 
Data construction for the formal and informal employment is presented in Section 4.3 and 4.5. 
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terms of the methodology, almost half the studies do not specify their estimation base 
(CREIA 2009; China’s 12th Five Year Plan 2011; CCICED 2011; NDRC 2012).104 Some 
studies resort to qualitative methods such as interviews or literature surveys (UNEP et.al 
2008; IRENA 2011; REN21 2013). Only two studies discuss the quantitative methods 
they use and the relevant assumptions (CASS 2010; Greenpeace 2012). CASS (2010) 
uses the Input-Output model (I-O) at a very aggregated level. Multipliers are calculated 
for the interactions among only three sectors: agricultural, industrial and service sector (p 
86-7). An I-O model could provide detailed information on the interactions among 
various sectors, and therefore allow estimation of employment from the relevant sectors. 
However, information on only three sectors is too general to even distinguish the 
composition of various different renewable sectors. Therefore the estimation results will 
not be the most reliable.  
The calculations by Greenpeace (2012) are based on the assumptions that “for every 
new megawatt of capacity installed in a country in a given year, 14 person/years of 
employment is created through manufacturing, component supply, wind farm 
development, construction, and transportation” and “0.33 person/years” necessary “for 
operations and maintenance work at existing wind farms”, which “seems to work as a 
global average” according to Greenpeace (2012). A key disadvantage of these 
assumptions is that they treat various renewable energy sectors within and among 
countries as having the same employment-output ratios. Although this might be useful as 
a first approximation for a global estimate, they are incapable by nature to estimate the 
																																																						
104 Keith Bradsher “China is leading the race to make renewable energy”, The New York Times, published 
Jan 30, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/business/energy-
environment/31renew.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, Accessed in November 3rd 2013. 
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employment-output ratios for individual renewable energy sectors, and for specific 
countries. 
Most studies in this literature survey have specified the employment generation 
among wind, solar, and bioenergy sectors. However, it is still impossible to make 
comparisons among these estimates, as some of the studies focus only on one sector of 
their interest (Greenpeace 2012; NDRC 2012), yet other produce estimates for a 
combination of the three sectors as a whole (UNEP et.al 2008; REN21 2013). Some 
studies do not even specify the kind of renewable energy sectors they are estimating 
(CREIA 2009; CCICED 2011). For example, CCICED (2011) estimated that China 
would generate 10.58 million jobs in the green sector between 2011 and 2015 while 
losing 952,100 jobs in high polluting and energy-intensive industries.105 Yet these 
employment estimates are for the “green sector” in general, including not only the 
renewable energy sectors examined in this paper, but also all the other sectors such as the 
waste management sector that contributes to a green economy. This information on the 
total employment of the generally defined “green sector” is thus of little value in 
understanding employment-output ratio of individual renewable energy sectors.  
Regarding the definition of employment, not a single study in this literature survey 
discusses its employment estimates for the Chinese case in terms of formal and informal 
employment categorizing. Only two studies (CASS 2010; REN21 2013) specify the 
																																																						
105 Li Jing “Green industries to add millions of jobs,” China Daily, Nov 16th 2011. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-11/16/content_14101445.htm, accessed in Nov 3rd 2013. In this 
essay, I mainly refer to the 12th Five Year Plan for comparison because no clear-cut renewable energy 
target has become available in the 13th Five Year Plan (2016-2020) by the time this paper is written. See 
discussion on solar energy development in the 13th FYP at http://www.lsxy-
edu.com/html/xuexiaoxinwen/429.Html , published on August 24th, 2014 and retrieved on October 2, 2014. 
Also see talk by the Director of the National Energy Bureau regarding wind energy development in the 13th 
FYP at http://finance.sina.com.cn/energy/news/20140821/150520080922.shtml, published on August 21st, 
2014 and retrieved on October 2, 2014.  
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employment estimates with regard to direct or indirect jobs, despite a slight difference in 
the definition used in this paper.106 CASS (2010) estimated that about 567,000 direct jobs 
and 1.52 million indirect jobs could be generated in the energy-saving and environment-
related sectors. REN21 (2013) estimated that, from 2009 to 2012, 267,000 people were 
working in the wind sector, 300,000 in the solar PV industry, 1.1 million in the solar 
power industry, and 380,000 in the biomass sector.  
Almost half the studies do not specify the spending level with respect to the 
employment estimates. CASS (2010) suggested that among the four trillion RMB 
stimulus-package issued by the Chinese government during the financial crisis, about 580 
billion RMB (or 14.5 percent) was directly related to ecological infrastructure. NDRC 
(2012) shares the same investment estimates with China’s 12th Five Year Plan that total 
renewable energy investment between 2011-2015 amounts to 1.8 trillion RMB. However, 
in most cases, an investment amount was not estimated relative to specific renewable 
energy sector. It is therefore difficult to estimate how much employment is generated 
relative to certain spending level for each renewable energy sector. Finally, the use of 
stocks or flows for employment estimation is also inconsistent among the existing 
literature, making it hard to undertake direct comparisons.  
In general, the existing literature has not provided any serious estimates for 
employment generation through renewable energy investment in China. More 
specifically, the literature does not provide either a clear methodology for estimation or 
even a clear concept of the term “employment.” It is therefore reasonable to conclude 
that, to date, there are no reliable estimates of the employment impacts of renewable 
																																																						
106 Note that definition of direct and indirect jobs in REN21 (2013) is slightly different from this paper 
whereas the former does not include R&D jobs as direct jobs. 
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energy investments in China, or any relative employment effects of renewable energy 
investments versus spending within the traditional fossil fuel sectors. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Input-output model 
This paper mainly builds on the Input-Output (I-O) model adopted in studying the 
United States case in Pollin et.al (2009) to estimate the employment impacts of renewable 
energy investment in China. A typical I-O model records detailed information on the 
supply and demand relationships between various industrial sectors and distinct 
categories of final demand in the economy.107 The I-O model is as follows: 𝑋" = 𝑎"-𝑋- + 𝑎"<𝑋< + ⋯+ 𝑎">𝑋> + 𝐷" (1) 𝑋 = 𝐴𝑋 + 𝐷    (2) 𝐼 − 𝐴 𝑋 = 𝐷  (3) 𝑋 = (𝐼 − 𝐴),-𝐷	(4) 
In the first equation, 𝑋" indicates the output produced by the 𝑖th sector;	𝑎-" indicates 
the required input from the 𝑖th sector to produce output for the 𝑗th sector. Equation (2) 
contains the same information as in equation (2), only is written in the vector form, where 
notation A indicates an i by j matrix containing all elements of 𝑎"- through 𝑎">. Equation 
(3) is a re-writing of equation (2) where notation I indicates an identity matrix. Equation 
																																																						
107 The I-O model is based on aggregate identities where the total output for any sector is assumed to be 
fully consumed by two channels: one is directly consumed by final users (i.e. household consumption, 
investment, government expenditure and exports; the other is consumed as inputs by other sectors for 
output production. 
 129 
(4) expresses X in terms of all the other components in the equation with the assumption 
that (I-A) is invertible. 
The I-O model shows how much materials (input) from each sector in the economy 
are used up by economic sector X to produce the goods and services (output) for the 
consumption of households, private businesses investment, government expenditures, and 
exports. Information on imports is also included, often implicitly, in the I-O model, 
through the documentation of “leakages.” It follows that the more detailed breakdown of 
economic sectors in an I-O model (e.g., rice farming sector versus agricultural sector in 
general), the more precise the inter-sectorial information and hence the employment 
estimation based on it. An example illustrates how an I-O model tracks the change in all 
the economic sectors caused by an initial increase in final demand. An increase in 
purchases of smart phones will cause purchases of intermediate inputs to rise (e.g., 
electronic components). Higher demand for electronic components will, in turn, increases 
demand for the inputs used by the electronic components industry (e.g., steel or plastics), 
and so forth. Given this information from the I-O model, we can estimate that following 
an investment (one element of the final demand) increase in, say, the solar energy 
industry, how the relevant sectors such as those manufacturing solar panels, and those 
producing steels or plastics for the manufacturing of solar panels, respond to the change.  
One challenge in using an I-O model to estimate how the increase in spending in 
certain renewable energy sectors affects the whole economy is that these renewable 
energy sector activities are not as yet specified into distinct industrial sectors, such as 
“solar energy sector” or “wind energy sector.” To solve this issue, I use information on 
the cost components of such investment from the existing literature and then use the 
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existing sectors within the I-O model to construct a new renewable energy sector based 
on the weighting structure that reflects such cost composition. The first step in the 
estimation is to calculate the output/investment ratio (O/I ratio), meaning how much 
change in output will be induced by a change in the investment level, as is discussed 
above.108 The second step is to calculate the employment/ output ratio (E/O ratio), which 
indicates how much employment is required to produce a certain output level of 
renewable energy goods. Assuming a linear model, the multiplication result of the row 
vector E/O and the matrix O/I implies the E/I ratio, suggests the total employment 
generation from investment in the renewable energy goods. 
 
3.3.2 Methodological concerns 
The assumption of a linear I-O model creates some limitations that need to be 
addressed. To put it into the context of this paper, linearity here suggests that the 
employment impacts of a $1 billion renewable energy investment project will be exactly 
1000 times greater than a $1 million spending on the same project. However, this 
assumption might not be able to generate the most accurate estimates in some situations. 
First, the basic linear I-O model does not incorporate any supply constraints that 
might occur from investing, for example, 1,000 times more in the same project. Yet 
within the current context of the Chinese economy, which is operating with substantial 
overcapacity especially after the 2008 global economic recession, it is reasonable to 
assume that supply constraints are less binding than demand constraints in the short and 
intermediate term. 
																																																						
108 This O/I ratio corresponds to the Leontief inverse coefficient, generated through matrix manipulation on 
the raw I/O data. 
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Second, the basic linear I-O model also assumes that relative prices are fixed 
regardless of any changes in demand. For example, if demand for solar panels declines 
due to the economic recession, then prices of the panel will fall. This could provide 
incentives for purchasing more solar panels therefore raise the demand again. This issue 
could be addressed in a more fully specified model such as in Computable Generable 
Equilibrium (CGE) model yet with its own limitation as discussed later. 
Third, when applying basic linear I-O model, productive relationships are assumed to 
be stable over the period of analysis. This assumption would seem especially relevant in 
employment estimation of the renewable energy investment. However, when put into the 
context, it only implies that productive relationships such as those between the 
manufacturing sector and construction sector in building solar energy are fairly stable, 
which is realistic to a certain extent. In Section 5.4, I compare the output-investment ratio 
I-O tables from 1995 to 2011 to show that productive relationship among sectors could be 
realistically assumed to be fairly stable in the context of China.   
Fourth, the static I-O model does not incorporate the treatment of time dimension 
either. It is certainly realistic to think that investment and employment generation occurs 
over a reasonable amount of time period rather than happening at one fixed point in time. 
A dynamic model would address this concern more accurately yet it is not necessary for 
this paper since the estimates cover an intermediate term rather than a specific year.  
The advantage of a relatively simple and transparent I-O approach is seen more 
clearly by comparing it with the Computable Generable Equilibrium (CGE) model, which 
is a relatively more complex modeling framework. In the CGE models, price dynamics, 
supply constraints and technological change are incorporated into the basic I-O structure 
 132 
through assumptions on a variety of price elasticities and equilibrium conditions. 
Critically, most CGE models operate with an assumption of full-employment. Despite the 
crucial roles these assumptions play in the model, they are almost impossible to be 
identified. In addition, these models are usually proprietary. This proprietary nature 
generally presents independent verification of the logic of the model. Also, the 
assumption that the economy operates at full employment at all times is unrealistic and 
inherently contrary to the purpose of using the model, which is to estimate the number of 
job creation through investments. Compared with the CGE model, the I-O model has 
critical benefits in terms of its relative simplicity, clarity, minimum number of behavioral 
assumptions and ability to handle details more fully as a result.  
In general, a basic linear I-O model is still the most effective available tool for 
estimating the employment effects of a large-scale renewable energy investment project 
in a national economy.  
   
3.4 Data Construction and Discussion 
3.4.1 Input-output data 
Starting from 1987, the Chinese Statistics Bureau published the Input-Output Table 
of China every five years, with the most recent one in 2007.109 This 2007 I-O table is the 
most detailed table since 1987, providing information on the 135-industry level basis.110 
A more recent I-O table, if available, would be preferable for more accurate prediction of 
																																																						
109 Unfortunately the 2012 I-O table that was supposed to be published one year ago has not come out yet 
by the time this paper is written.  
110 The 135 sectors include five agricultural sectors; five mining sectors; 81 manufacturing sectors; three 
utilities sectors; one construction sector; nine transportation, storage and postal services sectors; three 
communication sectors, one retail sector, two hotel and restaurant sector, two finance sectors, one housing 
sector, and 22 other services sectors. 
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employment generation. However, this more recent I-O table is not yet available.111 A 
2010 I-O table is available at 54-sector, yet I choose the 2007 I-O table for its details that 
are most critical for the estimation. Data limitation issue will be addressed and 
compensated by discussion of productivity change in section 5.5. 
 
3.4.2 Importance of separating the formal and the informal sector employment 
There are three main reasons to separate the formal and informal sectors in the 
discussion of employment impacts of investing in renewable energy. 
First, employment opportunities within the formal economy differ significantly from 
those in the informal economy in terms of job quality, even in the same industrial sector. 
If jobs generated in the formal and informal sectors are treated as equivalents, it implies 
that large numbers of jobs can be seen as an adequate substitute for low quality jobs. 
In 2012, about 75 percent employees within the urban informal economy come from 
rural migrant workers (nongmin gong) working in the cities.112 In 2013, 35 percent (or 58 
million) of the 166 million rural migrant workers work in the manufacturing and another 
23.5 percent (or 39 million) in construction, making for a total of about 97 million 
working in the urban “secondary industry.” The remaining 69 million rural migrant 
																																																						
111 From regional statistics insitution such as that in Shanghai, I found the national schedule for compiling 
and publishing I-O statistics. The regional data are expected to be submitted to the National Statistics 
Bureau around August 2013, and the national statistics is expected to be published after 2014. However, it 
is still not published by the time this paper is written. See http://tjj.stats-sh.gov.cn/trcc/index.asp 
112 Rural migrant workers are defined as those with “agricultural status” according to the household 
registration, but live on non-agricultural activities or migrate to other places for work for more than 6 
months. In 2014, National Bureau of Statistics published the data on rural migrant workers covering 2008 
to 2013 period. 163.3 million indicate the number of rural workers who literarily “migrate” to places other 
than their local geographical areas such as towns that belong to the same administration as their rural 
origin, and the ratio is based on its share of the total 218.6 million working in the urban informal sector in 
2012. See National report on rural migrant workers in 2013, published on May 12th, 2013 and retrieved on 
October 5, 2014. See http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201405/t20140512_551585.html. The 2007 data on 
rural migrant workers is not available, yet Huang (2009) reported the ratio for 2006 as about 72 percent, or 
120 million rural migrant workers over 168.2 million urban informal economy. 
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workers are working in the “tertiary industry” (or the service sector).113 This pattern did 
not change significantly since 2006 (Huang 2009).114 These are the workers “who have 
no security of employment, receive few or no benefits, and are often unprotected by labor 
laws” (Huang 2009). 
In addition to the rural migrant workers, the remaining quarter of the urban informal 
economy consists of urban residents who are laid off (xiagang) from their previous state-
owned or collective enterprises and who are now working mainly in the tertiary industry 
of services (Huang 2009). 
Table 3.2 shows the average annual wage comparison between the urban unit 
employees (or the formal sector employees) and the rural migrant workers who constitute 
the majority of the urban informal economy. As we can see, the wage for the rural 
migrant workers are no more than just 60 percent of the pay received by regular urban 
labors, and this pattern has not changed at all since 2004.115 On the other hand, 84 percent 
of the rural migrant workers are still working more than 44 hours a week in 2013.116 
Despite the low pay yet extra work time, these rural migrant workers enjoy little job 
security. In 2013, fewer than half of them are working with some kind of a contract, 
among which only 23 percent have contracts that are over one year.117 Moreover, only 
17.6 percent of the group had medical insurance and 15.7 percent of them had retirement 
																																																						
113 According to Huang (2009), these people work as domestic helps, guards of residential compounds, 
barber shop and massage parlor personnel, delivery persons, garbage collectors, street cleaners, or run 
small shops, stalls and vendors. 
114 See Report on China’s rural sector 2007: new development, new issues and new challenges published 
on April 2nd 2008. Retrieved on October 5, 2014 at 
http://www.china.com.cn/aboutchina/zhuanti/08zgshxs/2008-04/02/content_14114764.htm.   
115 See discussion on 2004 data in Huang (2009). 
116 See National report on rural migrant workers in 2013, published on May 12th, 2013 and retrieved on 
October 5, 2014. See http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201405/t20140512_551585.html. 
117 Ibid. 
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benefits in 2013.118 Although there is another 25 percent of the urban informal economy 
not represented by the rural migrant workers, it is reasonable to assume that the work and 
living situation of those workers would not be significantly better than the rural migrant 
workers due to the strong reserve army effects. 
Second, focus on the formal sector employment will leave out the entire employment 
population in the rural sector, which constitutes the preponderance of employment 
generated by investing in bioenergy. Therefore leaving out the agricultural employment 
will give an underestimation of the actual employment. 
Third, it is important to note the possibility that a rise in final demand might not 
increase employment in the informal economy as much as in the formal economy. This is 
especially relevant to those self-employed who would work more to address the rising 
demand instead of hiring more employees. It could also apply to others working in the 
informal economy that are underemployed to some extent and would be willing to work 
more hours to receive higher earnings instead of having their employers hire another 
worker. This is to say, using a national I-O model, it is not able to tell how the increase in 
total earnings, as a result of a boost in final demand will 1) increasing the number of self-
employed jobs at the prevailing earnings level; 2) increasing earnings while keeping the 
level of employment constant, or 3) some combination of the first two possibilities 
(Pollin et.al 2014a). Therefore, a separation of formal and informal sector employment 
will give a clearer picture for the job creation that are certain to be generated through 
investment (i.e. those in the formal sector), as compared to the employment generation 
																																																						
118 Ibid. 
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that might be overestimated (i.e. those in the informal sector). This issue is especially 
relevant for the bioenergy sector (see more discussion in Section 5.2). 
 
3.4.3 Employment data: formal sector employment 
The 2007 employment data are compiled from Table 3-1 in the 2008 China Labor 
Statistical Yearbook on a 90-industry level basis. The only employment data available at 
this level of detail are for the urban unit employment (danwei jiuye renyuan, a concept 
different from urban employment, chengzhen jiueye renyuan, as will be explained 
below).119 Two major groups of population are excluded from the statistical definition of 
urban unit employment: first, the entire employment population in the rural sector, which 
was about 62 percent of the total national employment in 2007 and 52 percent in 2012; 
second, those working in the urban sector but in the private enterprises, or as self-
employed or simply unregistered in the national statistics.120 This population was 22 
percent or 28 percent of the entire employment population across for year 2007 or 2012 
respectively.121  
Compared to urban employment data, urban unit employment data are more strictly 
defined in the sense that they only include employment in three types of officially 
registered enterprises, or units (danwei). They are the state-owned units (i.e. including the 
“state-owned” enterprises and the “state-holding” enterprises), urban collectively-owned 
units, and other ownership units (i.e. mixed ownership, or enterprises funded by foreign 
																																																						
119 Note that according to the statistical definition available from the China Bureau of Statistics, those who 
work in the Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs, xiangzhen qiye) are counted as rural employment, 
therefore not included in urban employment from Table 3-1. The urban and rural division here is in the 
administrative sense, unrelated to the household registration status of the worker. 
120 The percentage estimation is calculated based on Table 1-1 from the 2008 and 2013 China Labor 
Statistical Yearbook. 
121 Ibid. 
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investment, or by investments from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan).122 This type of 
employment is often associated with regular wage, normal working hours, standard 
benefits and job security, thus providing the best available estimates for urban formal 
sector employment in China. 
Table 3.3 presents the relationships among these statistical concepts for years 2007 
and 2012. As is shown, the urban unit employment (or formal sector employment), which 
aggregates employment from the three types of units, represents about 41 percent of total 
urban employment, and this percentage does not change significantly from the 2007 data 
used in this paper to the latest available employment data in 2012. 
 
3.4.4 Employment data: informal sector employment 
Table 3.3 also shows that the share of urban informal employment as of total urban 
employment (about 59 percent) is relatively stable from 2007 to 2012. The informal 
employment includes urban private enterprises and self-employment, as well as other 
urban employment that is not formally counted in the national statistics. 
The concept of private enterprises here does not imply all nongovernment enterprises 
as in the US context; they are instead defined as enterprises owned by “natural persons” 
(ziranren), therefore do not include “limited liability corporations” or “share-holding 
corporations limited” that have corporate “legal person” (fa ren) status (Huang 2009). 
They are mostly small businesses. In 2012, there were a total of 10.9 million such 
enterprises registered with a total of 113 million workers (including those registered in 
																																																						
122 State-holding enterprises refer to those mixed-ownership enterprises where the government has a larger 
share of the equity capital than any other shareholder. See “Explanatory Notes on Main Statistical 
Indicators” in the China Labor Statistical Yearbook. 
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both urban and rural areas thus the number is greater than 75.6 million in the urban 
private enterprises presented in Table 3.1), making for an average of only 10 workers per 
enterprises, including the employers of such enterprises.123 The average number for 2007 
is 13 workers per enterprise, suggesting that the size of the urban private enterprises has a 
declining trend.124 Workers in such small-scale enterprises usually enjoy little benefits or 
job security or labor law protection (Huang 2009). Although informal employment 
usually includes those working in micro-enterprises according to Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), an enterprise of average size of 10 
people cannot be counted as micro enterprises (which strictly require number of 
employees as no more than 10 people, instead of on average) based on the European 
Commission standard (Jutting et. al 2008).125 However, in this paper, I still include this 
category based on a general consensus in the literature on Chinese informal economy. 
The self-employed persons (e.g. small-shop and stall owners, artisans and 
apprentices, proprietors of small eateries and food stalls, repair shop owners, etc) 
represent about 86.3 million over 41 million entities, making for an average of 2.1 
employed persons per entity—usually the person registered together with a relative or 
friend.126 This number does not change much from 2007 with about 2 employed persons 
per entity.127 Not surprisingly this group of people do not enjoy benefits and job security 
(Huang 2009). 
																																																						
123 Calculated by author based on Table 4-8 Number of Engaged Persons in Private Enterprises at Year-end 
by Region (2012), China Statistical Yearbook (2013). 
124 Calculated by author based on Table 4-14 Number of Engaged Persons in Private Enterprises at Year-
end by Region (2007), China Statistical Yearbook (2008). 
125 See European Commission, What is an SME at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-
analysis/sme-definition/index_en.htm, retrieved on October 19, 2014. 
126 Calculated by author based on Table 4-9 Number of Self-employed Individuals at Year-end by Region 
(2012), China Statistical Yearbook (2013). 
127 Calculated by author based on Table 4-15 Number of Self-employed Individuals at Year-end by Region 
(2007), China Statistical Yearbook (2008). 
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Finally, there are about 90 million unregistered urban informal employees (recorded 
as “not formally counted” in Table 3.1), who are working as domestic helps, delivery 
workers, street vendors, and the like, with even lower levels of job security (Huang 
2009). 
The three main groups of the urban informal economy (private enterprises, the self-
employed, and the unregistered) add up to a composite picture of low pay, little job 
security, few or no benefits, and no protection under state labor laws. These 
characteristics are consistent with the features of informal economy defined by the 
International Labor Organization (ILO).128 
 
3.4.5 Constructing employment-output (E/O) ratios for the informal sector 
In this paper, employment in the informal sector refers to those working in the urban 
sector yet either employed by the small and medium private enterprises, or as self-
employed, or not formally counted by the national statistics. Rural informal employment, 
however, is not included due to the potential complication it could cause. These people, 
about 83 million people in 2007 and 103 million in 2012, usually work at “township and 
village” industries (usually manufacturing and construction sectors), or service sectors 
including transportation (e.g. truck drivers), trade (e.g. owners of small shops) and social 
services (e.g. barbers, repairmen) (Huang 2009).129 The literature on Chinese labor does 
																																																						
128 According to ILO, the characteristic features of informal employment are lack of protection in the event 
of non-payment of wages, compulsory overtime or extra shifts, lay-offs without notice or compensation, 
unsafe working conditions and the absence of social benefits such as pensions, sick pay and health 
insurance. See http://ilo.org/global/topics/employment-promotion/informal-economy/lang--en/index.htm.  
129 The 2012 data are based on National report on rural migrant workers in 2013, published on May 12th, 
2013 and retrieved on October 5, 2014. See 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201405/t20140512_551585.html. The exact data for 2007 is not available. 
The 83 million data in the paper is a simple extrapolation based on 80 million in year 2006 (Huang 2009) 
and 85 million in year 2008 from National report on rural migrant workers in 2013. 
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not have a consensus on measuring the rural informal economy. Some would only 
consider the rural non-agricultural workers who do not migrate to urban sector and are 
locally employed in rural, nonagricultural informal units as included in rural informal 
employment; Others argue that all rural employment should be considered informal (even 
including all the agricultural-related activities) because of the seasonal features of 
agricultural work, which could be as high as 476 million.130 This paper has counted the 
agricultural employment into the calculation of bioenergy employment generation.  
Constructing the employment data for the informal economy mainly rely on three 
sources. First, I refer to the employment data on the three strata of the economy (i.e. 
primary, secondary and tertiary).131 Second, I use the employment data on the urban 
private enterprises and self-employment for seven industrial sectors.132 Third, I also use 
the urban employment composition in Table 3.3 as a reference to disaggregate 
employment for industrial sectors that only have very high level of aggregation. 
Constructing informal employment data for agricultural-related sectors is 
straightforward. The three strata data provides the total employment of agricultural-
related activities. When this data is subtracted by the formal employment in agricultural-
related activities we used for calculating the formal employment-output ratio, then we 
will have the informal employment data for the five aggregated-related sectors including 
cropping, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery and service sector related to the these four 
																																																						
130 See Huang (2013), Restudy the Chinese laborers—historical evolution of labor law and the 
contemporary informal economy, at http://wen.org.cn/modules/article/view.article.php/4006, published at 
Oct 2013, retrieved at October 28, 2014. 
131 See Table 4-4 from China Statistical Yearbook (2008). The primary industry includes agriculture, 
forestry, animal husbandry and fishery; Secondary industry includes mining, manufacturing, power sector 
and construction sector; Tertiary industry includes everything else. 
132 See Table 4-13 from China Statistical Yearbook (2008). The seven industrial sectors are manufacturing; 
construction; transport, storage &post; wholesale and retail trades; hotel and catering services; leasing and 
business services; services to households and other services. 
 141 
sectors. To get an average informal employment-output ratio for the five agricultural-
related sectors, we divide the total informal employment by the aggregated gross output 
for these five sectors.  
Constructing informal employment for non-agricultural sectors are more 
complicated. In order to take advantage of all the available information regarding 
Chinese informal economy, I break down the calculation of informal employment into 
two categories: the group of people working in private enterprises or as self-employed 
(P&S), as well as the group of those not formally counted. 
For those working in the P&S, data are available for only seven sectors of high level 
of aggregation, amounting to 70 million in total. They are manufacturing; construction; 
transport, storage &post; wholesale and retail trades; hotel and catering services; leasing 
and business services; services to households and other services. The difference between 
the 70 million and the 78.9 million (see Table 3.3) of total employment in the P&S is the 
P&S employment for the remaining sectors in addition to the seven sectors, or 98 sectors 
by the details of aggregation as in the I-O model by 135 sectors. Then these 8.9 million 
workers are allocated to the remaining 22 non-agricultural sectors in the I-O model 
according to the formal employment composition in these 22 sectors.133 Thus we have the 
informal employment for all the non-agricultural sectors. 
The second category of workers who are not formally counted in the national 
statistics amounts to 94.4 million in total (Table 3.3). They are allocated to the 130 non-
agricultural sectors according to the composition of P&S employment in those 130 
																																																						
133 This allocation method assumes relatively similar formal and informal employment ratio in different 
sectors. Although the assumption might not hold for certain sectors, this is the best available method given 
the data limitation in the Chinese informal economy. 22 is the result of subtracting 135 sectors by the 5 
agricultural-related sectors and the 98 sectors with data available on the private enterprises. 
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sectors calculated from the previous step.134 The two categories of workers constitute the 
whole urban informal economy this paper focuses on estimating. Dividing this 
employment estimate by the gross output for each of the 130 sectors will give the 
informal employment-output ratio for these sectors. 
 
3.4.6 Weighting the renewable energy sector 
3.4.6.1 Selection of three kinds of renewable energy for in this paper 
This section will focus on estimating the cost components of three kinds of 
renewable energy that are of high relevance in the Chinese context, namely, solar power, 
wind energy and bioenergy.135 The reasons for the selection are explained below. 
According to China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan on energy development, installed 
capacity of solar power is expected to reach 21 GW in 2015, amounting to an annual 
growth rate of 89.5 percent from 0.86 GW in 2010.136 For reaching the 21GW target, the 
main factor is solar Photovoltaic (PV) technology—solar thermal power only accounts 
for 3GW. Thus, our calculation of the employment generation from developing solar 
energy will mainly focus on the solar PV sector.137  
																																																						
134 This allocation method assumes relatively stable ratio between those not formally counted in the 
national statistics and those counted as working for private enterprises or as self-employment in all the non-
agricultural sectors. Although this assumption might still not hold for certain sectors, it is a more realistic 
assumption than the one I use for allocating the employment group of private enterprises and the self-
employed. And again, this is the best available method given the limited information on the Chinese 
informal economy.   
135 This paper will focus on studying the employment effects of solar PV, on-shore wind and low-emission 
bioenergy. The reasons will be discussed in detail in section 4.3.1 though 4.3.3. 
136 Source: State Council January 23, The Twelfth Five-Year Plan on Energy Development. 
137 China to install 3000GW solar thermal power by 2015. Nov 2012. Extracted from website on May 15, 
2014. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-11/22/content_15950340.htm 
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Wind energy installation capacity is expected to reach 100 GW in 2015, requiring an 
annual growth rate of 26.4 percent from 31GW in 2010. Since wind energy is 
experiencing rapid development in China, it is included in the calculation.  
On the other hand, the expected installation capacity of hydropower is 290GW in 
2015 from the already existing 220GW in 2010. This essay excludes hydropower in the 
calculation for two reasons. First, hydropower has been well developed in China and 
there is limited potential for another round of major increases in hydropower installation. 
Thus, it is not of high relevance to the employment generation we are discussing here 
(Martinot and Li 2007; REN21 2012).138 Second, counting hydropower as renewable 
energy has become controversial due to the impact of dams on fisheries and water 
flows.139 
Last but not least, China's bioenergy production is estimated to exceed 50 million 
tons of standard coal by the end of 2015, and biomass electricity is expected to achieve 
13 million kilowatts capacity.140 Since the biomass energy sector contains significantly 
higher employment-output ratio than other renewable energy sectors based on the world 
experiences, I include the calculation of employment generation of biomass energy 
despite its relative underdevelopment in China for policy recommendation purpose. 
 
																																																						
138 According to REN21 (2012), China’s capacity exceeds that of Brazil, the USA and Canada combined. 
139 Is hydropower a renewable energy or not? September 2013. Extracted from the internet on May 15th 
2014. http://www.governing.com/topics/transportation-infrastructure/gov-hydropower-renewable-
energy.html 
140 Based on China’s 12th Five Year Plan (2011-15). The plan has outlined the following targets: Biomass 
Electricity: 13 million kilowatts capacity;, Biogas Annual Utilization: 22 billion cubic meters; Solid 
Biomass Fuel Annual Utilization: 10 million tons liquid; Biofuels Annual Utilization: 5 million tons. 
Hereby, bioenergy investment is expected to increase to 140 billion RMB (or 22.6 billion USD at 2012 
price level) with 100 billion annual sales turnover. Source: http://www.bbs-summit.com/en/, retrieved on 
September 27, 2014. 
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3.4.6.2 Necessity of country-specific weights 
It is necessary that our estimates be based on cost components that are specific to 
China. Figure 3.1 presents the cost components for renewable power generation 
technologies by regions covering OECD countries, Africa, Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, China, India and Latin America. As we can see, cost per kWh for the same kind of 
renewable technology can vary widely among different regions. For example, biomass 
energy costs about 0.06 to 0.29 USD/kWh in OCED European countries yet its cost in 
China ranges from 0.02 to 0.08 USD/kWh. Even within the same country, the cost 
structure of the solar industry in 2007 looked very different than it does now, due to the 
rapid technological development of the industry and the resulting significant decline in 
the costs of raw materials.  
Table 3.4 presents the estimation for the cost components of the solar industry 
conducted by China Solar PV Report 2007. We can see that the largest cost share comes 
from purchasing silicon materials (i.e. 45.2 percent of the total costs), while installation 
only accounts for 3.6 percent. This pattern is surely very different from the US case, yet it 
is hardly surprising for two reasons. First, the data in Li et.al (2007) are collected when 
the price for polycrystalline silicon was 470 USD/kg, a price that experienced about a 97 
percent decline over the next five years.141 Second, the installation costs measured by Li 
et.al (2007) listed only the in-grid type, which contains the lowest costs among all types 
of installation (IRNEA 2012a). Therefore in the following sections, I will mainly use the 
																																																						
141 In 2012, the silicon price fell to only 20 USD/kg for leading Chinese polycrystalline silicon 
manufacturers, and 12 USD/kg for international leading manufacturers. From News on the 2013 China 
Solar PV Report. See: http://www.pv-tech.cn/guest_blog/semi_deliver_report_of_2013_pv_industry/P1. In 
the first quarter of 2014, the price has risen to 20.3 USD/kg. See Mike Munsell, Fastest Quarterly Growth 
in Polysilicon Prices since 2010, at http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Fastest-Quarterly-
Growth-in-Polysilicon-Prices-Since-2010, published on April 4th, 2014 and retrieved on September 27, 
2014. 
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latest available literature on the cost components of renewable energy technology, 
combined with China-specific information, to indicate the changes in recent years. 
  
3.4.6.3 Solar PV 
Table 3.5 presents the capital cost structure of a PV system, composed of the PV 
module cost and the balance of system (BOS) cost (IRENA 2012a). According to the 
IRENA (2012a) definition, the PV module cost is determined by raw material costs, 
notably silicon prices, cell processing/manufacturing and module assembly costs. The 
BOS cost includes the cost of the structural system (e.g. structural installation, racks, site 
preparation and other attachments), the electrical system costs (e.g. the inverter, 
transformer, wiring and other electrical installation costs) and the battery or other storage 
system cost in the case of off- grid applications (p 15).142 Note that the module cost data 
in the upper part of the table are the average world price level, while the BOS costs in the 
lower part are estimated based on US data (IRNEA, 2012a). Since the average selling 
price of solar PV modules has already converged among nations including China, the cost 
structure among countries should not vary significant.143 The real gap between countries, 
as will be shown later, lies in the installation costs. Therefore in this paper I will apply 
the cost structure information for all the other costs except the installation based on the 
Table 3.4 information. 
 
																																																						
142 Note that the use of BOS is slightly different in IRENA (2013, p51), where BOS are used to refer all 
costs excluding both the module costs and the installation costs. Here we still use BOS as including the 
installation costs for convenience. 
143 Solarbuzz November 30, 2012: Installed PV system continue to exhibit strong global variations. 
http://www.solarbuzz.com/resources/analyst-insights/installed-pv-system-costs-continue-to-exhibit-strong-
global-variations 
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From Table 3.5, we can see that the installation costs for solar PV vary with the 
nature of the installation. For utility-scale PV plants, it can be as low as 20 percent (for a 
simple grid- connected system) or as high as 70 percent (for an off-grid system). For 
residential and small-scale systems, the BOS and installation costs make up 55 percent to 
60 percent of total PV system costs. This variation also applies across countries (IRENA 
2013).   
Table 3.6 gives the cost structure for the Chinese Solar PV industry in 2012. From 
the available information, we can calculate the installation costs for a utility-scale 
ground-mounted system as 0.5 USD/Watt, which is about 23 percent of the total costs, 
very different from the information presented in Table 3 which is based on 2007 data.144 
Applying the information from Table 3.5 (all but the installation costs) and Table 
3.6, Table 3.7 presents the cost structure in detail for the Chinese Solar PV industry. 
Notice that this number is only for the utility-scale ground-mounted version. I also 
included the Table 3.4 information on the 2007 cost structure for comparison. Table 3.8 
presents the industries and weights for solar energy matched to the I-O model used in 
estimation.  
 
3.4.6.4 Wind 
Wind energy in China consists of two main categories: onshore and offshore wind 
power. According to IRENA (2013), offshore wind power installation usually has a much 
higher construction cost share than the onshore wind power installation (25 percent 
versus 10 percent). However, since offshore wind power constitutes less than 1 percent of 
																																																						
144 Total installed costs minus PV module costs minus BOS costs (except installation costs). The percentage 
is calculated by 0.5 divided by 2.2 
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the total installed wind power in China, the analysis in this paper will focus on the 
onshore wind power case.145  
Table 3.9 presents the world average cost structure of on-shore wind energy 
investment and the estimated cost structure for the Chinese case. Column by column, I 
show how I use the world average statistics on wind energy structure from IRENA 
(2012b) and IRENA (2013) to work out the China’s specific cost structure through 
combining the information on China’s total installed costs of on-shore wind energy. For 
example, column 1 and 2 show the world average statistics on the detailed cost 
components of wind energy sector. Column 3 transforms the weights of the components 
in the turbine building costs to the total costs. Column 4 applies these specific weights to 
the context of China with consideration of the feature of low-cost turbines and low total 
installed costs as well. As a result, total installed costs of wind energy in China amount to 
only about 1300 USD/kW in 2011, compared with the world average of 1700 to 2150 
USD/kW (IRENA 2012b). The last column aggregates the information in the previous 
columns. Table 3.10 presents the industries and weights for wind energy matched to the 
I-O model used in estimation. 
 
3.4.6.5 Bioenergy 
Bioenergy can be used either directly through combustion to produce heat, or 
indirectly after being converted to various forms of biofuel. Currently China’s biomass 
energy sources mainly come from agricultural stalks, animal manure, forestry sources 
																																																						
145 By the end of 2012, China had only installed 389.6 Megawatt (MW) offshore wind capacity, while the 
total installed capacity for on-grid wind power has reached 60830 MW. Source: China unable to achieve 
5GW offshore wind goal by 2015 (http://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1187293/analysis---china-
unable-achieve-5gw-offshore-wind-goal-2015) & China National Renewable Energy Center. 
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and bioenergy crops, and are used to produce heat, electricity, solid fuel, liquid fuel 
(biofuel ethanol, biodiesel, biofuel), and gasified fuel (methane gas, biogas and 
hydrogen). These are used by households (e.g. cooking and heating) and in transportation 
and electricity provision (Tian et. al 2011).  
For the purpose of estimating meaningful employment opportunities, this paper 
focuses the estimation for biofuel. More specifically, this paper estimates the 
employment impacts from using biofuel that relies on the “beneficial” biomass resources 
defined by the Union of Concerned Scientists.146 
 
3.4.6.6 Combustion 
Although using biomass sources to produce heat contributes to the reduction in 
consuming non-renewable energy sources, its employment impacts are not very 
significant. This is because the production and consumption of such energy takes place in 
individual households—collection of biomass sources (e.g. agricultural stalks and animal 
manure) involves negligible costs. The same applies to transportation costs of the energy 
(from outside the house where sources are picked up to inside house where heat is 
generated for cooking and heating purpose). All in all, even though labor and time are 
involved, they are largely undercompensated and are not considered to be a job as long as 
an industrial scale of production is not achieved. Employment generation occurs in the 
industrial sector that produces firewood stoves, which represent the only considerable 
																																																						
146 The Union of Concerned Scientists terms “beneficial” biomass resources that meet the following 
standards. First, energy crops that do not compete with food crops for land; Second, portions of crop 
residues such as wheat straw or corn stover; Third, sustainably harvested wood and forest residues; Fourth, 
clean municipal and industrial wastes. 
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costs (200 RMB per firewood stoves, or 32 USD) involved with household’s use of 
biomass energy (Tian et.al 2011).  
Given the limited employment impacts of direct use of biomass, this paper does not 
include combustion as an important source for employment generation. 
 
3.4.6.7 Biogas 
The Chinese government has been supporting the development of the biogas industry 
in rural China since 1958.147 The use of methane gas technology (specifically rural 
household methane gas and breeding farm methane gas) has been developed to a 
considerable scale mainly because the main sources that methane gas relied on—rotting 
garbage, agricultural and human waste—are easily accessible and do not threaten food 
security (Tian et.al 2011).148 However, biogas industry is developed for local use mostly 
and therefore it does not involve significant transportation costs such as in the biofuel 
industry. Also the main sources that biogas relies on does not involve agricultural 
activities that create significant amount of jobs. Therefore despite the fact that biogas is 
used at a much larger scale than biofuel in China at the moment, this paper does not 
include employment estimates for biogas due to its limited potential for employment 
generation (USDA FAS 2013).   
 
																																																						
147 China’s renewable energy development history: 1958-1008. Retrieved from Gansu Website of China, 
http://www.gscn.com.cn/pub/special/2009zt/gsxny/xny/2009/07/13/1247456273000.html, September 26, 
2014.  
148 According to Tian et. al (2011), other types of biomass energy (such as for solid fuel or methane gas 
from stalks) are still in the preliminary stage for commercialization.  
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3.4.6.8 Biofuel 
When a biomass energy source is converted into liquid form, it becomes biofuel. 
However, it is important to note that whether biofuel (i.e. ethanol and biodiesel) 
contributes to environmental sustainability will depend on its production processes. A 30-
year lifecycle analysis suggests that the overall level of greenhouse gas emissions of corn 
ethanol refined through coal-fired processing is actually 34 percent higher relative to that 
of burning gasoline.149 Instead, the way to achieve major emission reductions is by 
burning waste-grease biodiesel, corn stover ethanol, or switchgrass ethanol (Pollin et. al. 
2014b). 
Biofuel development is extremely labor-intensive from the world experience 
(Raswant et.al 2008), but it also raises the issues of food security especially in the 
developing countries (FAO 2008; Raswant et.al 2008; FAO 2013; Pollin et.al. 2014b). In 
China, corn-based ethanol production has been constrained since 2007 due to its potential 
threat to domestic food security.150 Alternative crops, like sweet sorghum or cassava, that 
grow on marginal land have relatively low yields and small-scale production, therefore 
have limited potential to support large-scale industrial ethanol production unless China 
seriously expands its production bases to mid-west regions or coastal saline areas (USDA 
FAS 2013).151 Moreover, development of sorghum or cassava-based biofuel would not 
																																																						
149 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2009, May. “EPA Lifecycle Analysis of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Renewable Fuels,” Office of Transportation and Air Quality. EPA-420-F-09-024. 
Retrieved from: http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=P100B3F8.txt 
150 Since then the trend of biofuel production has been reversed. The realized fuel ethanol production in 
2010 was only 1.86 million tonnes with 0.37 million tonnes using non-grain feedstocks”, far short of the 
target of 2 million tonnes of non-grain fuel ethanol consumption (Chang et.al 2012). 
151 To ensure a domestic feedstock supply for biofuel production, China will need to expand its production 
bases in Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, two regions with substantial sunshine and heat resources suitable for 
the planting of sweet sorghum, as well as in the Bohai Rim Region, where a five million-ton fuel ethanol 
production base can be built in the region’s large saline areas, as proposed by the government think tank 
Institute of Nuclear and New Energy Technology at Tsinghua University. See Liu Yuanyuan, China seeks 
to develop biofuel industry despite production difficulties. April 24, 2012, at 
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have a massive impact on employment generation unless China changes its current 
importer role and seriously starts to grow the feedstock domestically, since feedstock 
accounts for about 50 percent of the total cost of electricity produced by biomass 
technologies in China (Chang et.al 2012; IRENA 2013, p66).152 
Despite government’s tight control on all kinds of grain-based ethanol production, 
majority feedstocks for biofuel in production are still grain-based mainly because the 
technological development for alternatives was lagged behind.153 This also explains why 
biofuel development is stagnating in China.154 
In addition, China’s biodiesel industry still lacks a large scale of industrial 
production mainly due to the high cost and therefore inconsistent supplies of feedstocks 
(i.e. grease waste, or waste cooking oil).155 Even today, no national or provincial mandate 
exists for biodiesel usage (USDA FAS 2013). This paper excludes biodiesel in the biofuel 
employment calculation. 
The choice of feedstocks for biofuel production in China should be based on the 
following standards. First, they must be “beneficial” sources in the sense that they neither 
threaten food security nor incurring more GHG emission than burning gasoline; second, 
																																																						
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/04/china-seeks-to-promote-development-of-
biofuels-industry-despite-production-difficulties, retrieved September 27, 2014. 
152 Remarks retrieved from the introduction of Division of Biofuels and Bio-chemicals, Institute of Nuclear 
and New Energy Technology, Tsinghua University, on December 25, 2013, at 
http://www.inet.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/ineten/5761/index.html 
153 According to USDA FAS (2013), 64 percent of fuel ethanol production in China was sourced from corn, 
30 percent from wheat and 6 percent from cassava in 2012. 
154 Although the National Energy Bureau of China announced ambitious goal for developing biofuel, it still 
only accounts for less than one percent of China’s liquid fuel production in 2013. See USDA FAS 2013; A 
spokesperson for the National Energy Bureau said that the Chinese government has set a goal of utilizing 
five million tons of ethanol fuel during the "12th Five-Year Plan" period spanning 2011 to 2015, nearly 
doubling the goal set for the prior period (2006-2010). See Liu Yuanyuan, China seeks to develop biofuel 
industry despite production difficulties. April 24, 2012, at 
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/04/china-seeks-to-promote-development-of-
biofuels-industry-despite-production-difficulties, retrieved September 27, 2014. 
155 China new energy network. Why is the Chinese biodiesel industry developing so slow? See: 
http://www.newenergy.org.cn/html/01211/11211250543.html. Retrieved Oct 9, 2013. Also see USDA FAS 
(2013) for relevant discussion. 
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they should have minimal demand for soil quality (e.g. saline soil, desert, grassland, etc) 
given China’s already serious land intensiveness; third, they need to be labor-intensive 
(i.e. involve massive agricultural activities) to ensure significant amount of employment 
opportunities.  
Perhaps there is no single feedstock that meets all the standards. Switchgrass, for 
example, demands lowest soil quality and contains largest amount of emission reduction, 
yet its flexibility of growing conditions implies that it does not involve much agricultural 
activities that are the main sources of job creation.156157 Therefore a combination of 
different feedstocks is necessary for reaching the best outcome of biofuel development 
before any technological breakthrough.158  
 
3.4.6.9 Cost breakdown 
The costs for generating bioenergy power include three critical components (IRENA 
2013). The first part occurs in the process of growing biomass feedstocks. Feedstock cost 
usually represents 40 percent to 50 percent of the total cost of electricity produced by 
biomass technologies, varying by the transportation costs, labor costs involved and the 
quality of the biomass sources (IRENA 2013, p66). Prices for the biomass sources range 
between USD 10/tonne to USD 160/tonne (IRENA 2013, p67). 
																																																						
156 According to Pollin et.al (2014b), switchgrass-based biofuels have emission level 124 percent lower 
than the gasoline. See Table 3.5 Greenhouse gas emissions reductions for alternative biofuels and biomass 
energy sources. 
157 National Energy R&D Center for Non-food Biomass (NECE), Switchgrass, published on March 13th, 
2013 at http://necb.cau.edu.cn/ylzy/nyzw/lzj/2013-03-13/520.html, retrieved on September 27, 2014.  
158 Research and development for non-grain based biofuel production is still ongoing. See China Science 
Newspaper Biomass: Grain and energy can coexist at http://news.bioon.com/article/6655908.html, 
published on July 25th, 2013, retrieved on September 27, 2014. 
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The second cost component arises when biomass feedstocks are transformed into the 
energy form that will be used to generate heat and/or electricity, or in most cases, when 
biomass is transformed into biofuel. This includes the cost for the equipment (prime 
mover and fuel conversion system), fuel handling and preparation machinery. 
The last cost component is generated during the use of power generation 
technologies, including engineering, construction and planning costs. It also includes grid 
connection, roads and new infrastructure required for the project (IRENA 2013, p68). For 
non-OECD countries, such costs are estimated to be in the range of USD 600 to USD 
1400/kW (IRENA 2013,p68). 
Based on the statistics for some non-OECD countries, I use an average of the costs to 
represent the cost breakdown for China. The weighting for relevant sectors of biomass 
energy is shown in Table 3.11 below. Table 3.12 presents the industries and weights for 
bioenergy matched to the I-O model used in estimation. 
 
3.4.7 Traditional fossil fuel sectors 
3.4.7.1 Coal 
UNEP et. al (2008) found that modern coal-fired power plants are becoming much 
less labor-intensive than a decade ago. Specifically, nowadays a coal plant employs about 
270 workers for a 1200-megawatt facility, compared with older plants employing up to 
1000 workers for a 50 to 100-megawatt facility (p91). However, developing countries are 
still lagging behind advanced nations in applying the technology to reduce the labor-
intensiveness in the coal sector. 
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The coal sector in China distinguishes itself in its heavily weighted component of 
transportation costs. Since most coal mining activities are conducted in the western and 
northern part of China while major coal demand occurs in the eastern and southern part 
of China, coal transportation cost usually makes up about 55 percent to 60 percent of the 
consumer-end electricity costs (Mao et. al 2008). In addition to the transportation costs, 
coal-fired energy production costs include production costs on the coal-mining sites as 
well as the actual electricity generation costs occurred in the coal-fired power plant. Xie 
et.al (2011) show that 88 percent of the coal-fired power generation costs come from the 
coal products (including the mining, processing and transportation) and the rest (i.e. 
electricity distribution and other related services) only constitute 12 percent. Depending 
on these pieces of information from the existing literature, I construct the industries and 
weights for coal energy as in Table 3.13 matched to the I-O data. 
 
3.4.7.2 Oil/Natural Gas 
 The reason to combine oil and natural gas in the same industry, although they 
have a slight difference in their cost structure to produce energy, is that they are also 
combined in the input-output table. The process of using oil/natural gas to produce 
energy mainly depends on activities in mining, transportation, refining and chemical 
product manufacturing, as well as management-level activities (Cui et.al 2008). Table 
3.14 presents two case studies of oil production cost structure. The weighting adopted in 
this paper is based on their average. Table 3.15 presents the industries and weights for 
oil/ natural gas sector matched to the I-O model used in estimation. 
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3.5 Results and discussion 
3.5.1 Employment generation per million of USD 
Table 3.16 through 3.19 present the full set of results in terms of job created per $1 
million USD spent in both renewable energy and fossil fuel sectors. 
As we can see (Table 3.16), the bioenergy sector generates highest number of jobs 
with the same amount of spending level, with 224 direct jobs per $1 million. This 
contrasts with a range of about 27-29 for solar and wind energy due to the significant 
amount of agricultural-related activities involved in bioenergy production. It is also 
significantly higher than the direct jobs generation in the fossil fuel sectors, with range 
between 30 to 70 jobs per $1 million. In terms of indirect jobs—those jobs generated 
through the supply chains associated with renewable energy production—the three kinds 
of renewable energy sectors show relatively consistent estimates, about 60-70 jobs per $1 
million, and is much higher than the fossil fuel sectors with range between 40 to 50 jobs 
per $1 million.  
If equal weights are assigned across the three renewable energy sectors, then results 
suggest that spending $1 million on renewable energy generates about 162.3 jobs, 
including 93.1 direct and 69.2 indirect jobs on average. This contrasts with only 96.7 
jobs, including 49.5 direct and 47.1 indirect jobs, generated from $1 million overall 
spending on both coal and oil/gas.159 
 The results suggest that, for China, spending on the clean energy economy (with a 
combination of the three kinds of renewable energy focused in this paper) will produce 
about twice as many jobs per dollar of expenditure than an equal amount of spending on 
																																																						
159 This average number is also calculated by assigning equal weights to the two fossil fuel sectors. 
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fossil fuels. Thus a clean energy investment strategy will not destabilize the overall 
employment level in China relative to the investment strategy biased towards the fossil 
fuel energy sectors. 
 
3.5.2 Composition of Employment 
The informal workers mainly concentrate in the mining, construction, manufacturing, 
transportation sectors, which are also the significant components for the renewable 
energy and fossil fuel sectors. Table 3.17 presents the composition of employment in 
terms of formal and informal employment. As we can see, the bioenergy sector is 
constituted mostly (261 jobs or 90 percent of jobs) by employment in the informal 
economy. Those are the people growing or logging for bioenergy feedstock, as well as 
workers engaged in manufacturing equipment and machinery to transform feedstocks into 
the energy form that will be used to generate heat and/or electricity. 
On the other hand, three quarters of employment (or about 75 jobs per $1 million) 
created by solar and wind energy sectors are within the informal economy. Workers in 
the construction sector constitute a significant portion. Specific manufacturing sectors 
also contribute to the informal component of jobs in these two sectors. They include 
manufacturing of power transmission equipment and mining machinery for the solar 
energy sector (i.e. for the mining of polycrystalline silicon materials crucial for building 
solar panels), as well as manufacturing of metal products and other sectors related with 
building wind turbines.  
The fossil fuel energy sectors also have a high level of informal employment 
composition. In the oil and natural gas sector, 20.9 jobs (or 81 percent of the jobs) 
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generated from $1 million spending are within the informal economy. These are mostly 
workers on the field extracting oil and natural gas, corresponding to the informalization 
of the state-owned oil and natural gas enterprises in the recent decade. With respect to the 
coal energy sector, 78.6 jobs (or 70 percent of the jobs) generated from $1 million 
spending are within the informal economy. These are mostly workers in the railway 
transportation, mining and coking sectors. 
It is important to note that the amount of informal employment generation might be 
overestimated either due to the inclusion of small and medium scale private enterprises, 
or the fact that the final demand is only raising earnings instead of generating new 
employment especially for the self-employed population (as discussed in section 4.5). 
 
3.5.3 Cumulative employment generation 
In addition to the estimates of employment generation in terms of jobs per 
1$ million, this section presents the projection of the cumulative employment generation 
(jobs generated over certain time period). The difference here lies in the nature of the 
employment estimates as flows or stocks. Table 3.20 presents the cumulative 
employment generation for solar, wind and bioenergy according to the investment target 
in the 12th Five Year Plan period (2010-2015). Based on my estimation, the cumulative 
formal employment generation in the three renewable energy sectors adds up to 3.7 
million, among which direct jobs accounts for 1.7 million. When informal employment is 
included, the cumulative employment generation in the three sectors adds up to 19.1 
million, among which direct jobs accounts for 8.5 million. 
Table 3.21 presents the cumulative employment generation in the wind sector 
supposing the investment targets announced in the National Development and Reform 
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Commission are met. As we can see, the wind sector could generate about 12.5 million 
new jobs from 2010 to 2020 through investing a total of 264.4 billion USD, 57.2 million 
new jobs from 2010 to 2030 through 571.8 billion USD investment and 180.6 million 
new jobs from 2010 to 2050 through 1804.1 billion USD.  
Among these jobs generated, 6.5 million, 14.1 million and 44.6 million respectively 
are in the formal sector. If we take the annual average employment generation from the 
three ranges of years to approximate employment generation for the end-year for each 
period respectively, then we can roughly estimate that the wind sector generates 1.3 
million jobs in year 2020, 2.9 million jobs in year 2030, and 4.5 million jobs in year 
2050. This total employment in both formal and informal sectors would compare to 0.1, 
0.3 and 0.6 percent of the labor force for year 2020, 2030 and 2050 respectively.160  
Employment estimates for bioenergy and solar sectors are based on the assumption 
that investment in these two sectors follows the same growth rate as in the wind sector. 
The solar sector will generate relatively fewer employment opportunities than the wind 
sector, yet the numbers are still significant. Specifically, the solar sector will generate 
about 12.5 million new jobs by 2020, 27 million by 2030 and 85.1 million by 2050, 
among which 3.1 million, 6.7 million and 21.3 million are in the formal sector 
respectively, all relative to the 2010 level. The bioenergy will generate the largest number 
of jobs especially when informal employment is included. Specifically, it will generate 
employment for about 35.7 million new jobs by 2020, 43.3 million by 2030 and 136.6 
million by 2050, among which 1.7 million, 3.8 million and 11.9 million are in the formal 
																																																						
160 According to United Nations World Population Prospects (r. 2012), China’s working-age population 
(age 15 to age 60) will be 929, 875 and 700 million respectively for year 2020, 2030 and 2050, assuming 
constant fertility. See Table Population by Age Groups- Both Sexes at http://esa.un.org/wpp/Excel-
Data/population.htm 
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sector respectively, compared with the 2010 level. However, it should be noted that the 
formal and informal employment proportions in China should shift in favor of formal 
employment by year 2050. Therefore the estimates for the informal employment could be 
overestimated by then. 
 
3.5.4 Output-Investment Ratio (output multipliers) 
In this section, I compare the output multipliers over time to show their relative 
stability for all energy sectors in the past decade.161 The output multipliers tell the amount 
of output increase as a result of increase in final demand therefore providing information 
on the production relationships between sectors in the I-O table. The data was taken from 
the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), a project of the European Commission, which 
produces annual national I-O tables for a selected number of countries. For China, the 
WIOD tables are more aggregated (i.e. 35 sectors) than the one I used to produce the 
employment estimates in this paper (i.e. 135 sectors). I use the same weighting schemes 
that were applied to produce employment estimates to estimate output multipliers for 
synthetic sectors of both renewable and fossil fuels—the energy sectors that are not 
readily available in the original I-O tables. Table 3.22 presents the results. 
As we can see, for all the energy sectors, the annual average percentage changes in 
the output multipliers from 1995 to 2007 are negligible (all within the range of 1 percent 
in absolute values).162 This concludes that the production relationships between the 
																																																						
161 Output multipliers are calculated from the Leontief inverse for each of the four countries. The Leontief 
inverse matrix is given by L=(I-A)-1 in which L is the Leontief inverse matrix, I is the identify matrix, and 
A is the matrix of I-O coefficients derived from the WIOD tables. 
162 I intentionally choose year 2007 as end point to avoid cyclical complication by the 2008 economic 
crisis. 
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domestic sectors in China did not change significant over the 12-year period between 
1995 and 2007. This conclusion addresses the concerns for not incorporating dynamic 
elements in the model. It is now reasonable to assume that output multipliers would 
change only at a modest pace over the next two decades for which employment 
projection will be made. 
 On the other hand, changes in output multipliers from 2007 to 2011 vary among 
different sectors. Solar, wind and coal energy sectors still show relative consistent 
production relationships (with the range of changes in output multipliers within 1 percent 
in absolute values). Yet bioenergy and oil/gas sectors show moderately fast annual 
average changes in output multipliers (1.1 percent and -1.3 percent respectively).163 
However, since the changes are still not very dramatic, it is reasonable to think that the 
employment estimates will not be improved much by using the 2011 I-O table with only 
information on 35 aggregated sectors than to use the 2007 I-O table (with a detailed 
breakdown of 135 sectors) as this paper does.  
 
3.5.5 Productivity and declining Employment-Output (E/O) ratio 
Although more updated I-O tables are available for year 2010 (with 54 sectors) and 
year 2011 (with 35 sectors), the 2007 I-O table still provides the most sufficient details of 
the production relationship among sectors relevant for energy production. This is why 
this paper sticks to the 2007 I-O table to provide employment estimates for both 
																																																						
163 The decline of output multiplier in oil/natural gas sector in China can be explained by China’s growing 
imports of oil. In 2013, China has become the largest net imports of petroleum and other liquid fuels. See 
EIA, China is now the world’s largest net importer of petroleum and other liquid fuels at 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15531, published on Mar 24th 2014, retrieved on October 
13, 2014. 
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renewable and fossil fuel energy sectors. Since I-O table also provides information on 
gross output by sectors, lack of more updated I-O table with comparable level of details 
as in the 2007 I-O table means that even though more recent data are available for 
employment by sector, they are not compatible with the 2007 industry data and therefore 
cannot be utilized to calculate a more updated E/O ratio at a desired level of detail.  
To compensate for the lost information, I calculate the E/O ratio for period 2007 to 
2011 to show its general pattern in the post-2007 years, although it is defined more 
loosely and at a more aggregated level with a different unit compared with the E/O ratio I 
use for the major estimation.164 Note that the E/O ratio is simply the inverse of labor 
productivity therefore an increase in labor productivity will reduce the E/O ratio. I use the 
same weighting scheme to aggregate relevant sectors to synthetic energy sectors of 
interest to this paper.165 The results are presented in Table 3.23.  
As we can see, the coal sector has the most significant productivity gain among all 
energy sectors, almost twice the productivity gain for all renewable energy sectors. This 
increasing productivity suggests that for the same spending level, the employment 
generation in the coal sector will be much smaller now than five years ago. Although we 
observe that coal sector show comparable employment generation per $1 million relative 
to the renewable energy sectors in terms of both formal and informal employment, this 
result suggests that the coal sector will very quickly lose its “advantage” in terms of labor 
intensiveness. The oil and gas sector does not show productivity gain as dramatic as the 
																																																						
164 Note that the latest China Statistical Yearbook 2013 did not publish estimates gross output value or the 
annual average persons by industrial sector consistent with those published in previous yearbooks. Thus I 
exclude the 2012 data for comparison.  
165 Note that gross output data are not available for all the sectors relevant for the energy sectors (such as 
R&D and Transportation). Under such circumstances, it is assumed that these sectors with missing 
information will experience the same productivity changes as the weighted average of productivity changes 
in other relevant sectors for producing the same kind of energy.  
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other energy sectors, yet it is already the least labor-intensive energy sector among all. 
Thus it is reasonable to conclude that renewable energy sectors, compared with fossil fuel 
energy sectors, have the advantage over fossil fuel energy in terms of job creation in the 
long run. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This paper addresses the impacts of transformative renewable energy investment 
program for China. It focuses on estimating the relative employment impacts of 
investments in three renewable energy sectors in China, i.e. solar, wind and bioenergy, 
versus spending within China’s traditional fossil fuel sectors i.e. coal, oil and natural gas. 
The existing literature has never treated employment impacts of investing in 
renewable energy in China as a primary concern. Existing estimates either lack a 
transparent methodological discussion or do not provide a clear definition of employment 
as a concept. They are therefore incapable of serving as a solid empirical evidence for 
policy discussions on building a clean energy economy. 
This paper mainly builds on the Input-Output model to estimate the employment 
impacts of renewable energy investment in China. One challenge in using an I-O model 
to estimate how the increase in spending in certain renewable energy sectors affects the 
whole economy is that these renewable energy sector activities are not as yet specified 
into distinct industrial sectors, such as “solar energy sector” or “wind energy sector.” To 
solve this problem, I use information on the cost components of such investment from the 
existing literature and then use the existing sectors within the I-O model to construct 
synthetic renewable energy sectors within China’s I-O model. These synthetic sectors—
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for solar, wind and bioenergy respectively—are based on the weighting structure that 
reflects the composition of costs within each specific sector. 
Based on this estimation methodology, I find that the bioenergy sector generates 
highest number of jobs with a given level of spending. That is, I estimate that China’s 
bioenergy sector generates 224 direct jobs per $1 million of spending. This contrasts with 
a range of about 27-29 for solar and wind energy. The large difference here is the result 
of the significant amount of agricultural-related activities involved in bioenergy 
production. It is also significantly higher than the direct jobs generated through spending 
within China’s fossil fuel sectors, which generate about 30 to 70 jobs per $1 million of 
spending. In terms of indirect jobs—those jobs generated through the supply chains 
associated with renewable energy production—the three kinds of renewable energy 
sectors show relatively consistent estimates, about 60-70 jobs per $1 million, and is much 
higher than the fossil fuel sectors with range between 40 to 50 jobs per $1 million. If 
equal weights are assigned across the three renewable energy sectors, then results suggest 
that spending $1 million on renewable energy generates about 162.3 jobs, including 93.1 
direct and 69.2 indirect jobs on average. This contrasts with only 96.7 jobs, including 
49.5 direct and 47.1 indirect jobs, generated from $1 million overall spending on both 
coal and oil/gas. 
 In terms of formal and informal employment, with China’s bioenergy sector, to 
begin with, job creation is heavily weighted toward informal jobs—specifically, about 90 
percent, or 261 jobs per $1 million will be informal jobs. The proportions of informal 
jobs are somewhat lower—at about 75 percent—with the solar and wind energy sectors. 
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Within China’s fossil fuel energy sectors, informal job creation is about 81 percent in the 
oil and gas sector and 70 percent in the coal sector. 
If the investment target of the 12th Five Year Plan is met, then the total formal 
employment generation in the three renewable energy sectors adds up to 3.7 million from 
2010-2015, among which direct jobs accounts for 1.7 million. When informal 
employment is included, the total employment generation in the three sectors adds up to 
19.1 million, among which direct jobs accounts for 8.5 million. 
Supposing the investment targets announced by the National Development and 
Reform Commission are met, cumulative employment generation in the wind sector will 
amount to 12.5 million new jobs from 2010 to 2020, 57.2 million from 2010 to 2030 and 
180.6 million from 2010 to 2050. Among these jobs generated, 6.5 million, 14.1 million 
and 44.6 million respectively are in the formal sector. If we take the annual average 
employment generation from the three ranges of years to approximate employment 
generation for the end-year for each period respectively, then we can roughly estimate 
that the wind sector generates 1.3 million jobs in year 2020, 2.9 million jobs in year 2030, 
and 4.5 million jobs in year 2050. This total employment in both formal and informal 
sectors would compare to 0.1, 0.3 and 0.6 percent of the labor force for year 2020, 2030 
and 2050 respectively.  
Based on the same assumption, the solar sector will generate about 12.5 million new 
jobs by 2020, 27 million by 2030 and 85.1 million by 2050, among which 3.1 million, 6.7 
million and 21.3 million are in the formal sector respectively, all relative to the 2010 
level. The bioenergy will generate the largest number of jobs especially when informal 
employment is included. Specifically, it will generate about 35.7 million new jobs by 
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2020, 43.3 million by 2030 and 136.6 million by 2050, among which 1.7 million, 3.8 
million and 11.9 million are in the formal sector respectively, relative to the 2010 level. 
However, it should be noted that the formal and informal employment proportions in 
China should shift in favor of formal employment by year 2050. Therefore the estimates 
for the informal employment could be overestimated by then. 
The overall implication of this study is that a clean energy investment strategy will 
not destabilize the overall employment level in China relative to the investment strategy 
biased towards the fossil fuel energy sectors. The challenges of raising job quality 
standards in China’s energy economy will nevertheless remain substantial. 
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Table 3.1. Employment estimates of investing renewable energy in the existing 
literature (continued onto next page) 
 
Studies Methodology 
Specify 
sectors 
Specify formal 
or informal 
employment 
Specify 
direct or 
indirect jobs 
Specify job 
creation 
relative to 
spending 
level 
Stock or 
flow 
Total 
employmen
t generation 
for 
renewable 
energy 
investment 
(million) 
UNEP et.al 
(2008) 
Interview 
officials and 
experts 
Wind, solar 
and 
biomass 
No No No 
Stock; “by 
2007” 
0.9 
CREIA 
(2009) 
NA NA No No No Flow; 2008 1.1 
CASS 
(2010) 
2005 I-O 
table of three 
aggregated 
levels 
Wind and 
solar  
No Yes 
580 billion 
RMB 
Stock; 
2008-2011 
30 
China’s 12th 
Five Year 
Plan (2011) 
NA Bioenergy No No 
1.8 trillion 
RMB 
Stock; 
2011-2015 
3.6 
CCICED 
(2011) 
NA NA No No $909 billion 
Stock; 
2011-2015 
10.6 
IRENA 
(2011) 
Literature 
survey 
Wind, solar 
thermal and 
solar PV166 
No No No 
Stock; “by 
2010” 
0.3 
																																																						
166 Solar thermal technology first translates the sun’s light to heat and then to electricity, while solar PV 
directly converts the sun’s light to electricity. Therefore solar PV technology is only effective during 
daylight hours as storing electricity is not a particularly efficient process as compared to heat storage.  
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Greenpeace 
(2012) 
Assuming 14 
person/years 
of 
employment 
for every new 
megawatt and 
€23 billion of 
annual 
investment 
Wind No No 
Annual 
average of 
€23 billion 
Stock; by 
2020 
0.3 
NDRC 
(2012) 
NA Wind  No No 
1.8 trillion 
RMB 
Stock; by 
2050 
0.7 
REN21 
(2013) 
Literature 
survey 
Wind, solar 
and 
biomass 
No Yes No 
Stock; 
2009-2012 
1.7 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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Table 3.2. Annual average wage (RMB) comparison between urban unit employees 
and rural migrant workers 
 
  Urban unit 
employees 
Rural migrant 
workers 
Rural wages as a share 
of the Urban Wages 
2008 28,898 16,080 56% 
2009 32,244 17,004 53% 
2010 36,539 20,280 56% 
2011 41,799 24,588 59% 
2012 46,769 27,480 59% 
 
Source: Table 4-11 China Statistical Yearbook 2013 and National report on rural migrant workers 
in 2013. 
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Table 3.3. Urban employment and urban units employment in 2007 and 2012 (in 
millions) 
 
Category 2007 % 2012 % 
Urban employment (million) 293.5 100 371.0 100 
Urban units employment 120.2 41.0 152.4 41.1 
   State-owned Units 64.2 21.9 68.4 18.4 
   Collective-owned Units 7.2 2.5 5.9 1.6 
   Other Ownership Units 48.8 16.6 78.1 21.1 
Urban informal employment 173.3 59.0 218.6 58.9 
Urban private enterprises 45.8 15.6 75.6 20.4 
 Self-employment 33.1 11.3 56.4 15.2 
Not formally counted 94.4  32.2 86.6  23.3 
 
Source: China Labor Statistical Yearbook 2008 and 2012, Table 1-1. Details of urban 
private enterprises and self-employed are retrieved from Table 4-14 and Table 4-15 in 
China Statistical Yearbook (2008); Table 4-8 and Table 4-9 in China Statistical Yearbook 
(2013). 
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Table 3.4. In-grid solar PV electricity investment costs in 2006 
 
Item Percentage (%) 
Research 2 
Industrial design 2 
Solar PV battery (including the 
panels) 66 
      Silicon 45.2 
      Battery 10.0 
      Electronic components 10.8 
GCI (grid connector inverter) 10 
Electricity distribution measuring 
and cables 10 
Transportation 1.6 
Installation and testing 3.6 
Grid connection testing 1.6 
Tax and other expenses 3.2 
 
Source: Li et.al (2007)  
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Table 3.5. Cost components of Solar PV of roof-top and ground-mounted types 
 
 
Source: Calculated by author based on IRENA (2012) Figure 4.2 and 4.5. 
  
 Utlity Scale Residential Scale 
 In-grid Off-grid    
Module cost 80% 30% 50% 
Silicon materials 40 15 25 
Cell processing/ 
manufacturing 20 7.5 12.5 
Module assembling 20 7.5 12.5 
BOS cost 20% 70% 50% 
 Roof- top Ground- mounted Roof- top 
Ground- 
mounted Roof- top 
Ground- 
mounted 
Inverter 2 3 8 9 5 6 
Mounting and racking 
components 6 6 21 22 15 16 
Combiner box and 
miscellaneous electrical 
components 
1 2 5 5 3 4 
Site preparation and 
installation, labor costs 5 3 18 12 13 9 
Battery storage 1 1 4 4 3 3 
System design, 
management, etc 4 5 15 18 11 13 
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Table 3.6. Cost Structure for the Chinese Solar PV industry in 2012 
 
Category USD/Watt 
PV module costs 0.75 
BOS costs except 
installation costs for 
utility-scale system 
(ground-mounted) 
0.95 
Total installed costs for 
ground-mounted system 2.2 
 
Source: Compiled by author based on IRENA (2013), p52-5 
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Table 3.7. Detailed cost structure for the Chinese Solar PV industry in 2012 
 
 USD per Watt Percentage in 2012 
Percentage in 
2007 
PV module costs 0.75 34.1 45.2 
Silicon materials  17  
Cell processing/ 
manufacturing  8.5  
Module assembling  8.5  
BOS costs except 
installation costs 0.95 43.2 49.6 
Inverter  7.6 10 
Mounting and racking 
components  15.2 11.6 
Combiner box and 
miscellaneous electrical 
components 
 5.1 10.8 
Battery storage  2.5 10 
System design, 
management, etc  12.7 7.2 
Installation costs 0.5 22.7 5.2 
Site preparation and 
installation, labor costs  22.7  
 
Source: Calculated by author based on Table 3 to Table 5 
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Table 3.8. Industries and Weights for Solar Energy in the I-O Models 
 
I-O Industry Weight (%) 
Mining of Non-Ferrous Metal Ores 17.1 
Smelting of Non-Ferrous Metals and 
Manufacture of Alloys 
8.5 
Manufacture of Equipments for Power 
Transmission and Distribution and Control 
11.1 
Manufacture of Other Electronic Equipment 12.7 
Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery for 
Mining, Metallurgy and Construction 
15.2 
Research and Experimental Development 12.7 
Construction 22.7 
 
Source: calculation by author based on Table 6 
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Table 3.9. On-shore wind energy cost structure: the world average versus China 
(continued onto next page) 
 
World 
average cost 
structure 
  
Cost in 
China 
(USK/kw) 
Weights 
(%) 
Turbine cost 
(64% to 84%) 
Rotor blades (glass 
fibre, eposxy resin or 
polyster) 
50%~60% of the 
turbine costs, or 
32% to 50% of 
the total costs 
610 
28 
Tower 
Gearbox 
Generator, transformer, 
power converter 
13% of the 
turbine costs, 
therefore 8.3% to 
11% of the total 
costs 
7 
Other costs 
(miscellaneous costs 
associated with tower, 
such as rotor hub, 
cabling and rotor 
shafts) 
3% to 43.7% of 
the turbine costs 
12 
Civil works 
(4% to 16%) 
Construction of access 
roads and other related 
infrastructure required 
for the wind farm 
 260 22 
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Transportation and 
installation of wind 
turbine and towers 
 
Grid 
connection 
costs (9% to 
14%) 
Connection to the local 
distribution or 
transmission network 
 260 18 
Planning and 
project costs 
(4% to 10%) 
  169 13 
Total   1300  
 
Source: Author's own calculation based on IRENA 2012b, p19&p24; IRENA (2013). 
Note: Italicized numbers are calculated by author assuming world average cost share. 
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Table 3.10. Industries and Weights for Wind Energy in the I-O Models 
 
I-O Industry Weight (%) 
Research and Experimental Development 13 
Construction 22 
Manufacture of Synthetic Materials 10 
Manufacture of Boiler and Prime Mover 7 
Manufacture of Metal Products 30 
Manufacture of Equipments for Power 
Transmission and Distribution and Control 
10 
Production and Supply of Electric Power and 
Heat Power 
8 
 
Source: calculation by author based on Table 8 
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Table 3.11. Bioenergy cost structure 
 
 
 Weight (%) 
Grow and transport biomass feedstock 45 
Prime mover and fuel and conversion system 31.5 
Fuel handling and preparation machinery  4.5 
Infrastructure& logistics 7.7 
Civil works 7.3 
Grid connection 3 
Planning 1 
 
Source: Author's own calculation based on IRENA 2013 
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Table 3.12. Industries and Weights for Bioenergy in the I-O Models 
 
I-O Industry Weight (%) 
Agriculture 25 
Forestry 20 
Manufacture of Lifters 36 
Construction 15 
Manufacture of Equipment for Power 
Transmission and Distribution and Control 
3 
Research and Experimental Development 1 
 
Source: calculation by author based on Table 10 
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Table 3.13. Industries and Weights for Coal in the I-O Models 
 
I-O Industry Weight (%) 
Mining and Washing of Coal 18 
Coking 18 
Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery for 
Mining, Metallurgy and Construction 
1 
Production and Supply of Electric Power and 
Heat Power 
10 
Transport Via Railway 51 
Other Services 2 
 
Source: calculation by author based on Mao et.al (2008) and Xie et.al (2011) 
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Table 3.14. Cost structure of Oil/Natural Gas energy 
   
     
 Case study 1 Case study 2 Average  
Material Cost 26.5 12.5 19.5 
Mining 
Wage and Compensation 4.2 4.7 4.45 
Mining Cost (well-injecting fee, 
labor under-well fee, well testing 
fee, maintenance and repair costs, 
etc) 
25.8 54.8 40.3 
Transportation fee 7.9 4.8 6.35 Transportation 
Management 35.6 23.2 29.4 R&D 
Source: Bing et.al (2008)     
Note: Case study 1 is based on data from China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC); 
Case study 2 is based on data from China Petroleum and Chemical Cooperation (or SINOPEC) 
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Table 3.15. Industries and weights for oil/gas energy in the I-O Models 
 
I-O Industry Weight (%) 
Extraction of Petroleum and Natural Gas 50 
Processing of Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 20 
Transport Via Pipeline 5 
Other Services 25 
 
Source: calculation by author based on Table 14 
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Table 3.16. Total employment generation in renewable energy and fossil fuel energy 
sectors (unit: jobs per $1 Million) 
 
  Direct Indirect Direct+ Indirect 
Renewables 
(average) 
93.1 69.2 162.3 
Solar PV 28.1 72.0 100.1 
Wind 27.1 73.0 100.1 
Bioenergy 224.0 62.5 286.4 
        
Fossil Fuels 
(average) 
49.5 47.1 96.7 
Coal 68.0 43.6 111.6 
Oil/Natural Gas 31.0 50.7 81.7 
 
Source: Author's own calculation 
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Table 3.17. Formal and informal employment share in total employment in 
renewable energy and fossil fuel energy sectors 
 
  
Total 
employment 
(jobs per $1 
Million) 
Formal 
employment 
share 
Informal 
employment 
share 
Renewables       
Solar PV 100.1 26% 74% 
Wind 100.1 25% 75% 
Bioenergy 286.4 9% 91% 
        
Fossil Fuels       
Coal 111.6 30% 70% 
Oil/Natural 
Gas 
81.7 19% 81% 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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Table 3.18. Formal employment generation in renewable energy and fossil fuel 
energy sectors (unit: jobs per $1 Million) 
 
  Direct Indirect Direct+ Indirect 
Renewables       
Solar PV 11.0 14.7 25.7 
Wind 9.8 14.9 24.7 
Bioenergy 13.2 11.7 24.9 
        
Fossil Fuels       
Coal 23.5 9.5 33.0 
Oil/Natural 
Gas 
10.1 5.8 15.9 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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Table 3.19. Informal employment generation in renewable energy and fossil fuel 
energy sectors (unit: jobs per $1 Million of USD) 
 
  Direct Indirect Direct+ Indirect 
Renewables       
Solar PV 17.1 57.3 74.4 
Wind 17.3 58.1 75.4 
Bioenergy 210.8 50.8 261.4 
        
Fossil Fuels       
Coal 44.5 34.1 78.6 
Oil/Natural Gas 20.9 44.9 65.8 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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Table 3.20. Total Employment generation between 2010 to 2015 
 
    
Target investment in 
2010-2015 (billion 
USD) 
Total Formal 
Employment 
generation in 2010- 
2015 (million jobs) 
Formal + Informal 
Employment 
generation in 2010- 
2015 (million jobs) 
Solar 
Direct 40.3 0.5 
1.0 
1.1 
Total 25 4.0 
Wind 
Direct 85.5 0.8 
2.1 
2.3 
Total 24.7 8.6 
Bioenergy 
Direct 22.6 0.3 
0.6 
5.1 
Total 25 6.5 
   
Source: Author's own calculation based on the investment information from National 
Development and Reform Commission (2012), 12th Five Year Plan on the renewable 
energy development p37. 
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Table 3.21. Cumulative employment generation by 2020, 2030 and 2050 relative to 
2010 level 
 
    
Cumulative investment 
target (billion USD)  
Formal Sector: 
cumulative 
employment 
generation 
(millions) 
Formal and Informal 
Sector: cumulative 
employment 
generation (millions) 
  2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050 2020 2030 2050 
Solar 
Direct 
124.6 269.5 850.4 
1.6 3.6 11.2 3.5 7.6 23.9 
Total 3.1 6.7 21.3 12.5 27.0 85.1 
Wind 
Direct 
264.4 571.8 1804.1 
2.6 5.6 17.7 3.4 15.5 48.9 
Total 6.5 14.1 44.6 12.5 57.2 180.6 
Bioenergy 
Direct 
69.9 151.1 476.9 
0.9 2.0 6.3 27.9 33.9 106.8 
Total 1.7 3.8 11.9 35.7 43.3 136.6 
 
Source: Author's calculation based on the investment target in National Development and 
Reform Commission (2012), China's wind energy development roadmap, Table 3-2.  
Note: Investment target for wind is direct in National Development and Reform 
Commission (2012). Investment target for bioenergy and solar is derived based on the 
assumption that they share the same growth rate with that for the wind energy sector. 
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Table 3.22. Output multipliers and percentage changes in energy sectors in China, 
1995-2011 
 
  1995 2007 2011 1995 to 2007 2007 to 2011 
Renewables       Annual average % increase 
Solar 2.41 2.56 2.64 0.5% 0.7% 
Wind 2.40 2.56 2.58 0.6% 0.2% 
Bioenergy 2.17 2.31 2.41 0.5% 1.1% 
            
Fossil fuels           
Coal 2.05 2.15 2.14 0.4% -0.1% 
Oil and Natural Gas 2.18 2.17 2.06 -0.1% -1.3% 
 
Source: Author's calculation based on World Input-Output Database 
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Table 3.23. Productivity changes in energy sectors in China 
 
Measured as the inverse of productivity: Number of persons 1 million of RMB 
 
  2007 2011 2007 to 2011 
Renewables     Annual Average 
Percentage change  
Solar 3.19 2.03 -9.1% 
Wind 3.19 2.02 -9.2% 
Bioenergy 3.23 2.14 -8.4% 
        
Fossil fuels       
Coal 2.67 1.22 -13.6% 
Oil and Natural Gas 0.91 0.78 -3.6% 
 
Source: Author's calculation based on Table 13-2 or 14-2 Main Indicators of Industrial 
Enterprises above Designated Size by Industrial Sector from China Statistical Yearbook 
2008-2012. Price index based on Table 9-1, China Statistical Yearbook 2012. Data for 
productivity for construction sector is calculated based on Table 15-34 CSY 2012 and 
Table 14-36 in CSY 2008. 
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Figure 3.1. Typical cost components for renewable power generation technologies by 
region167 
 
 
Source: Extracted from IRENA (2013) Figure 2.3 
 
  
																																																						
167 Solar photovoltaic (PV) directly converts solar energy into electricity using a PV cell made of a 
semiconductor material. Concentrating solar power (CSP) devices concentrate energy from the sun’s rays 
to heat a receiver to high temperatures. This heat is transformed first into mechanical energy (by turbines or 
other engines) and then into electricity – solar thermal electricity (STE). See definition from IEA, at 
http://www.iea.org/topics/solarpvandcsp/. Other renewable energy sources in the figure are self-
explanatory. 
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